




# CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2011

Heidelberg Institute for  
International Conflict Research



disputes  
non-violent crises  
violent crises  
limited wars  
wars

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2011 ON NATIONAL LEVEL



■ : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT  
■ : CRISIS  
■ : LIMITED WAR  
■ : WAR

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### VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2011 ON SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

Analyzed Period  
12/01/2010 - 12/31/2011

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg is a registered non-profit association. It is dedicated to research, evaluation and documentation of intra- and interstate political conflicts. The HIK evolved from the research project »COSIMO« (Conflict Simulation Model) led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch (University of Heidelberg) and financed by the German Research Association (DFG) in 1991.

## GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

Between December 2010 and December 2011, a total of 388 conflicts were observed. Among these were twenty wars and eighteen limited wars, amounting to 38 highly violent conflicts. Another 148 conflicts were classified as violent crises, thereby exceeding last year's all-time high.

The remaining 202 conflicts were conducted without violent means, with 87 conflicts being judged as non-violent crises and 115 as disputes. Compared to the previous year, the total number of conflicts increased by eighteen, from 370 to 388. Most significant was the increase in the number of wars, from six cases in 2010 to twenty in 2011, while limited wars decreased by four from last year's 22 cases. Furthermore, the number of crises rose by nine, from 139 to 148. In contrast, the number of non-violent conflicts decreased by two, with a drop of non-violent crises from 108 to 87 and a simultaneous rise of disputes from 95 to 115.

With this year's total of twenty, the number of wars reached an all-time high since the beginning of the observation period in 1945. Three new conflicts started as wars in 2011, all of them in the context of the Arab Spring protests and located in the region of Middle East and Maghreb: Yemen (various opposition groups), Libya (opposition), and Syria (various opposition groups). The six wars which had already been observed in 2010 remained on the same level of intensity in 2011: Iraq (Sunni militant groups), Afghanistan (Taliban et al.), Pakistan (various Islamist militant groups), Sudan (Darfur), Somalia (Islamist groups), and Mexico (drug cartels). Furthermore, eleven already existing conflicts escalated into wars in 2011. Only the conflict in Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners) escalated from a non-violent level into war, whereas six former violent crises turned to wars: Egypt (various opposition groups), Côte d'Ivoire (opposition), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan), Sudan (inter-ethnic violence) [since July South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)], and Sudan (SPLM/A – various militias) [since July South Sudan (various militias)]. Additionally, four former limited wars were fought out as wars in 2011: Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas), Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia), Myanmar


(KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State), and Pakistan (Mohajirs – Balochis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis).

Among the eighteen limited wars monitored, three erupted anew in 2011. One of them also occurred in the course of the Arab Spring protests [→Tunisia (various opposition groups)], two emerged due to the independence of South Sudan on July 9 [→Sudan – South Sudan, Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. Another six conflicts escalated from violent crises in 2010 into limited wars in 2011: Mauritania (AQIM), Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas), Thailand – Cambodia (border), Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State), DR Congo (FDLR), and Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels). The remaining nine limited wars had already been fought out on this level of intensity in 2010: Algeria (AQIM), Israel ( Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory), India (Naxalites), Pakistan (Taliban – various tribes), Thailand (various Islamist separatist / southern border provinces), Uganda (LRA), Colombia (FARC), Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups), and Russia (Islamist militants / Dagestan).


Eighteen new conflicts emerged in 2011. All new conflicts observed started violently in the very year of their beginning, six of them on a highly violent level. Most affected was the region of Middle East and Maghreb, accounting for thirteen new violent conflicts, among them three wars and one limited war. Furthermore, three new crises started in Asia and Oceania, while two limited wars erupted in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Seven conflicts were considered to have ended during the observation period. Three of these were located in Sub-Saharan Africa, two in the Americas, and one each in Asia and Oceania, as well as in Europe. While conflicts in DR Congo (Enyele – Boba), Somalia (al-Shabaab – Hizbul Islam), Colombia – Ecuador, and Russia – Norway (Barents Sea) were solved by treaties or agreements between the conflict parties, Canada's (Bloc Québécois / Quebec) was considered to have ended after the conflict actor Bloc Québécois had lost its party status. The conflict between Bangladesh and India was resolved due to the improved relations between the two states [→Bangladesh – India]. Furthermore, the conflict between the Khartoum govern-

GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN  
2011 COMPARED TO 2010



GLOBAL CONFLICTS OF LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH  
INTENSITY 1945 TO 2011



ment of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ended with the independence of South Sudan on July 9, but was subsequently succeeded by the conflict between Sudan and the new state [→ Sudan – South Sudan].

In order to reveal a long-term trend, the five intensity levels were categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels were summarized as low intensity conflicts, while limited wars together with wars, as conflicts of high intensity. For this purpose violent crises were labeled medium intensity conflicts. As the graph below shows, the number of conflicts observed rose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 388 in

2011. However, this increase must partly be considered as a statistical artifact, as the scope and quality of available information on current conflicts augmented considerably in recent decades. Most of the observed conflicts were conflicts of low intensity. With regard to high intensity conflicts, their number increased almost constantly until 1992, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high-intensity conflicts shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, its number dropped sharply, but then rose again until it reached 45 in 2003. In the last eight years, the number of highly violent conflicts has ranged between 31 and 41.

## ANALYSIS INTRASTATE - INTERSTATE


With 301 intrastate and 87 interstate cases, internal conflicts accounted for more than three quarters of the conflicts monitored in 2011.

Two interstate conflicts over territory were fought out as limited wars in 2011, one in Sub-Saharan Africa and one in the region of Asia and Oceania. After the independence of South Sudan in July, a highly violent territorial conflict with Sudan succeeded the former secession conflict, accounting for the sole limited war between two states in this region [→ Sudan – South Sudan, Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)]. In Asia and Oceania, the territorial conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over border demarcation turned highly violent. More than 30,000 civilians were displaced in February on both sides due to constant fighting.


Five interstate violent crises were observed, with both Pakistan and Israel each accounting for two conflicts with other

states. Pakistan's conflict with the USA, as well as the territorial and power conflict with India, remained violent. Israel was involved in violent conflicts with Syria, on the one hand, and Lebanon, on the other. In the latter cases, protests commemorating the 1948 Arab-Israeli war escalated on May 15, with Israeli border patrol killing numerous demonstrators approaching the Israeli border from the Lebanese and the Syrian sides. As in previous years, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh remained the sole interstate crisis in Europe. In the Americas, however, no violent interstate conflicts were observed. The long-term analysis of conflicts since 1945, for which both limited wars and wars were summarized in one group of high-intensity conflicts, clearly shows that the intrastate preponderance among the highly violent conflicts sustains.

NUMBER OF INTRA- AND INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN 2011 BY INTENSITY LEVEL



INTRA- AND INTERSTATE CONFLICTS OF HIGH INTENSITY 1945 TO 2011



## REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

With 124 cases, almost one third of all conflicts was located in the region of Asia and Oceania, accounting again for the highest number among the five regions. Sub-Saharan Africa ranked second with 91, followed by Europe with 65, the Middle East and Maghreb with 62, and the Americas with 46.

Regarding the highly violent conflicts, the Middle East and Maghreb accounted for thirteen high-intensity conflicts, closely followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with twelve. Among these were eight wars in each of both regions. In Asia and Oceania, eight highly violent conflicts, among them three wars, were observed

in 2011. While the Americas accounted for three limited wars and one war, only one limited war was observed in Europe.


The regions of Europe, Asia and Oceania, as well as the Americas saw no considerable change in the number of high-intensity conflicts. Compared to 2010, the number of highly violent conflicts in Europe decreased from two to one, and in Asia and Oceania from nine to eight. In the Americas, the number of highly violent conflicts rose from three to four. The remaining two regions showed a steep increase of high-intensity conflicts. With twelve cases, the number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa doubled; while it rose from eight to thirteen in the Middle East and Maghreb.

As the number of limited wars dropped or remained the same in each region, except the Americas, the increased total of highly violent conflicts could be ascribed to the significant surge of wars in the Middle East and Maghreb and in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Relating the number of high-intensity conflicts to the number of states within the respective region, it appears that the Middle East and Maghreb was again worst affected by severe violence as it accounted for 0.4 highly violent conflicts per state. Sub-Saharan Africa followed second with 0.25, thereby

surpassing Asia and Oceania, with 0.19 high-intensity conflicts per state.

### DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS IN 2011 BY REGION AND INTENSITY TYPE



## DYNAMICS WITHIN INDIVIDUAL CONFLICTS

As in the preceding years, almost two thirds of all conflicts monitored, i.e. 251 out of 388 conflicts, remained on the same intensity level in 2010 and 2011. In total, 55 conflicts escalated, fifteen of which by two and one by three levels of intensity, while 64 conflicts de-escalated. Among the latter, 53 cases de-escalated by one level, ten by two levels, and one by three levels.

Half of the de-escalating cases turned from violent to non-violent conflicts. Among them were 21 violent crises de-escalating by one level to non-violent crises. In addition, all conflicts which de-escalated by two levels were carried out non-violently in the period of review. Eight of those de-escalated from violent crises to disputes [→Bolivia (opposition), Comores (Anjouan, Mohéli), Ecuador (opposition groups), Indonesia (Bugis – Dayaks / Kalimantan), Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh / Aceh), Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam), Macedonia (Albanian minority / northwestern Macedonia), Pakistan (opposition)]. Further two conflicts de-escalated from limited wars to non-violent crises: The subnational predominance conflict between Enyele fighters and the DR Congo government and the conflict over subnational predominance and resources between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. The subnational predominance conflict between the Shiite Yemeni al-Houthi rebels and the Saudi Arabian government turned from a limited war to a dispute, thus de-escalating by three intensity levels.

In contrast to the de-escalating cases, 54 conflicts escalated. In all, 33 conflicts crossed the threshold to violence: 23 non-violent crises escalated by one level to violent crises, while nine conflicts escalated by two levels. The latter were set as follows: Eight disputes escalated to violent crises, i.e. Belarus (opposition), Brazil (MST), Chile (social movements), DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UDPS, UNC), Egypt (Islamist groups), Kuwait (Bedouns), Malaysia (opposition movement), Somalia (Somaliland - SSC), and South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal). One conflict

escalated by three levels from a non-violent crisis to a war: In Nigeria, violence between the mainly Muslim Northerners and mainly Christian Southerners, the ethnically, culturally, and economically divided inhabitants of the northern and southern parts of the country, erupted after the presidential elections and resulted in an estimated 800 casualties and approx. 65,000 displaced in the northern part of the country [→Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners)].

Further six conflicts escalated by two levels from a violent crisis to a war. These were three conflicts in Sudan [→Sudan (inter-ethnic violence) since July South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence), Sudan (SPLM/A - various militias) since July South Sudan (various militias), Sudan (SPLM/A - South Sudan)], the struggles for national power in Côte d'Ivoire and Egypt [→Côte d'Ivoire (opposition), Egypt (various opposition groups)], and the conflict between the Boko Haram sect and the Nigerian government [→Nigeria (Boko Haram)].

| Change of intensity          | Number |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Escalation by four levels    | 0      |
| Escalation by three levels   | 1      |
| Escalation by two levels     | 15     |
| Escalation by one level      | 39     |
| No change                    | 251    |
| Deescalation by one level    | 53     |
| Deescalation by two levels   | 10     |
| Deescalation by three levels | 1      |
| Deescalation by four levels  | 0      |



## CONFLICT ITEMS


As in preceding years, system/ideology with 130 cases was the most prevalent conflict item in 2011. Conflicts involving this item were conducted with the aim to change the political, socioeconomic or cultural order. As in previous years, resources and national power followed with 84 and 81 cases, respectively. Since many conflicts centered on more than one item, a single conflict might occur twice or more times in this analysis. Frequent combinations of conflict items were system/ideology and national power, subnational predominance and resources, as well as territory and resources.

The conflict item most prone to violence proved to be secession, i.e. the motivation to separate a territory from an existing state in order to create a new state or to join another. In 73 percent of the secession conflicts, the use of violence was observed. In contrast, demands for autonomy were articulated violently in only one third of the cases. The item autonomy refers to the aim of a group or region to gain more political, socioeconomic or cultural rights within an existing state. Subnational predominance, i.e. attaining de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population, ranked second with 67 percent violent conflicts. System/ideology and national power closely followed with 64 and 62 percent violent cases, respectively. Almost half of the resource conflicts were fought out violently. In comparison, 14 percent of the conflicts on territory or international power, respectively, were carried out violently. Therefore, these conflict items, which exclusively occur in interstate conflicts, were less prone to violence than the other items.

The world regions differed considerably concerning the frequency of conflict items. System/ideology, the globally most frequent conflict item, was predominant in the Middle East and Maghreb (41 cases, i.e. two thirds of the conflicts in the region), the Americas (20 cases, i.e. half of the conflicts), as well as Asia and Oceania (42 cases, almost a third), but less important in Europe (15 cases, i.e. nearly a quarter), and of minor importance in Sub-Saharan Africa (twelve cases, i.e. an eighth of the region's conflicts). Self-determination conflicts,

i.e. conflicts over secession or autonomy, accounted for half of the European conflicts, almost a third of conflicts in Asia and Oceania, a fifth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and about a tenth in the Americas, as well as in the Middle East and Maghreb. While conflicts on resources accounted for about ten percent of all conflicts in Europe, in the Middle East and Maghreb, as well as in Asia and Oceania, 35 percent of the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and half of the conflicts in the Americas featured this item. Subnational predominance was contested in only two conflicts in Europe, in 9 out of 62 in the Middle East and Maghreb, in ten out of 46 in the Americas, in 25 out of 91 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in 31 out of 124 conflicts in Asia and Oceania. While in the Middle East and Maghreb, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa about a third of all conflicts featured national power, 15 percent in both, the Americas, as well as Asia and Oceania, and only six out of 65 conflicts in Europe revolved around this item.

### GLOBAL FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 BY INTENSITY GROUPS



## TERRORISM

Throughout the year, terrorist incidents occurred in all regions. Systematic use of force against civilians by militant groups mainly included suicide and car bomb attacks, often launched in public places or on symbolic infrastructure. Most frequently, militants used these means to pursue secession or contest national power.

In Europe, the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), which still had pursued secession from Spain with violent means in 2010, declared an end to the use of weapons [→Spain (ETA, PNV / Basque Provinces)]. Meanwhile, militant groups continued their armed fight for an independent Northern Ireland [→United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)]. For instance, the Real Irish Republican Army launched bomb attacks on Claudy, Londonderry County, on September 14. However, Minister of Justice David Ford declared a month later that the number of dissident republican attacks had decreased from

40 in 2010 to 25 in 2011.

In Africa, Nigeria experienced a significant increase of attacks by Boko Haram (BH), an Islamist group aiming at the implementation of the Sharia all over Nigeria. BH mainly targeted civilians and symbolic buildings. For instance, in a suicide attack on August 26, a car loaded with explosives rammed through the barrier of UN Headquarters in the capital Abuja, killing at least 23 people and wounding 70. Furthermore, BH coordinate-ly bombed several churches, police stations, military buildings, and a housing estate in the cities of Damaturu and Potsikum in Yobe State and Maiduguri on November 4, claiming the lives of at least 180 people. In the secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian government, a bomb attack on the AU summit in Addis Ababa was foiled. After several OLF members had been arrested in late January for allegedly planning the attack, the government designated OLF

a terrorist organization on June 14. According to a UN report released in July, the foiled attack had been coordinated by the Eritrean government [→Ethiopia - Eritrea]. However, OLF as well as Eritrea denied their involvement in the planned assault.

In the Americas, Colombia and Mexico faced an increasing threat by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and various drug cartels, respectively. The Marxist-Leninist FARC launched a series of attacks in the Cauca Department between July 7 and 12, leaving ten people dead and 100 wounded [→Colombia (FARC)]. In the course of the attacks, a bus explosion with 100 kg of explosives damaged at least 460 houses in the town of Toribío. Throughout the year, civilians equally suffered injuries from anti-personnel mines set by FARC. In Mexico, prevailing drug cartels spread fear by launching car bomb attacks, beheading civilians, and circulating videos of executions [→Mexico (drug cartels), Mexico (intercartel violence, paramilitary groups)]. On August 25, the drug trafficking organization Los Zetas launched an arson attack on a casino in Monterrey, Nuevo León, killing 52 civilians. Mexican President Felipe Calderón denounced the attack as a terrorist act and increased military presence in the city.

In Asia and Oceania, Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgent groups launched several attacks in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir which claimed the lives of numerous civilians [→India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)]. However, according to state police, the region saw the lowest number of militancy-related incidents within the last 22 years. On November 2, police arrested two Hizbul Mujahideen members for allegedly being involved in the September 7 bomb explo-

sion at the Delhi High Court [→India (various Islamist militant groups)]. In the war between various Islamist militant groups, including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qaeda, and the Pakistani government, suicide and car bombings targeted security personnel as well as civilians [→Pakistan (various Islamist militant groups)]. Some of these attacks were declared as revenge for the May 2 killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in the US "Operation Neptune Spear" in Abbottabad. For instance, TTP suicide bombers targeted paramilitary personnel in Shabqadar tehsil in Charsadda District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on May 13, killing 73 paramilitary forces and seventeen civilians.

In the Middle East and Maghreb, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other militant groups carried out suicide attacks on civilians and important infrastructure. In the war over national power and the orientation of the political system with the Afghan government, militants mostly used improvised explosive devices and conducted large-scale coordinated assaults on public places [→Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. On September 13, Islamist militants launched a major attack in the capital Kabul, targeting police offices, government buildings, and the US embassy with bombs and rocket-propelled grenades. In Iraq, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and other Sunni militant groups launched attacks on an almost daily basis. The death toll peaked on August 15. After AQI had stated in an online voice recording that they were preparing a large-scale assault, 42 attacks were carried out all over the country. Car bombs, gunfire, and suicide bombings left some 100 people dead and at least 300 wounded.

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## COUPS D'ÉTAT

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With a total of three cases, Sub-Saharan Africa encompassed all attempted coup d'états observed in 2011. In Guinea, President Alpha Condé survived an assassination attempt by a group of soldiers on July 19, while at least three people were killed when his guards fended off the assault [→Guinea (opposition)]. An attack on the military headquarters by soldiers in neighboring Guinea-Bissau on December 26 was also la-

beled an attempted coup d'état by the government after the country had seen a series of similar incidents in recent years [→Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)]. After last year's successful coup in Niger, the government of President Mahamadou Issoufou arrested a group of military officers in late July, thereby allegedly foiling an attempt to topple the new government [→Niger (opposition)].

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## REVOLUTIONS

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In the Middle East and Maghreb, several revolutions, i.e. a change of the political system initiated or implemented by the population of a country, were observed throughout 2011. These incidents together with the numerous protests against ruling government became known as the so-called Arab Spring. Demonstrations against poor living standards and for political reform started in Tunisia in December 2010 and subsequently sparked further protests in the region [→Tunisia (various opposition groups)]. At least 147 people had died in clashes between tens of thousands of demonstrators and security forces by January. Eventually, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled the country in January and was tried and convicted in absentia. In October, elections for a constituent assembly were held and opposition leader Moncef Marzouki was elected president in December.

In Egypt, hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the

streets to call for the dismissal of President Hosni Mubarak [→Egypt (various opposition groups)]. More than 800 people had been killed and thousands injured when Mubarak stepped down on February 11. After the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces under Mohamed Hussein Tantawi had become the new government, demonstrations continued, while a constitutional referendum paved the way for new presidential and parliamentary elections. The latter started in December under enduring clashes of protesters and security forces.

Moreover, mass protests against the government of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya led to a highly violent conflict with between 10,000 and 50,000 casualties, as armed opposition forces headed by the National Transitional Council (TNC), supported by NATO warplanes, and government troops fought for control of the country [→Libya (opposition)]. The TNC had gradually seized strategic cities until the UN recognized it as



the official government in September. After Qaddafi's death in October, clashes between his supporters and government forces nevertheless continued.

In Yemen, hundreds of thousands protested against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Government officials, troops, and tribesmen withdrew their support for the president after security forces had killed dozens of demonstrators. Altogether, more than 1,600 people were killed and thousands injured in the ensuing clashes. Saleh finally signed a deal to transfer power in November, granting himself immunity from prosecution. The following month, a unity government was formed, while thousands of protesters demanded Saleh to be put on trial.

Also in other countries in the Middle East and Maghreb,

people took to the street to protest against the respective governments without achieving a regime change during the observed period. For instance, in Syria, original calls for democratic change by hundreds of thousands of citizens changed to demands for regime change as security forces repeatedly launched assaults on major cities, killing hundreds of civilians [→ Syria (various opposition groups)]. By the end of the year, 5,000 civilians and army defectors had reportedly died, while the government of Bashar al-Assad claimed that 2,000 security forces had been killed.

Additionally, calls especially for democratic reforms resulted in numerous protests in the other world regions. Therefore, several countries under autocratic rule saw the first mass demonstrations in years.

## NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES

Throughout the year, numerous conflict actors held talks and signed treaties all over the world, but only some of them had significant impact on the course of the respective conflicts.

For instance, the conflict between Bangladesh and India over resources and territory ended after high-level meetings and the signing of legal contracts had significantly improved the relations between the conflict parties. In India, the government, the state government of West Bengal, and the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha signed a deal giving the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration further powers [→India (GJM et al. / northern West Bengal, eastern Assam)]. However, the conflict continued on a violent level. In Myanmar, peace talks were held between the government, on the one hand, and the Chin National Army (CAN) and the Chin National Front (CNF), on the other, concerning the secession of Chin State in December. The government also negotiated with the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and the renegade Brigade 5 of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) despite clashes on a daily basis. KNU and DKBA Brigade 5 agreed on a ceasefire in November. Subsequently, peace talks started. Another ceasefire agreement was reached in December with the southern wing of the Shan State Army [→Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N / Shan State)]. In the Philippines, the government held peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) throughout the year, while clashes between government troops and MILF fighters endured. In December, Thailand and Cambodia agreed to comply with an International Court of Justice order to withdraw military personnel and to establish a provisional demili-

tarized zone in the area around Preah Vihear in December.

In the Palestinian territories, the conflict between the secular Palestinian National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) deescalated as the parties stepped up their cooperation and agreed on the formation of a unity government and a prisoner release by the end of January 2012. In Afghanistan, the governmental High Peace Council (HPC) held peace talks with the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami and the Haqqani network in mid-2011. However, HPC head Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed in a suicide attack in September. In December 2010 and January, the first negotiations after one year between the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany and Iran took place, yet yielding no results [→Iran – USA, EU (nuclear program)]. Subsequently, the USA and the EU expanded their sanctions against Iran.

In Honduras, former President Manuel Zelaya, who had been ousted in 2009, returned after signing the Cartagena Agreement with President Porfirio Lobo [→Honduras (opposition)]. The agreement ensured him and his members of staff a safe return after two years in exile.

In Sudan, the war in the region of Darfur was characterized by a high number of agreements between several rebel groups and the government in the second half of the year [→Sudan (Darfur)].

Furthermore, the conflict between Russia and Norway over territory and resources in the Barents Sea was solved with the bilateral Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean [→Russia – Norway (Barents Sea)].

## AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE ICJ

By the end of 2011, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had fifteen disputes on its list of pending cases, including one request for advisory opinion. Throughout the year, three proceedings were closed and two new cases initiated.

On April 1, ICJ dismissed a suit filed by Georgia against Russia in 2008. Georgia had accused Russia of violating the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) during its interventions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia between 1990 and 2008 [→Georgia (Abkhazia), Georgia (South Ossetia)]. ICJ ruled that, under CERD Article 22, Georgia would have had to enter into negotiations with Russia over the issue of racial discrimination before approaching the court in The Hague.

On April 5, the court removed the case between Belgium and Switzerland over the interpretation and application of the 1988 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of verdicts in civil and commercial matters from its list of cases. On March 21, Belgium had requested the discontinuation of the case in reaction to Switzerland's preliminary objections.

On December 5, ICJ delivered its judgment in the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) against Greece. The UN court declared Greece's veto against FYROM's application for NATO membership to be a breach of Greece's obligations. The latter had prevented FYROM from joining NATO in 2008 due to the naming dispute with FYROM [→Greece - Macedonia].

Following the judgment, both countries expressed their willingness to find a mutually acceptable solution in the naming issue.

On April 28, Cambodia demanded ICJ to clarify its 1962 judgment concerning the temple of Preah Vihear [→Thailand - Cambodia (border)]. The court had declared the temple to be on Cambodian territory in 1962, but had not specified political boundaries. On July 18, ICJ decided that both countries should withdraw their military personnel and not engage in any military activity in the region. On December 21, both countries agreed to establish a demilitarized zone.

On December 22, Nicaragua took legal action against Costa Rica over the construction of a road in Costa Rica along the disputed San Juan River [→Nicaragua - Costa Rica (Río San Juan)]. Nicaragua claimed that the construction work caused environmental damage in and around the river and violated Nicaraguan sovereignty.

In the course of the year, ICJ released reports on developments in other pending cases.

In a second case involving Costa Rica and Nicaragua, filed by Costa Rica in 2010 for alleged violations of its territory, the court delivered a provisional ruling on March 8. It declared that neither conflict party should send any personnel, whether civilian, police or security, to the territory in question. However, Costa Rica was allowed to send civilian personnel concerned

with environmental protection to the area and Nicaragua was permitted to continue dredging in the affected zone.

In the case Nicaragua against Colombia concerning territorial and maritime disputes, ICJ ruled on May 4 that Costa Rica and Honduras were not allowed to intervene in the proceeding [→ Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)].

In an order of September 20, The Hague set time limits for the submission of pleadings on the question of compensation in the case between Guinea and the Democratic Republic

Congo (DRC) concerning the detention and expulsion of the Guinean businessman Ahmadou Sadio Diallo by DRC in 1996. Pleadings were to be filed until December 6 and February 21, 2012 by Guinea and DRC, respectively. In the case between Germany and Italy over jurisdictional immunities, ICJ ruled on July 4 that Greece was allowed to intervene as a non-party. However, intervention was limited to the decision of Greek courts in the Distomo case.

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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Throughout 2011, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) administered sixteen missions across the five world regions, encompassing a total of 98,639 uniformed and 18,379 civilian personnel at the end of the year. While fifteen of these were peacekeeping missions, the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was a DPKO-administered political mission.

As in previous years, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most DPKO-administered UN missions, encompassing six (see table below). Another five peacekeeping missions were stationed in the Middle East and Maghreb, among them UNAMA. Although the highest number of conflicts was observed in Asia and Oceania, only two UN missions were deployed to this region. In Europe, UN maintained as many missions as in Asia and Oceania, while only one mission was stationed in the Americas.

With the independence of South Sudan on July 9, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) ended after it had been established to monitor the peace process between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 2005 [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)]. But due to the continuing instability in the region and the ongoing violence between Sudan and the new state, the UN Security Council (UN SC) immediately established the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by Resolution 1996 on July 8 [→ Sudan – South Sudan)]. Additionally, the UN SC had authorized the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to demilitarize and secure the disputed Abyei area in late June. Therefore, 3,798 uniformed and 20 civilian personnel had been deployed to the area by the end of the year.

Furthermore, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) ended on 12/31/2010 in accordance with Resolution 1923.

While the 98,639 uniformed personnel consisted of 14,300 police, 82,377 troops, and 1,962 observers from 114 countries, also 5,553 international and 12,809 local civilian personnel served in the sixteen DPKO-led peace operations. Fatalities among UN peacekeeping missions' personnel amounted to a total of 111 in 2011, showing a significant decrease compared to 173 in 2010. Since 1948, a total of 2,966 UN personnel died in peace operations. Among the 114 countries sending uniformed personnel in 2011, the main contributors of troops to UN peace operations were the Asian and African countries of Bangladesh (10,394), Pakistan (9,416), India (8,115), Ethiopia (6,224), and Nigeria (5,749), while for instance the United Kingdom (279), Germany (258), and the US (126) could be found near the bottom of the scale. As the Global South

therefore shouldered the largest share of the peacekeeping personnel, the Global North did the main funding. The three main financial contributors to the annual budget of approx. USD 7.84 billion for peacekeeping missions were the USA with 27 percent, Japan with thirteen percent, and the United Kingdom with eight percent. According to UN, the allocated budget thereby represented less than 0.5 percent of global military expenditures. The two missions with highest budget by far were AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with more than USD 1.6 billion and UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with over USD 1.4 billion, being both located in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to the DPKO missions, the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) led twelve political field operations, encompassing 4,284 personnel, 286 of them uniformed. Seven of the operations were located in Sub-Saharan Africa: While the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) succeeded the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) in January and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was inaugurated in March, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) continued. In Asia and Oceania, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA) remained in place, while the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) withdrew in accordance with UN SC Resolution 1939. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the UNDPA maintained four missions, one of them newly established. While the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), and the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) continued, the UN SC decided to establish the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in order to support the country's new government in restoring peace and order after the months-long heavy fighting [→ Libya (opposition)]. Both the DPKO-administered missions and the UNDPA-led political field operations were supported by the UN Department for Field Support (UNDFS) established in 2007.

Although the UN's peacekeeping missions were, for the most part, based on robust mandates, the international community also applied non-military measures to sustain or restore peace and security, such as for example sanctions. By the end of 2011, UN maintained twelve sanction committees concerning seven states of Sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Eritrea, and

Sudan), another six in the Middle East and Maghreb (Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan), and an arms embargo against North Korea since 2006. A further sanction committee targeted the transnational network of al-Qaeda as well as associated individuals and entities. Throughout the year, several sanctions were prolonged. For instance, the assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo concerning al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups and people included on the Committee's Consolidated List were reaffirmed on June 17. Furthermore, the UN SC by Resolution 1970 on February 26 established a new sanction committee concerning Libya in response to the deteriorating security situation in the country [→ Libya (opposition)]. Another four resolutions had amended the sanction measures against Libya by the end of the year. On March 17, the UN SC faced the humanitarian crises at the Horn of Africa, by exempting the asset freeze against Somali individuals decided by Resolution 1844 for another 16 months. About two weeks later, the UN SC adopted Resolution 1975, thereby imposing sanctions including travel and financial measures against former President Laurent Gbagbo, his wife, and three of his associates [→ Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)].

Besides the UN, several regional organizations maintained field missions. For instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintained sixteen field opera-

tions with 2,831 personnel in Europe and Central Asia.


The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranean Sea, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), as well as the counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. Between March and October, NATO together with non-NATO allies conducted "Operation Unified Protector" in Libya. Additionally, NATO continued its support for UNAMID troops in Darfur, Sudan, while the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) was permanently withdrawn on December 31. By the end of the year, the Council of the EU maintained three military and ten civilian missions. The latter were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore, the military missions encompassed European Union Force – Operation Althea (EUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) off the coast of Somalia as well as in the Indian Ocean, and the European Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in Uganda. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) continued the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

## CURRENT UN MISSIONS LED OR SUPPORTED BY DPKO

| Mission Acronym                    | Name of Mission   | Start | Country                        |
|------------------------------------|---|-------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Europe</b>                      | —   | —     | —                              |
| UNFICYP                            | United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus   | 1964  | Cyprus                         |
| <b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>          | —   | —     | —                              |
| UNMISS                             | United Nations Mission in South Sudan   | 2011  | South Sudan                    |
| UNMIS                              | United Nations Mission in Sudan   | 2005  | Sudan                          |
| UNAMID                             | African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur                                   | 2007  | Sudan                          |
| AMISOM                             | African Union Mission in Somalia  | 2007  | Somalia                        |
| BINUB                              | United Nations Office in Burundi  | 2011  | Burundi                        |
| MONUSCO                            | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | 1999  | Congo (Kinshasa)               |
| UNIOGBIS                           | United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office in Guinea Bissau                          | 2010  | Guinea-Bissau                  |
| MINURCAT                           | United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad                               | 2007  | Chad, Central African Republic |
| UNOCI                              | United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire   | 2004  | Côte d'Ivoire                  |
| <b>The Americas</b>                | —   | —     | —                              |
| MINUSTAH                           | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti   | 2004  | Haiti                          |
| <b>Asia and Oceania</b>            | —   | —     | —                              |
| UNMIT                              | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste  | 2006  | Timor-Leste                    |
| UNMOGIP                            | UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan                      | 1949  | India, Pakistan                |
| <b>The Middle East and Maghreb</b> | —   | —     | —                              |
| UNDOF                              | United Nations Disengagement Observer Force   | 1974  | Syria, Israel                  |
| UNIFIL                             | United Nations Truce Monitoring Forces in Lebanon   | 1978  | Lebanon                        |

EUROPE

EUROPE





The total number of conflicts observed in Europe was 65. No new conflict emerged, while one conflict was solved [→Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)]. Compared to 2010, this year saw a slight decrease from nineteen to eighteen violent conflicts. Among them was only one highly violent conflict, in comparison to two in the past year. This limited war was fought over secession and system/ideology between Islamist militants and authorities in the Russian North Caucasus republic of Dagestan [→Russia (Islamist militants / Dagestan)]. As in the years before, secession was Europe's most frequent conflict item, followed by an almost equal number of conflicts over system/ideology, autonomy, territory, and international power, respectively. While all fifteen of Europe's autonomy conflicts were carried out on the lowest level of intensity, eleven out of nineteen secession conflicts were fought out violently. This applied to the Caucasus as well as to certain Western European democracies [→France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom (IRA et al. / Northern Ireland)]. In three out of six cases, national power was contested with violent means [→Azerbaijan (various opposition groups), e.g. Belarus (various opposition groups), Georgia (various opposition groups)]. The two subnational predominance conflicts were conducted on the level of a violent crisis [→Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants) in Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)]. Europe's sole violent interstate conflict was also the only violent one over territory [→Armenia - Azerbaijan].

The Caucasus remained Europe's most conflict-affected area, accounting for a total of nineteen, mostly interrelated, conflicts, of which eleven were violent crises and one a limited war. Besides the two opposition conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia and the predominance conflict in North Ossetia-Alania, there were another three violent crises between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea [→Armenia – Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia (Abkhazia)] and also six insur-


gencies aiming for independent Islamic statehood in Russia's North Caucasus [→Russia (Islamist militants / Chechnya) et al.].

Southeast Europe, including the Balkans, formerly Europe's most volatile area, continued to feature a large number of conflicts. However, only three of them were judged as violent crises [→Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants), Greece (left-wing militants), Serbia (Kosovo)]. The Balkans accounted for sixteen conflicts, with one conflict deescalating from a violent crisis to the lowest intensity level [→Macedonia (Albanian minority / northwestern Macedonia)].


In the Baltic region and Middle and Eastern Europe, the system conflict and power struggle in Belarus escalated to a violent crisis when presidential elections were held and opposition protests violently dispersed [→Belarus (opposition)]. At the same time, this area experienced the only conflict resolution in Europe this year. Russia and Norway ratified the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which came into force on July 7 and thus ended the conflict over territory and resources in the Barents Sea.

In West and South Europe the number of violent conflicts declined from four in 2010, to three. Among them were the secession conflicts in Northern Ireland and the French island of Corsica [→France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)]. In contrast, the conflict over secession of the Basque provinces from Spain further deescalated when ETA reinforced its permanent ceasefire and announced the definitive end of violence [→Spain (ETA, PNV / Basque provinces)]. The third violent crisis in Western and Southern Europe occurred in Greece [→Greece (left-wing militants)]. This year's violence erupted primarily in the context of demonstrations against governmental austerity measures due to the Greek economic and financial crisis.

### CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN EUROPE IN 2011 COMPARED TO 2010



### FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 IN EUROPE BY INTENSITY GROUPS



## CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                               | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                            | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|--|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Armenia (opposition)  | opposition vs. government  | national power                            | 2003  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Armenia - Azerbaijan  | Armenia vs. Azerbaijan   | territory                                 | 1987  | •                   | 3                      |
| Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)*                              | Nagorno Karabakh vs. government  | secession                                 | 1988  | •                   | 3                      |
| Azerbaijan (various opposition groups)*                     | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 2003  | •                   | 3                      |
| Belarus (various opposition groups)                         | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1994  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Belarus - Poland*   | Belarus vs. Poland   | international power                       | 1994  | •                   | 1                      |
| Belgium (N-VA / Flanders)                                   | N-VA vs. government, Walloon parties   | autonomy                                  | 2007  | •                   | 1                      |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs / Republic of Srpska) | Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak- Croat Federation             | secession                                 | 1995  | •                   | 1                      |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat parties / Herzegovina)*       | Croat parties vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation, Bosniak, parties | autonomy                                  | 1992  | •                   | 1                      |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)                  | Wahhabi militants vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| Croatia (Croatian Serbs / Krajina, West and East Slavonia)* | Croatian Serbs vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)*                                   | Northern Cyprus vs. central government   | secession                                 | 1963  | •                   | 2                      |
| Cyprus - Turkey   | Cyprus vs. Turkey  | territory, international power, resources | 2005  | •                   | 2                      |
| Denmark - Canada (Hans Island)*                             | Denmark vs. Canada   | territory                                 | 1973  | •                   | 1                      |
| Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*                        | Russian-speaking minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| France (FLNC / Corsica)                                     | FLNC vs. France  | secession                                 | 1975  | •                   | 3                      |
| Georgia (Abkhazia)*   | Abkhazian separatists vs. government   | secession                                 | 1989  | •                   | 3                      |
| Georgia (Armenian minority)*                                | Armenian minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 2004  | •                   | 1                      |
| Georgia (Azeri minority)*                                   | Azeri minority vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 2004  | •                   | 1                      |
| Georgia (South Ossetia)                                     | South Ossetian separatists vs. government  | secession                                 | 1989  | •                   | 2                      |
| Georgia (various opposition groups)                         | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 2007  | •                   | 3                      |
| Greece (left-wing militants)                                | leftwing militants, SPF, EA, SE, Sect of Revolutionaries vs. government          | system/ideology                           | 1973  | •                   | 3                      |
| Greece - Macedonia (official name of the Macedonian state)* | Greece vs. Macedonia   | other                                     | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Hungary - Romania (minority)*                               | Hungary vs. Romania  | international power                       | 1990  | •                   | 1                      |
| Hungary - Slovakia (minority)*                              | Hungary vs. Slovakia   | international power                       | 1993  | •                   | 1                      |
| Hungary - Slovakia (resources)*                             | Hungary vs. Slovakia   | resources                                 | 1989  | •                   | 1                      |
| Italy (Lega Nord/northern Italy)*                           | Lega Nord vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Italy (Red Brigades)*                                       | Red Brigades vs. government  | system/ideology                           | 1970  | •                   | 2                      |
| Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)*                         | Russian-speaking minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Macedonia (Albanian minority/ northwestern Macedonia)*      | Albanian minority, NLA vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 1991  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Moldova (AEI - PCRM)*                                       | AEI vs. PCRM   | system/ideology, national power           | 2009  | •                   | 1                      |
| Moldova (Transdniestria)*                                   | Kosovarian government vs. Macedonia  | secession                                 | 1989  | •                   | 2                      |
| Montenegro - Croatia (Prevlaka)*                            | Montenegro vs. Croatia   | territory                                 | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |

## CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                      | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>   | Conflict items                            | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|---|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Romania (Hungarian minority/ Transylvania)*        | Hungarian minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1989  | •                   | 1                      |
| Russia (Ingush minority /North Ossetia-Alania)*    | Ingush minority vs. government, Ossetians   | subnational predominance                  | 1992  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants /Chechnya)              | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 1989  | •                   | 3                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants /Dagestan)              | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 1999  | •                   | 4                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants / Ingushetia)           | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 2004  | ↘                   | 3                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants / Kabardino-Balkaria)   | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 2004  | •                   | 3                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants / Karachay-Cherkessia)* | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 2001  | •                   | 3                      |
| Russia (Islamist militants /North Ossetia-Alania)* | Islamist militants vs. government   | secession, system/ideology                | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Russia (various opposition groups)                 | various opposition groups vs. government  | system/ideology, national power           | 2001  | •                   | 2                      |
| Russia - Estonia                                   | Russia vs. Estonia  | territory, international power            | 1994  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Russia - Georgia*                                  | Russia vs. Georgia  | international power                       | 1992  | •                   | 2                      |
| Russia - Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)*          | Azerbaijan vs. Iran vs. Kazakhstan vs. Russia vs. Turkmenistan                                    | territory, international power, resources | 1993  | •                   | 1                      |
| Russia - Latvia*                                   | Russia vs. Latvia   | international power                       | 1994  | •                   | 1                      |
| Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)                      | Russia vs. Norway   | territory, resources                      | 1947  | END                 | 1                      |
| Russia - Norway et al. (Arctic)*                   | Russia vs. United States vs. Canada vs. Norway vs. Denmark  | territory, resources                      | 2001  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Russia - Ukraine*                                  | Russia - Ukraine  | territory, international power, resources | 2003  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Serbia (Albanian minority /Presevo Valley)*        | Albanian minority vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 2000  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Serbia (Bosniak minority /Sandzak)*                | Bosniak minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Serbia (Hungarian minority/ northern Vojvodina)*   | Hungarian minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1998  | •                   | 1                      |
| Serbia (Kosovo)                                    | Kosovar government vs. central government   | secession                                 | 1989  | •                   | 3                      |
| Serbia (Wahhabi militants / Sandzak)               | Wahhabi militants vs. government  | secession, system/ideology                | 2007  | •                   | 1                      |
| Serbia (ZzV/Vojvodina)                             | ZzV vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 1989  | •                   | 1                      |
| Slovakia (Hungarian minority/ southern Slovakia)*  | Hungarian minority vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1993  | •                   | 1                      |
| Slovenia - Croatia (border)                        | Slovenia vs. Croatia  | territory                                 | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Spain (Catalan nationalists/ Catalonia)*           | ERC, CiU, Catalan regional government vs. central government                                      | secession                                 | 1979  | •                   | 1                      |
| Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)                  | ETA, PNV vs. government   | secession                                 | 1959  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Spain - United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*                | Spain vs. United Kingdom  | territory                                 | 1954  | •                   | 1                      |
| Turkey - Armenia                                   | Turkey vs. Armenia  | international power, other                | 1991  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Turkey - Greece (border)                           | Turkey vs. Greece   | territory                                 | 1973  | •                   | 2                      |
| United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)   | IRA, RIRA, ONH, CIRA, INLA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, DUP, UUP, Orange Order, UDA, UVF, RHC | secession                                 | 1968  | •                   | 1                      |
| United Kingdom (SNP/Scotland)*                     | SNP, Scottish regional government vs. central government  | secession                                 | 2007  | •                   | 1                      |
| USA - Russia (missile system)*                     | USA vs. Russia  | international power                       | 2007  | •                   | 2                      |

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between the opposition, mainly represented by the Armenian National Congress (HAK) of former President Levon Ter-Petrosian, and the government of President Serge Sarkisian de-escalated to a non-violent level.

Throughout the year, the opposition held several protest rallies, encouraged by the Arab Spring protests (→ Tunisia (various opposition groups); i.a.). The largest protests since 2008 had been taking place between February 18 and June 30 in Yerevan, the capital. A climax was reached on March 1, when some 35,000 people demonstrated on the occasion of the third anniversary of the 2008 post-election violence, which had left ten HAK supporters dead. Subsequently, the government fulfilled HAK's three main demands, being the release of political prisoners, the right to demonstrate on the liberty square, and the reinvestigation of the 2008 post-election violence. However, the government repeatedly rejected HAK's demand of early elections. On May 26, parliament approved a general amnesty for political prisoners, which led to the release of 400 detainees, including leading opposition figures Sasun Nikaelian and Nikol Pashinian. Tensions decreased further when the conflict parties started a political dialogue in June. However, the efforts petered out, after the authorities arrested seven HAK youth activists under disputed circumstances on August 9. In the following, the opposition resumed demonstrations, e.g. on September 9 and November 25, with 6,000 respectively 3,000 participants. Between October 1 and 8, up to 3,000 HAK supporters staged a non-stop protest and erected a tent camp in central Yerevan.

The opposition faced several constraints imposed by the government. For instance, authorities refused to grant necessary frequencies and slots to pro-opposition TV stations. Furthermore, legal amendments concerning libel, adopted by parliament in April 2010, resulted in a number of lawsuits against pro-opposition newspapers. jak, ld

## ARMENIA - AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: **Armenia vs. Azerbaijan**  
 Conflict items: **territory**

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, remained violent.


Throughout the year, frequent ceasefire violations were reported. On January 18, a shootout at the Line of Contact left one Azerbaijani soldier dead and two Armenian conscripts wounded. On January 20, April 29, and between November 19 and 21, exchanges of fire claimed the lives of four Armenian

soldiers. Armenian officials blamed Azerbaijan for the killings. Both sides accused each other of ongoing ceasefire violations and breaches of international law, e.g. at the UN General Assembly on September 23 and 27.

Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev met for talks mediated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Saint Petersburg on February 2, in Sochi on March 5, and at the Kazan Summit on June 24. Despite international insistence by US President Barack Obama and the Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US, France, and Russia, Aliyev and Sarkisian failed to reach agreement on the Basic Principles foreseeing a phased approach to solve the conflict. Medvedev held bilateral talks with Aliyev in Sochi on August 9 and with Sarkisian in Moscow on October 24 over a possible solution of the conflict.

Both conflict parties urged to improve their military and strategic situation throughout 2011. Azerbaijan increased its military budget to USD 3.3 billion, and started cooperation with Israel to build drones. It purchased aircrafts from Turkey, won a UN Security Council seat, and entered the Non-Aligned Movement. Armenia reached a military agreement with Russia on April 13 and intensified its cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, Armenia explored potential military cooperation in talks with Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Reza Mozafari Nia and tried to purchase weapons from Moldova. ld

## BELARUS (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: **various opposition groups vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and power conflict between several opposition groups and the government turned violent. Tensions between the conflict parties rose after President Alexander Lukashenko was reelected in the presidential elections held on 12/19/10. The opposition and the OSCE called the election flawed and manipulated. On election day, 40,000 people protested against Lukashenko on the central square in Minsk. Authorities cracked down on protesters by using noise grenades, tear gas, and batons, wounding several protesters including presidential candidate and key opposition figure Vladimir Niaklajeu. About 600 protesters were detained, among them seven of the nine presidential candidates, and several journalists. Most of the protesters were sentenced to up to 15 days in prison, others were immediately released. During rallies staged in late December, state authorities arrested several opposition activists. Police also detained several leading opposition members and raided opposition and newspaper offices. On January 9, different opposition groups, usually deeply divided, agreed to form a joint national cooperation council to counter the government. On January 31, EU imposed sanctions, which were condemned by Belarus and Russia. On March 25, police bore down on hundreds of opposition activists who staged a rally, detaining about 50 people.

On April 11, thirteen people died and 200 were injured in a

bomb explosion in Minsk's subway. The opposition denied any involvement. However, the government blamed the dissidents, detained several, and closed two independent newspapers on April 27. Three weeks later, a court sentenced two famous opposition candidates, Niaklajeu and Andrei Sannikov, to five years in jail. Police dispersed opposition rallies of approx. 1,000 protesters between June 16 and 23 and detained about 500 protesters. Every week since June, the opposition had organized nationwide marches known as Revolution by Social Networks. Thousands of activists staged silent protests, using applause as a form of protest. This was banned by the government on October 6. On July 3, Independence Day, about 800 demonstrated against the government and disrupted the celebrations. Police detained about 300 participants. A court sentenced a rights group leader to seven years in prison on August 5.

In September, Lukashenko invited the EU, Russia, and the opposition to hold talks. The opposition rejected the proposal unless the government would release imprisoned activists. On September 14, Lukashenko pardoned several detainees. During new anti-government demonstrations held in central Minsk in October, police detained several activists. In a rally staged on the post-election protest anniversary on December 19, police again detained dozens of protesters, among them about ten journalists. *map*

## BELGIUM (N-VA / FLANDERS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: **N-VA vs. government, Walloon parties**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between the nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the largest party in federal parliament, on the one hand, and the government as well as Walloon parties, on the other, continued. The conflict parties, trying to form a new government since June 2010, mainly disagreed on transferring power to the regions and forming the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde constituency (BHV).

On January 6, N-VA rejected a compromise draft on state reforms proposed by Royal Mediator Johan Vande Lanotte. The Royal Mediator was to find a Formateur, in charge of forming a new federal government. On January 13 and 18, he met N-VA leader Bart De Wever and Francophone Socialists leader Elio Di Rupo. As the talks did not yield any tangible results on resolving the political stalemate, King Albert accepted Vande Lanotte's resignation offer on January 26. On February 2, Albert appointed Francophone Liberal Party member Didier Reynders as new Royal Mediator, but replaced him with the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) leader Wouter Beke one month later. The latter resigned in mid-May. Di Rupo was appointed as Formateur on May 17. His basic proposals for government formation talks were rejected by N-VA on July 7. However, as of August 23, Di Rupo started negotiations over a new federal government with eight Francophone and Flemish parties, including CD&V. They reached an accord on the splitting of BHV on September 15. A further accord on state reforms was reached on October 8. While N-VA expressed its

support in favour of the deal on BHV, it criticized the state reforms accord as disadvantaging the Flemish community. Between November 26 and December 5, negotiations had resulted in agreements on socio-economic reforms and the future government's composition. Di Rupo won a confidence vote in parliament on December 10, becoming new prime minister. The N-VA was not represented in the new federal government. *fmb*

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BOSNIAN SERBS / REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: **Republic of Srpska vs. government, Bosniak Croat Federation**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Serbian Republic of Srpska (RS) and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continued. On April 29, RS President Milorad Dodik announced that the July referendum, aiming at the abolition of the Bosnian justice system for the Serbian part of the country, affected the territorial integrity of BiH. The referendum had been approved by the RS parliament on February 2010. Dodik perceived the jurisdiction as disadvantaging Serbians in the RS. On May 10, the High Representative for BiH Valentin Inzko stated that the referendum violated the Dayton Paris Peace Agreement and accused Dodik of advocating the dissolution of the country. He declared that he would therefore repeal the referendum decisions. On May 13, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton visited RS political leaders, among them Dodik, in Banja Luka to prevent the announced referendum.

Subsequently, Dodik dropped the referendum plan while Ashton assured the support of the European Commission in restructuring BiH's judicial institutions. After the capture of former RS Chief of Staff of the Army Ratko Mladic, dozens of Serb nationalists protested in the cities of Pale and Banja Luka and demanded the release of the suspected war criminal on May 26. On December 28, some 15 months after the general elections, six party leaders, representing both Bosniaks and Serbs, agreed to form the Council of Ministers. *np*

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (WAHHABI MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: **Wahhabi militants vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

The conflict between Wahhabi militants and the government remained violent. On March 22, authorities opened a trial against suspected Wahhabi militants. They were accused of having perpetrated a car bombing in the city of Bugojno in June 2010, which had left one police officer dead as well as six more injured and had damaged a police station.



On June 5, police forces arrested an alleged Wahhabi for the illegal possession of arms and four kilograms of explosives. On October 28, a Wahhabi militant attacked the US embassy in the capital of Sarajevo. Special police forces arrested the attacker, after he had opened fire injuring two local police officers.

The Council of Ministers introduced counter-terrorism measures, including the freezing of funds on November 9. The next day, authorities detained three Wahhabis, and sentenced them to prison terms between three and four years on charges of plotting a terrorist attack as well as possession of automatic weapons and explosives. *np*

## CYPRUS - TURKEY

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: *Cyprus vs. Turkey*  
Conflict items: *territory, international power, resources*

The conflict between Cyprus and Turkey concerning territory, resources and international power continued. Turkey defined Cyprus as a matter of national interest and considered Turkish Cypriots, populating Northern Cyprus, as part of the Turkish nation, as Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay stated on September 14.

On March 10, the European Parliament requested Turkey to withdraw forces from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), only recognized by Turkey [→ Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)]. Throughout the year, Cyprus repeatedly called for a lifting of the Turkish embargo on Greek Cypriot ships and airplanes. However, TRNC pleaded to maintain the embargo as long as the embargoes on TRNC were in force, as did TRNC President Dervis Eroglu on March 16. On November 28 and December 1, Turkey's EU Minister Egemen Bagis offered to open ports and airports in Cyprus for commercial purposes, if the EU eased its restrictions on TRNC. On July 9, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu voiced hope that an agreement on the conditions for the reunification of Cyprus would be concluded by the end of 2012, calling for a referendum in early 2012. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated on July 19, that his country would freeze relations with the EU if the Cyprus issue was not solved until the beginning of Cyprus' EU presidency in July 2012.

On August 6, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz criticized Greek Cyprus' plans to explore natural gas resources in the Mediterranean Sea as being illegitimate. In turn, Turkey and TRNC signed an agreement to explore gas and oil resources in the Mediterranean Sea on September 21. Cyprus condemned the accord as a violation of international law. Turkey's announcement on September 23 that its exploration vessel would be escorted by warships resulted in a Cypriot complaint to the UN and the EU. On September 28, Yildiz explained that the Turkish vessel served seismic research only, two days after explorations had started. On December 6, EU foreign ministers expressed concern over Turkey's declared policy towards the EU under Cypriot presidency and also voiced support for Cyprus' drilling activities in the Mediterranean Sea. *fmb, kwu*

## FRANCE (FLNC / CORSICA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: *FLNC vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession*

The secession conflict between the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the government remained violent. Throughout the year, Corsica witnessed at least 22 homicides and about 15 attempted assaults. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in some cases, but attributed to FLNC militants by officials. Several attacks targeted tourist resorts in the department of Haute-Corse. On 12/23/10, ten to 15 unidentified gunmen attacked a tourist complex near Bastia. A bomb blast hit a holiday home in Prunelli-di-Fiurnorbo on 12/30/10. On June 26, unknown perpetrators assaulted a building in a touristic area of Santa-Maria-Poggio. In both cases, investigators discovered FLNC inscriptions on walls nearby. On January 29, approx. 150 people, including Corsican nationalists, demonstrated for the relocation of Corsican prisoners from the mainland to Corsica in Toulon, department of Var. On February 14, the trial against two Corsican nationalists, Ballester Baptiste and Jacques Filippi, began in Paris. The men were charged for six bomb attacks including a car bombing against the Corsican Gendarmerie in April 2006, for which FLNC had claimed responsibility. As Minister of Justice Michel Mercier visited Corsica, a dozen gunmen took two pensioners hostage in their home on May 12, demanding the transfer of prisoners from the mainland to Corsica. Officials blamed FLNC for the incident. On June 28, Charles-Philippe Paoli, alleged close associate of Corsican nationalist Charles Pieri and member of the pro-independence party Corsica Libera, was shot dead. Two days before, a bomb blast had severely damaged a building complex under construction in Santa-Maria-Poggio, commissioned by Paoli's Limited Liability Company. Police found FLNC inscriptions on a wall. However, in a clandestine press conference in a forest near Bastia, approx. 30 hooded and armed FLNC members denied any involvement in the killing of Paoli and the bombing. On October 28, Christian Leoni, alleged member of the Corsican criminal organization Sea Breeze, was killed. One month later, FLNC claimed responsibility for the killing and accused Leoni of having killed Charles-Philippe Paoli. Furthermore, FLNC admitted authorship of attacks against 30 homes and five utility installations. On December 4, unknown perpetrators killed Jacques Paoli, a militant Corsican nationalist and member of Corsica Libera, in his house. *elo*

## GEORGIA (SOUTH OSSETIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *South Ossetian separatists vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession*

The conflict between the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which had declared its independence in 2008, and Georgia continued. On September 19, Tuvalu became the fifth country to recognize South Ossetia as an independent state. On No-



September 27, South Ossetia held the second round of presidential elections which were recognized neither by Georgia nor by EU and NATO member states. Opposition candidate Alla Jioyeva won the elections with 56.7 percent of the vote. However, South Ossetia's Supreme Court declared the results invalid and rescheduled elections for March 25, 2012. In addition, the court excluded Jioyeva from the new elections.

On May 18, two Georgians were injured in a shootout in the district of Sachkhere near the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) between the region of South Ossetia and Georgia. Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that Russian security personnel had opened fire. In contrast, South Ossetian authorities said that its border guards had detained a group of Georgians crossing the ABL and were shot at by unidentified perpetrators. Georgian citizens crossing the ABL were repeatedly detained by South Ossetian law enforcement agencies. Between May and June, South Ossetian authorities detained at least 15 people, most of whom were released later. Over the year, Georgia and South Ossetia exchanged more than 20 prisoners who had been detained after the August 2008 war.

In late December 2010, Russia held military exercises in South Ossetia's Akhlagori district close to the ABL and deployed a tactical-operational missile unit with Tochka-U rockets to the Russian military base in South Ossetia in January [→ Russia – Georgia]. On September 22, the Russian State Duma ratified a treaty on the establishment of a Russian military base in South Ossetia for a period of 49 years despite Georgian protest.

Negotiations between Russia and Georgia over international security arrangements for the region and the return of refugees continued with five rounds of talks in the framework of the Geneva talks. No tangible results were yielded. On July 8, South Ossetia pulled out of the negotiations after the UN General Assembly had endorsed a resolution on the status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia)]. The ICJ announced on April 1 that a case filed by Georgia against Russia was not admissible, because Georgia had not sought remedy before the UN or in negotiations with Russia before addressing the Court. Georgia claimed that Russia had violated its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination during its interventions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia between 1990 and 2008. *mak*

## GEORGIA (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: *various opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between several opposition groups and the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili remained violent.

Talks between Saakashvili's ruling party United National Movement (UNM) and a group of eight opposition parties over a reform of the electoral law, especially demanded by EU and OSCE, stalled after the two sides failed to reach agreement in early March. Both sides blamed each other for the stalemate.

On April 13, EU ambassadors in the capital Tbilisi appealed to resume talks. On June 24, the UNM proposed the expansion of parliament from 150 to 190 seats, neglecting opposition proposals, with 107 parliamentarians being elected from party lists and the remaining being elected in single-mandate constituencies. The Christian Democratic Movement and the New Rights Party, both withdrawing from the group of eight opposition parties, as well as the National Democratic Party, and Industry Will Save Georgia formally accepted the UNM proposal. The remaining six parties criticized the proposal for advantaging the ruling party.

On May 21, the People's Representative Assembly, led by key opposition figure Nino Burjadinadze, launched a five-day campaign for Saakashvili's resignation in Tbilisi. Some 10,000 people participated. Protesters and police briefly scuffled on May 22. Shortly after the official permission to protest expired on May 26, some 2,000 heavily armed special forces and riot police dispersed the protesters using water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets. Two people died and dozens were injured on both sides. In July, authorities dismissed or disciplined several police officers for using excessive force. On September 8, a court sentenced 15 opposition activists to prison terms of up to six years on charges of forming an illegal armed group to help former Defense Minister and exiled opposition figure Irakli Okruashvili to return to Georgia during the violent protests in May.

On October 5, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili announced his plans to form a political party and to compete against Saakashvili in the 2012 parliamentary elections. A few days later, the authorities revoked Ivanishvili's citizenship. According to officials, it had become invalid due to his French citizenship. Hundreds of people, among them former President Eduard Shevardnadze and Patriarch Ilia II., voiced their support for Ivanishvili. On December 11, Ivanishvili founded the public movement Georgian Dream and announced his plans to unite the opposition forces, deeply divided into a radical and a moderate camp. *jd*

## GREECE (LEFT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: *leftwing militants, SPF, EA, SE, Sect of Revolutionaries vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology*

The system and ideology conflict between left-wing militants and the government continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, protests against governmental austerity measures in reaction to the Greek financial and economic crisis left at least 700 wounded. On 12/15/10, during demonstrations against austerity measures, left-wing militants clashed with police, leaving 28 people injured. While militants threw petrol bombs at police and damaged parts of Athens' city center, police used tear gas and flash grenades. The same day, violence erupted in a 20,000-person demonstration in Thessaloniki, leaving eight injured. Police detained 20 people. At least 30 people were injured, when tens of thousands demonstrated against austerity cuts in Athens between May 11 and 14. A small group of

rioters vandalized parts of the city center and threw stones at police, which reacted with tear gas. Three police officers were injured, when 150 anarchists stormed into a hospital. Three people were wounded in a Molotov cocktail attack on the Exarchia police station.

About 100 masked anarchists attacked the Ministry of Finance in Athens with gasoline bombs on June 15, forcing tens of thousands of peaceful protesters to retreat. On June 29, militants clashed with thousands riot police officers during demonstrations in Athens, leaving at least 500 demonstrators and 20 policemen wounded. On September 10, a demonstration of approx. 17,000 people turned violent in Thessaloniki as protesters threw petrol bombs. Police detained 94 people. Between October 19 and 21, anarchist and left-wing protesters had heavily clashed with riot police during demonstrations with up to 100,000 participants in Athens. On October 20, approx. 250 militants tossed stones and petrol bombs at police officers in riot gear, who reacted with tear gas. More than 60 people were injured, one man died of a heart attack. In reaction to the protests and ongoing financial and economic crisis, Prime Minister George Papandreou stepped down on November 9, succeeded by Lucas Papademos two days later. Nonetheless, violence continued. On November 17 and December 6, masked youths and police clashed in Athens, using Molotov cocktails and tear gas, respectively. The clashes left 27 people injured.

In the course of the year, authorities proceeded with actions against left-wing militants. On January 14, police arrested five alleged militants in Athens, searched their apartment, and seized a plan to attack justice officials. Three days later, trials against nine suspected members of the far-left extremist group Revolutionary Nuclei of Fire (SPF) began in Athens. They were charged for a series of bombings on official buildings and embassies as well as failed parcel bombings targeting leading European politicians and institutions in 2009 and 2010. On July 10, the court sentenced six of them to prison terms of up to 25 years. Police detected and destroyed a letter bomb at the Justice Ministry on February 2. SPF claimed responsibility. On April 29, police detained three left-wing militants charged with the homicide of three citizens in Athens on 05/05/10, when a bank was set on fire during an anti-austerity demonstration. A trial of eight Revolutionary Struggle members, accused of having injured policemen in 2009, began on October 24. *kwu, fmb*

## RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / CHECHNYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *Islamist militants vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The secession conflict between Islamist rebels in the North Caucasus Republic of Chechnya and both the central and regional government remained violent.

Frequent attacks and combat actions between security forces and militants caused numerous deaths and injuries. Between January and November 30, the conflict left at least 94 people dead, among them 63 insurgents, 21 security per-

sonnel and ten civilians, as well as 110 injured, according to official sources. Responsibility for the attacks was in many cases uncertain, but usually attributed to Islamist militants by the authorities.

On January 24, Magomed Yevloyev from the village of Ali-Yurt, Ingushetia, blew himself up at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport, killing 36 and injuring 152 people [→ Russia (Islamist militants / Ingushetia)]. On February 7, Dokka Umarov, former Chechen rebel leader and self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasus Emirate, claimed responsibility for the attack. Militants repeatedly targeted security forces. For instance, gunmen ambushed a convoy of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) in Grozny, the Chechen capital, on January 9. The assault left three people dead and at least six injured. On February 7, unidentified perpetrators shot at a helicopter of the Russian Ministry of Interior troops during a patrol flight. Three suicide bombers killed at least nine people, including seven policemen, during the Eid ul-Fitre celebrations marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan in Grozny on August 30.

Security forces conducted several special operations against Islamist militants. On May 12, authorities conducted a special operation in the Vedeno district with helicopters firing rockets. However, no casualties were reported. Between July and October, security forces had conducted further operations in the districts of Grozny, Shatoi, and Achkhoy-Martan. On April 21, interior ministry troops killed Haled Yusef Muhammad al Emirat alias Muhannad, alleged al-Qaeda chief envoy in Chechnya, in an operation in the Shalinsky district. In early May, security forces killed Turkish national Doger Sevdet alias Abdullah Kurd, who succeeded Muhannad, in the Urus-Martan district. On September 16, three close associates of Umarov, among them Berg-khazh Musaev alias Emir Khamzat, were shot dead in Istanbul, Turkey. *lw*

## RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / DAGESTAN)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: *Islamist militants vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The system and secession conflict between Islamist militants and the central, as well as regional government continued on a highly violent level. Apart from the largest Islamist group Shariat Jamaat, at least five other groups were operating in the republic. Shootings, bombings, and ambushes against security forces, government authorities, and civilians occurred at times on a daily basis. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in many cases, but usually attributed to Islamist militants by officials. According to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the former were subordinated to Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasian Emirate [→ Russia (Islamist militants / Chechnya) et al.].

Throughout the year, the conflict had been claiming at least 413 lives and injuring 411 people, an increase of 20 percent compared to the previous year. Among the killed were at least 70 security forces, 150 militants, and 100 civilians, including

international journalists, as well as moderate muftis and imams.

Militants committed several bomb attacks. For instance, on February 15, two suicide bombers blew themselves up in the mountain village of Gubden, leaving three policemen dead and further 27 people heavily injured. On September 22, car bombs killed a policeman and wounded at least 60 people in Dagestan's capital Makhachkala. In some cases, police and FSB foiled bomb attacks, e.g., when FSB specialists defused a bomb outside a mosque in Makhachkala on February 11.

Several attacks of Islamist militants were turned on security forces, moderate religious leaders, and journalists. On April 9, unknown attackers shot dead an imam, known as a critic of the armed Islamist underground, in Yasnaya, Kizlyar district. On September 23, gunmen killed four people, among them the deputy prisons chief of Dagestan. On May 8, unknown gunmen killed moderate Islamic journalist Yakhya Magomedow near Khasavyurt. On December 15, unknown attackers killed Khadzhimurad Kamalov, known as government critic and sympathizer of Islamist militants, with automatic rifles in Makhachkala.

In the course of the year, government forces amplified efforts to contain militant Islamist activities by conducting special operations throughout the republic. In some cases, security forces utilized helicopters and heavy artillery in these operations. In a special operation on January 5, federal forces killed four suspected Islamist militants, who fired with a grenade launcher, in Khasavyurt. On January 28, troops killed Adam Guseinov, one of the Caucasian Emirs, and his wife in Khasavyurt. Guseinov had been accused of organizing and taking part in several main attacks on police officers. On April 11, five policemen and at least three Islamist militants were killed in a special operation in Tsudinsky district. The next day, three forces of the same unit were killed, when militants ambushed their vehicles in neighboring Tsumadinsky district. On April 18, security forces killed Israpil Validzhaniv, Umarov's top representative in Dagestan, held responsible for plotting several major attacks. In a large-scale operation in the Kizlyar region on May 9, troops killed seven suspected militants.

Police and FSB repeatedly uncovered arms caches, confiscating hundreds of rifles, machine guns, and explosives. In addition, authorities froze several bank accounts of alleged financial supporters. On June 26 in Makhachkala, North Caucasian muftis held the First Congress of Religious Leaders, discussing problems of political and religious extremism. *dh*

## RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / INGUSHETIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: *Islamist militants vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The secession and system conflict between the Ingush Jamaat and both central and regional authorities eased, but remained violent. Bomb attacks, gunfights, and assassination attempts on government officials and security forces occurred regularly throughout the year. According to the Ministry of Interior, violence claimed at least 70 casualties in 2011, compared to 144 in the previous year. Among the killed were 40 militants,

19 security forces as well as 10 civilians. Responsibility for the violence was uncertain in many cases, but usually attributed to Islamist militants by the authorities. According to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the former were subordinated to Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasian Emirate [→Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)].

On January 25, an Ingush suicide bomber killed 36 people and wounded over 150 in an attack on Moscow's Domodedovo airport. Later, Umarov claimed responsibility for the bombing.

Frequently, government officials and high-ranking security personnel were targeted in attacks. On January 4, a car bomb on the highway between Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia–Alania, and the main Ingush city of Nazran injured the deputy chief of staff of a military unit. Unidentified attackers killed a top administration official in Nazran on January 31. Sultan-Girei Khashagulgov, a former Ingush Deputy Minister, was injured in a car explosion on April 10. On July 1, unknown perpetrators fired heavy weapons at the Malgobek district court and detonated an explosive device near the building. Between May 31 and July 12, insurgents had been committing several attacks on police officers. On July 20, four policemen were injured in separate car bombings on the Kavkaz federal road in the Nazranovskiy District. Militants injured at least seven Chechen servicemen in an attack on their motorcade near the Ingush village of Dattykh on August 15. According to reports, a resident from Surkhakhi allegedly attacked the motorcade of Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov on October 23. However, media reports denied the incident later. Shootouts between unknown assailants and police claimed the lives of one policeman in Verkhniye Alkun on March 28 and of one civilian in the Sunzhenskiy district on June 12.

Security forces conducted several operations in Ingushetia since December 2010. On March 4, federal security forces killed Khamzat Korigov in an operation in Nazran. According to FSB, Korigov had been a leading Ingush militant. A combined airstrike and ground operation in the Sunzhenskiy district on March 28 left 17 militants dead, among them Supyan Abdulayev, a top leader and chief ideologue of the Caucasian Emirate. In the operation, special forces also detained two suspects in the Moscow airport bombing. On April 11, security forces shot dead two members of Umarov's unit in the wooded area of Sunzhenskiy district. According to the National Anti-terrorist Committee, militant leader Vakha Mochukiyev died in a shootout in Nazran on May 24. In a large-scale counter insurgency operation in the North Caucasus, the FSB had been conducting a series of special operations in Sunzhenskiy district between July 5 and November 30. Militant district leader Artur Amriyev was killed in one of these operations in Ordzhonikidzevskaya on November 19. *ka*

## RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / KABARDINO-BALKARIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: *Islamist militants vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The secession and system conflict between Islamist mili-

tants of Yarmuk Jamaat and the central as well as the regional government authorities remained violent. Gun battles, ambushes, and assassination attempts occurred regularly throughout the year, at times on an almost daily basis. Between January and December, violence left at least 73 militants, 28 security forces, and 15 civilians dead, according to official sources. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in many cases, but usually attributed to Islamist militants by the authorities. On 12/15/10, unknown assailants killed mufti Anas Pshikhachev, a top Muslim cleric, in Nalchik the regional capital. Emir Abdullah aka Asker Dzhappuyev, leading Yarmuk Jamaat together with Emir Zakaria aka Ratmir Shameyev, claimed responsibility for the attack.

In several cases, high-ranking administrative or security personnel were targeted by militants. Unidentified perpetrators shot dead Mikhail Mambetov, head of the Chegem district administration, in the town of Chegem on January 28. On February 2, several violent incidents claimed the lives of six policemen. On February 19, unidentified assailants shot dead a local official in Nalchik. Late in February, several attacks on police stations and buildings of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in and around Nalchik left at least ten people wounded. Between May 31 and September 1, militants assassinated at least seven regional police and FSB personnel.

Furthermore, militant assaults were directed at civilians. Among those were eight hunters, who were kidnapped and later killed by militants in the woods near Baksan in late December 2010. On 12/29/10, Aslan Tspinov, a well-known Circassian ethnographer, was shot dead in Nalchik. Three tourists from Moscow were shot dead by militants on their way to the Elbrus area on February 19. Later, Yarmuk Jamaat claimed responsibility for the assassination.

Throughout the year, authorities carried out several military operations, especially in the mountainous Elbrus area. The longest operation lasted from February 20 until November 6 and was conducted in response to the killing of the three tourists. On February 22, an exchange of fire between security personnel and militants in the same district left at least three militants dead. Security forces killed ten militants on Stavropol territory near the border to Kabardino-Balkaria on April 29. Among the dead were the leaders of Yarmuk Jamaat, Dzhappuyev and Shameyev. On June 2, law enforcement officers shot local militant leader Buzzhigit Khadzhiev and his companion Magomed Zalikhanov. Another operation in the Elbrus district left six militants dead on June 10. On September 3, security forces killed six insurgents in a shootout in an operation in Baksan. At least three militants and two policemen were killed in a clash in the Elbrus district on September 20. According to the head of the interior troops, 6,000 additional police troops were deployed to the Russian North Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan throughout 2011 [→ Russia (Islamist militants / Dagestan)].

ka

## RUSSIA (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: *various opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between several opposition groups and the government continued. On 12/13/10, authorities arrested about 130 protesters for taking part in unsanctioned demonstrations in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. On January 4, authorities detained 35 opposition activists staging a rally for the release of oppositional Solidarity leader Boris Nemtsov. Throughout the year, opposition activists were keeping up their pro-constitutional rallies, named Strategy 31, on the last day of each month with 31 days. The aim was to draw public attention to article 31 of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly. In turn, authorities repeatedly detained protesters. For instance, on March 31, police arrested about 150 activists, among them key opposition figures Konstantin Koyakin, leader of the Left Front movement, and Eduard Limonov, leader of the banned National Bolshevik Party, in Moscow. On April 16, some 5,000 people attended protests in Moscow, including the leaders of the unregistered People's Freedom Party (PFP), an umbrella organization of several opposition groups, and demanded fair elections and anti-corruption measures. In June, the Ministry of Justice refused to register PFP.

Between July 17 and 22, members of the Other Russia Party had been demonstrating in front of the Federal Security Service's headquarters in Moscow to urge the release of opposition activist Taisia Osipova. Authorities repeatedly dispersed the gatherings, detaining up to 80 protesters. On the occasion of the ruling United Russia (UR) party's annual congress on September 24, President Dmitry Medvedev announced not to run for presidency in 2012 but possibly to take over as prime minister in March, paving the way for Putin's third term in office. Earlier this year, constitutional changes had extended the president's term in office. In the parliamentary elections of the State Duma on December 4, Putin-led UR won 49.3 percent of the vote, suffering significant losses, but still obtaining the absolute majority in seats. OSCE election monitors criticized the vote as being manipulated in favor of the UR. On election evening, up to 10,000 people staged protests in Moscow against electoral fraud and Putin's possible return as a president. Furthermore, they called for a rerun of elections. Nationwide, police detained about 300 protesters, among them opposition leaders Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin. In the largest rally in post-Soviet Russia on December 10, some 50,000 people demonstrated against Putin in Moscow, approx. 10,000 in Saint Petersburg, and further thousands across the country. Police detained about 1,000 activists and journalists. On December 15, in a four-hour TV phone-in show, Putin rejected the accusations, as well as a recount of the election results. On December 22, Medvedev proposed electoral reforms without addressing the opposition's demands. On December 24, nationwide protests against Putin were held, with at least 30,000 people in Moscow. Authorities arrested dozens of people staging un-



sanctioned New Year's Eve protests in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

kh, map

## RUSSIA - ESTONIA

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: **Russia vs. Estonia**  
Conflict items: **territory, international power**

The conflict between Russia and Estonia over territory and international power deescalated. On January 6, Russia accused Estonia of attempting to revise their common border after Estonia's new one Euro coin appeared to display Russian territory as part of Estonia. On January 9, Russia established a ban on landownership by foreigners applying to 380 municipalities in the border area. Estonia demanded Russia to explain the measure. Therefore, negotiations concerning the 2005 border treaty, which was signed, but not ratified by Russia, remained deadlocked. On April 12, Estonia criticized Russian media for spreading anti-Estonian propaganda. On July 7, Estonian Defense Minister Mart Laar said in an interview that his country would be able to repulse a Russian tank attack. Russia was infuriated by the interview and denied any plans to attack Estonia. On September 19, Russia and Estonia signed a cooperation document concerning the return of illegal migrants to their country of origin. In addition, Estonia's Regional Affairs Minister Siim Kiisler and his Russian counterpart Viktor Basargin met on September 22 and 23 to discuss cross-border cooperation.

joe

## RUSSIA - NORWAY (BARENTS SEA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: **Russia vs. Norway**  
Conflict items: **territory, resources**

The conflict between Russia and Norway over territory and resources in the Barents Sea was solved. On 09/15/10, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Støre signed the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean [=> Russia - Norway et al. (Arctic)]. Both countries agreed on splitting the 175,000 square kilometers disputed territory into two equally sized parts. The Norwegian and Russian parliaments ratified the treaty on February 8 and March 25, respectively. Russia added a statement, saying that the treaty must not harm fishermen. On July 7, the treaty entered into force, ending the conflict. Both parties started joint military maneuvers, e.g. a six-day joint naval exercise in the Barents Sea in mid-May. In addition, Russia offered Norway to start common economic projects in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic region.

akn, map

## SERBIA (KOSOVO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: **Kosovar government vs. central government**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Kosovar government, supported by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the one hand, and the central government of Serbia and parts of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, on the other, remained violent. The Serbian government insisted that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia, whereas Kosovo continued to view itself as an independent state following its unilateral declaration of independence on 02/17/08. By December 31, the Republic of Kosovo was diplomatically recognized by 88 states. The UN, especially its Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), repeatedly urged the conflict parties to conciliate relations.

On March 8, first high-level negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo began in Brussels since the latter's unilateral declaration of independence. Thousands demonstrated against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) on March 30. Reportedly, there were among the protesters former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). On May 12, in reaction to the first visit of a Serbian state official in Kosovo, about 100 Albanians protested in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, and threw stones at the police. Security forces in riot gear used batons and tear gas to disperse the crowd, injuring some of the protesters. The Serbian government boycotted the Warsaw summit on May 25 and 26 over Kosovo's participation in the conference. Two EULEX cars were set alight in Pristina on June 7. Responsibility remained uncertain. On June 23, EU urged Serbia to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo, being a necessary precondition for accession to the EU negotiations. Subsequently, on July 2, Serbia started to accept Kosovar ID cards. Furthermore, Serbia and Kosovo exchanged their population registers. On July 26, Kosovar authorities sent police troops to the Jarnjak border post in Northern Kosovo to prevent goods traffic between Kosovo and Serbia. Consequently, several Serbs protested at the crossing point. They opened fire on the policemen, one Kosovo Police's Special Intervention Unit Kosovo officer died in a grenade blast. Furthermore, a NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) Mi-17 helicopter was shot at. The next day, ethnic Serbs attacked and burned down Jarinje border post in Northern Kosovo. While Kosovar police forces drew back, KFOR troops secured the border posts. On August 3, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic accused Kosovo of fueling tensions in Northern Kosovo. The next day, Serbia demanded Kosovar authorities to authorize KFOR to observe the border crossings. However, Kosovo rejected the demand. On September 27, KFOR and Serbs clashed in the city of Zubin Potok, northern Kosovo. While Serbian protesters threw stones and pipe bombs, KFOR troops used tear gas and rubber bullets. At least 20 people were injured. Subsequently, EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo were canceled as the former were unwilling to proceed. On October 20, some 100 Serbs protested near Zupin Potok after an Albanian had shot dead an ethnic Serb in Western Kosovo. KFOR used tear gas to disperse the protesters. On November 10, Serbs and Albanians clashed

in Kosovska Mitrovica, leaving one man dead and two injured. KFOR tried to dismantle a road blockade and disperse a crowd of protesters near Zupin Potok on November 28. Clashes left 55 people injured.

Parliamentary elections in Kosovo were held on 12/12/10. Due to electoral fraud, elections were repeated in five municipalities on January 9. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won the elections with 32.1 percent of the vote. A coalition was formed between PDK and the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR). On February 22, AKR leader Behgjet Pacolli was elected president by parliament as stipulated in the coalition agreement. However, the vote was ruled unconstitutional by the Kosovar Constitutional Court. After Pacolli had resigned on March 30, non-partisan Atifete Jahjaga was elected president on April 7. *ad, fph*

## SERBIA (WAHHABI MILITANTS / SANDZAK)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: *Wahhabi militants vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The system and ideology conflict between Serbia and the Wahhabi militants in the region of Sandzak slightly increased. On October 10, Serbian police forces conducted a raid in 18 buildings in Novi Pazar, Sejnica and Tutin. The police seized computers, laptops, CDs, military uniforms and literature promoting the Wahhabi movement. 17 people were detained, but later released after questioning. *mk*

## SERBIA (ZZV / VOJVODINA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *ZzV vs. government*  
Conflict items: *autonomy*

The autonomy conflict between Together for Vojvodina (ZzV), a political alliance of regional parties including the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats (LSV), the Union of Socialists of Vojvodina, the Vojvodinian Movement, the Social Democratic Union and the Democratic Union of Croats, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. On January 10, LSV demanded the Constitutional Court to ban the Serb Radical Party (SRS) due to radical statements of SRS deputy leader Milorad Mircic. On September 21, Vojvodina Executive Council chairman Bojan Pajtic announced the opening of Vojvodina's regional representation to the EU in Brussels, realizing a 2010 decentralization agreement between the region of Vojvodina and the central government. On October 4, Milinko Jovanov, provincial board spokesman of the Democratic Party of Serbia, accused Pajtic and LSV leader Nenad Canak of attempting the creation of a new nation of Vojvodinians. On November 27, former Minister of Agriculture Dragan Veselinov demanded the independence of Vojvodina and the call of a referendum regarding this issue by the regional parliament of Vojvodina. *fph*

## SLOVENIA - CROATIA (BORDER)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *Slovenia vs. Croatia*  
Conflict items: *territory*

The maritime and land border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia continued. On January 20, Slovenia sent a protest note to Croatia, claiming that Croatia's newly adopted regulations on fishing area boundaries were an unilateral step to determine the maritime border. The regulations drew the sea border demarcation line through the middle of the disputed Bay of Piran. One day later, however, Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor stated that Croatia regulations had no legal bearing on the arbitration agreement signed in November 2010. According to the agreement, international arbitrators would determine the sea boundary between the two countries. On May 25, Croatia and Slovenia submitted their arbitration agreement to the UN for registration. Furthermore, the conflict parties came to an understanding that the procedures for arbitration would begin after Croatia and the EU had finished accession negotiations. Finally, Croatia completed its EU accession negotiations on July, and signed the treaty on December 9. The country is expected to enter the union by the end of June 2013. *sth*

## SPAIN (ETA, PNV / BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: *ETA, PNV vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession*

The conflict between Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the central government concerning independence for the Basque provinces deescalated to a non-violent level.

ETA declared its 2010 ceasefire to be permanent on January 10. On September 25, more than 700 imprisoned ETA members called on the organization to lay down arms. On October 1, ETA supporter organization Ekin announced its disbanding. However, Spanish and French authorities continued their operations against suspected ETA members and supporters and demanded an irreversible end of ETA's militant activities.

On 12/15/10, Spanish police arrested eight suspected members of Basque pro-independence organization SEGI, affiliated with ETA, in Bilbao and Pamplona. On March 3, Spanish police arrested four suspected ETA members in Bilbao and Galdakao and seized 200 kg of explosives. The suspects had been accused of being involved in ETA's killing of a police officer in 2009. On March 11, French police arrested Alejandro Zobarán Arriola and Mikel Oroz Torrea, suspected to be ETA's military and logistics chiefs, in a village near the Belgian border. Between April 12 and 15, Spanish police detected a total of 1,600 kg of bomb-building components in various hideouts and arrested three suspects. On July 7, British policemen arrested an alleged ETA member in Cambridge, United Kingdom, wanted for an assassination attempt on Spanish King Juan Carlos I. in 1997.

In the course of the year, Spanish and French courts tried



several ETA members for their involvement in militant activities. For instance, a Madrid court sentenced former ETA military leader Garikoitz „Txeroki“ Aspiazu to 377 years in prison on July 22. On November 4, former ETA chief Francisco Javier Garcia Gaztelu received a prison term of 105 years for killing a politician and his bodyguards in February 2000. Several senior figures of the banned political Batasuna party, accused to be related to ETA by the government, declared the formation of the new party Sortu on February 17. Sortu distanced itself from ETA and opposed ETA violence.

On October 20, ETA declared the definitive end of the use of weapons and asked the governments of Spain and France for a dialog. Three days before, international negotiators had met in San Sebastian, appealing ETA for non-violence. Subsequently, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero met with the leader of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) on October 24 to discuss the new political situation and the relocation of prisoners to the Basque country. *ts, dh*

## TURKEY - ARMENIA

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: **Turkey vs. Armenia**  
Conflict items: **international power, other**

The conflict between Turkey and Armenia over international power and Turkey's refusal to recognize mass killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire in the course of World War I as genocide, remained on a non-violent level.

On January 25, Turkish President Abdullah Gül emphasized at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France, that Turkey would not recognize the killings as genocide. On April 24, all over Armenia several thousand people commemorated the massacre's anniversary and demanded Turkey's recognition of the killings as genocide. The same day in Istanbul, Turkey, hundreds of Turkish intellectuals and human rights activists participated in a commemoration rally for the Armenian victims of the killings. On May 3, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian repeated his demand for an international recognition of the killings as genocide. International reactions were discordant. While US President Barack Obama refused the recognition on April 24, the French parliament passed a bill on December 22, naming the disputed killings a genocide and criminalizing its denial. Already in October, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had urged Turkey to follow Sarkisian's appeal.

On April 26, Turkish authorities dismantled a reconciliation monument in the Turkish province of Kars near the Armenian border. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian strongly condemned the deconstruction as damage to the countries' normalization process. During preceding protests in Istanbul against the dismantling on April 18, popular Turkish artist Bedri Baykam and his secretary Tugba Kurtulus were stabbed by unknown attackers.

After Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian had announced his country's readiness to reestablish diplomatic ties with Turkey, he blamed Turkey for continuously refusing the ratification of Turkish-Armenian normalization agreements from 2009 in a speech at the UN General Assembly on September

23. On December 2, Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil Cicek announced that the normalization agreement protocols were to be discussed again by the parliament. *fes*

## TURKEY - GREECE (BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: **Turkey vs. Greece**  
Conflict items: **territory**

The conflict between Turkey and Greece over territory continued. The conflict parties' common maritime border in the Aegean Sea and air space remained disputed.

On 12/21/10, eight Turkish F-16 jets entered the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) and flew over two Greek islands in the northeastern Aegean, before they were intercepted by Greek air forces. On November 16, two Turkish aerial-survey planes entered the Athens FIR for one minute and flew at low height over the Greek island of Kastelorizo. The Greek armed forces perceived the air space violation as a provocation. In mid-January, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan requested the General Staff and the Turkish Air Force Command to limit the number of flights over the disputed Aegean areas. According to Turkish media, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou followed a similar stance, asking the Greek Air Force's pilots to maintain a distance of two miles to Turkish warplanes. In early June, Greek Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Vasileios Klokozas attended the Turkish Air Force's 100th anniversary celebrations, following an invitation of his Turkish counterpart Hakan Aksay. On May 24, the Turkish General Staff shortly cancelled its annual military land, air, and sea exercise.

On September 15, Turkey launched a two-months marine survey in the southeastern Aegean Sea, which Greece considers being its own seabed. The following day, Greece protested against the survey and requested the abstention from exploratory activities near Kastelorizo. *kwu*

## UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: **IRA, RIRA, ONH, CIRA, INLA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, DUP, UUP, Orange Order, UDA, UVF, RHC**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict between the antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom continued.


The republican party Sinn Féin declared to seek a referendum on Irish unity, and a new all-Ireland constitution in its election campaign. On May 5, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly were held. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) turned out as the strongest party with 38 seats, followed by Sinn Féin which gained 29.

On September 16, Minister of Justice David Ford criticized the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister for slow progress on the parliamentary strategy on improving community relations called Cohesion, Sharing and Integration, made to address issues like peace lines, segregated housing, shared schooling, and racism. Paramilitary violence continued. Constable Ronan Kerr was killed by a car bomb in Omagh, Tyrone County, on April 2. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, officials blamed dissident republicans. On a rally organized by the 32 County Sovereignty Movement in Londonderry on April 25, a masked man threatened that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) would kill police officers and declared its opposition to the Queen's first visit to the Irish Republic in May. On June 20 and 21, violence erupted in East Belfast, leaving a photographer dead. According to police sources, paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) orchestrated the unrest. In the run-up to the Orange Order's July Twelfth parades, tensions rose in several parts of Belfast, culminating in clashes between nationalist youths and riot police on July 12. Police used batons and water cannon while rioters threw brick stones, petrol bombs, and fireworks. Two bomb attacks hit Claudy, Londonderry County, on September 14. Officials blamed RIRA for the bombings. Another bomb attack on Londonderry's 2013 City of Culture offices was attributed to dissident republicans. On November 14, Ford declared that the number of dissident republican attacks had decreased from 40 in 2010 to 25 in 2011.

*jb*

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



■ : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT  
■ : CRISIS  
■ : LIMITED WAR  
■ : WAR

With a total of 91, the number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by two in comparison to 2010. Twelve of these were highly violent conflicts, thereby showing a doubling of this category. While the northern part of Sub-Saharan Africa was almost completely affected by violent and especially highly violent conflicts, the southern part was only affected in patches.

Altogether, eight wars were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa: In addition to the continuing wars in Somalia and Sudan (→ Somalia (Islamist groups), Sudan (Darfur)), six conflicts escalated to the intensity level of war.

The conflict between the Islamist groups of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, on the one hand, and the Somali government supported by the Ahlu Sunna wa-Jama'a, on the other, was fought out as a war for the sixth year running and was further aggravated by the famine in the Horn of Africa. The war in the Sudanese region of Darfur had remained on a highly violent level since its eruption in 2003, but was characterized by a high number of negotiations and ceasefire agreements between most of the rebel groups and governments in the second half of the year.

Furthermore, the conflict between supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and supporters of Alassane Ouattara in Côte d'Ivoire escalated to a war, when Gbagbo refused to hand over power to the internationally recognized new president Ouattara after the November 2010 elections (→ Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)). Also, the conflict between the northern and the southern populations of Nigeria turned highly violent when the southern candidate and then president Goodluck Jonathan decided to run for president (→ Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)). The fifth conflict on the intensity level of war was also observed in Nigeria. After the Islamist group Boko Haram had conducted mostly single drive-by shootings in recent years, they changed their modus operandi this year, detonating a series of bombs, and thereby intensified their fight for a Muslim state (→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)).

Another three conflicts escalated to the intensity level of war in Sudan and South Sudan, respectively. Concentrated in the province of Jonglei, various ethnic groups clashed over natural resources and livestock, with most of the violence occurring between members of the Murle and the Lou-Nuer (→ Sudan (inter-ethnic violence), since July South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)). Altogether, these fights left at least 1,700 people

dead. Furthermore, several groups of militias, most of them led by renegade generals, had started their fight against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) after the April 2010 elections [Sudan (SPLM/A – various militias), since July South Sudan (various militias)]. Prior to the independence of South Sudan on July 9, the conflict between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and SPLM/A, which constituted the regional government of the province Southern Sudan as well as the later national government of the new state South Sudan, intensified (→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)). The conflict formally ended with the secession of Southern Sudan, transforming into a new highly violent conflict between the two states of Sudan and South Sudan (→ Sudan – South Sudan).


The number of limited wars stayed constant with a total of four cases: While the conflict DR Congo (FDLR) escalated into a violent crisis, Uganda (LRA) remained a limited war. Furthermore, one intrastate and one interstate conflict started as limited wars in the very year of their beginning, both of them in the context of the independence of South Sudan (→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile), Sudan – South Sudan).

The number of violent crises decreased slightly by three, compared to 37 cases in 2010, resulting in 34 violent crises in 2011. The most frequent conflict item in the region were resources with 32 cases, often combined with the second-most frequent item, national power (29 cases), or subnational predominance (25 cases). In five out of the eight wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, resources were on the agenda, while issues of system/ideology were central to four wars.


All three cases of attempted coup d'états were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, but all of them failed or were foiled (→ Guinea (opposition), Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters), Niger (opposition)).

This year, the Sudanese and South Sudanese territory were worst affected by violent conflicts, encompassing four wars, two limited wars, and one violent crisis. Also heavily affected by conflicts was Nigeria with seven intrastate and one interstate conflict, six of them violent. Nevertheless, the country with the highest number of conflicts remained the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), accounting for ten intrastate and three interstate conflicts, while three of the conflicts in DRC were classified as crises and one as a limited war.

### CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2011 COMPARED TO 2010



### FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



## CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                                | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                                       | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|--|--|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Angola (FLEC / Cabinda)                                      | FLEC vs. government  | secession, resources                                 | 1975  | •                   | 3                      |
| Angola (UNITA)*  | UNITA vs. government   | national power                                       | 1975  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Angola - DR Congo*   | Angola vs. DR Congo  | territory, resources, other                          | 2009  | •                   | 2                      |
| Botswana (Basarwa)*  | Basarwa vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources | 1997  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Burundi (FNL)  | FNL vs. government   | national power                                       | 2005  | •                   | 3                      |
| Burundi (Hutu - Tutsi)*                                      | various Hutu parties vs. various Tutsi parties   | national power                                       | 1962  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Burundi (various opposition groups)                          | UPRONA, FRODEBU, FORSC, CNDD vs. government  | national power                                       | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Burundi - Rwanda (border)*                                   | Burundi vs. Rwanda   | territory  | 1960  | •                   | 1                      |
| Cameroon (insurgents / Bakassi)                              | AMC, BFF vs. government  | autonomy   | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Central African Republic (various rebel groups)              | CPJP vs. government, UFDR  | national power                                       | 2005  | •                   | 3                      |
| Chad (various opposition groups)*                            | government vs. UNDR, URD, et al.   | national power                                       | 1990  | •                   | 1                      |
| Chad (various rebel groups)*                                 | UFR, PFNR, MPRD, UFDD vs. government   | national power, resources                            | 2005  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Comores (Anjouan, Mohéli)*                                   | regional government of Mohéli, regional government of Anjouan vs. regional government of Grand Comore            | national power                                       | 1997  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Côte d'Ivoire (FN)*  | FN vs. government  | national power                                       | 1999  | •                   | 2                      |
| Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)                                   | supporters of Ouattara, FN vs. supporters of Gbagbo  | national power                                       | 2000  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| DR Congo (Bundu dia Mayala)*                                 | Bundu dia Kongo vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology                            | 2000  | •                   | 1                      |
| DR Congo (CNDP)*   | CNDP vs. government  | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2004  | •                   | 2                      |
| DR Congo (Enyele - Boba)*                                    | Enyele vs. Boba  | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2009  | END                 | 1                      |
| DR Congo (Enyele)*   | Enyele vs. government  | subnational predominance                             | 2010  | ↓                   | 2                      |
| DR Congo (FDLR)  | FDLR vs. government  | subnational predominance, resources                  | 1997  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| DR Congo (FRF)*  | FRF vs. government   | national power                                       | 1998  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| DR Congo (Ituri Militias)                                    | DR Congo Armed forces (FARDC) vs. Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI), Popular Front for Justice in Congo | subnational predominance, resources                  | 1999  | •                   | 3                      |
| DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)*  | various Mayi-Mayi groups, government   | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2004  | •                   | 3                      |
| DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UDPS, UNC)                               | MLC, UNC, UDPS vs. government  | national power                                       | 1997  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| DR Congo - Rwanda*   | DR Congo vs. Rwanda  | resources, other                                     | 2002  | •                   | 1                      |
| Equatorial Guinea - Gabon (Mbanié, Cocotier, Conga islands)* | Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon  | territory, resources                                 | 1970  | •                   | 1                      |
| Eritrea - Djibouti (border)*                                 | Eritrea vs. Djibouti   | territory  | 1994  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Ethiopia (OLF / Oromiya)                                     | Ethiopia vs. OLF   | secession  | 1973  | •                   | 3                      |
| Ethiopia (ONLF / Ogaden)*                                    | ONLF vs. government  | secession, resources                                 | 1984  | ↘                   | 3                      |
| Ethiopia (Oromo - Somali)*                                   | Oromo vs. Somali   | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2005  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Ethiopia (TPDM)*   | TPDM vs. government  | subnational predominance                             | 2002  | •                   | 1                      |
| Ethiopia (various opposition groups)                         | Medrek, OFDM, OPC, UDJ, ENDP vs. government  | national power                                       | 2005  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Ethiopia - Eritrea   | Ethiopia vs. Eritrea   | territory, other                                     | 1998  | •                   | 2                      |
| Gabon (UN)   | UN vs. government  | national power                                       | 2009  | •                   | 2                      |
| Guinea (UFDG)  | UFDG vs. government  | national power                                       | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)*                               | government vs. coup plotters   | national power, resources                            | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| Guinea-Bissau (opposition)*                                  | opposition vs. government  | national power                                       | 1998  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)                                | Samburu vs. Turkana vs. Pokot vs. Borana vs. Merille   | subnational predominance, resources                  | 1991  | •                   | 3                      |



## CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>            | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>                                       | Conflict items                             | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|---|--|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Kenya (Mungiki)                          | government vs. Mungiki  | system/ideology, subnational predominance  | 2002  | •                   | 3                      |
| Kenya (PNU - ODM)*                       | PNU vs. ODM   | national power                             | 1999  | •                   | 2                      |
| Kenya (SLDF)*                            | SLDF vs. government   | subnational predominance                   | 2002  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Madagascar (TGV - TIM)*                  | TIM vs. TGV   | national power                             | 2009  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Mali (AQIM)                              | AQIM vs. government   | system/ideology, other                     | 2009  | •                   | 3                      |
| Mali (Tuareg / Kidal)                    | ANM, MTNM, MNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. government                        | autonomy, resources                        | 1989  | •                   | 2                      |
| Niger (AQIM)*                            | AQIM vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance  | 2009  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Niger (opposition)                       | opposition groups vs. government                                    | national power                             | 2009  | •                   | 3                      |
| Niger (Tuareg / Agadez)*                 | MNJ vs. government  | autonomy, resources                        | 1999  | •                   | 2                      |
| Nigeria (Boko Haram)                     | BH vs. government   | system/ideology                            | 2003  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)*          | Christian groups vs. Muslim groups                                  | system/ideology, subnational predominance  | 1960  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists)*        | farmers vs. pastoralists  | subnational predominance, resources        | 1960  | ↘                   | 3                      |
| Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)      | MEND, NDLF, IRA, et al. vs. government                              | subnational predominance, resources        | 1997  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nigeria (MASSOB / Biafra)*               | MASSOB vs. government   | secession                                  | 1967  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni / Niger Delta)*    | MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government   | autonomy, resources                        | 1990  | •                   | 1                      |
| Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners)      | Northerners vs. Southerners   | system/ideology, national power, resources | 1960  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)*            | Nigeria vs. Cameroon  | territory, resources                       | 1961  | •                   | 1                      |
| Republic of Congo (CNR, Ninja militias)* | CNR, Ninja militias vs. government                                  | autonomy                                   | 1997  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)       | FDLR, various Hutu rebel groups vs. government                      | national power                             | 1990  | •                   | 3                      |
| Rwanda (various opposition groups)*      | FDU-Inkingi, UDF, ex-RPF, PS, DGPR vs. government                   | national power                             | 2010  | •                   | 2                      |
| Rwanda - France*                         | Rwanda, France  | international power, other                 | 2004  | •                   | 1                      |
| Rwanda - Uganda*                         | Rwanda vs. Uganda   | other                                      | 2000  | •                   | 1                      |
| Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)               | MFDC vs. government   | secession                                  | 1982  | •                   | 3                      |
| Sierra Leone (APC - SLPP)*               | APC vs. SLPP  | national power                             | 2007  | •                   | 3                      |
| Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)*     | al-Shabaab vs. Hizbul Islam   | subnational predominance                   | 2009  | <b>END</b>          | 3                      |
| Somalia (Islamist groups)                | Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab vs. TFG, ASWG                              | system/ideology, national power            | 2006  | •                   | 5                      |
| Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)          | autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland | territory, subnational predominance        | 1998  | •                   | 3                      |
| Somalia (Puntland)*                      | autonomous region of Puntland vs. TFG                               | autonomy                                   | 1998  | •                   | 1                      |
| Somalia (Somaliland - SSC)*              | regional government of Somaliland vs. SSC                           | subnational predominance                   | 2009  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Somalia (Somaliland)*                    | regional government of Somaliland vs. TFG                           | secession                                  | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal)*            | ANC vs. NFP vs. IFP   | subnational predominance                   | 1990  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| South Africa (xenophobes - immigrants)   | xenophobic gangs in South Africa, immigrants in South Africa        | other                                      | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| South Africa - Namibia (border)*         | Namibia vs. South Africa  | territory, resources                       | 1991  | •                   | 1                      |
| Sudan (Darfur)                           | JEM, SLM/A-AW, SLM/A-MM, LJM, JEM-KI, SPLM/A-North vs. government   | subnational predominance, resources        | 2003  | •                   | 5                      |
| Sudan (Eastern Front)*                   | Eastern Front vs. government  | autonomy, resources                        | 2005  | •                   | 1                      |

## CONFLICTS IN V IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>   | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                      | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|--|-------------------------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Sudan (inter-ethnic violence), since July South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence) | Murle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Dinka-Bor vs. Turkana vs. Toposa vs. Mundari  | subnational predominance, resources | 2008  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A), since July South Sudan (LRA)*                           | LRA vs. SPLM/A, since July government  | subnational predominance            | 1994  | •                   | 3                      |
| Sudan (SPLM/A - various militias), since July South Sudan (various militias)  | Shilluk militias (South Sudan), Militias David Yau Yau, SSLM-Gadet, SSDM, Militias Gatluak Gai, Militias Gabriel Tang-Ginye vs. GoSS | system/ideology, resources          | 2010  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)  | Sudan vs. SPLM/A   | secession, resources                | 1955  | END                 | 5                      |
| Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)                           | SPLM/A-North vs. government  | autonomy, system/ideology           | 2011  | NEW                 | 4                      |
| Sudan - Eritrea *   | Eritrea vs. Sudan  | other                               | 1994  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Sudan - South Sudan   | Sudan vs. South Sudan  | territory, resources                | 2011  | NEW                 | 4                      |
| Sudan - Uganda (border), since July South Sudan - Uganda (border)*            | Sudan vs. Uganda   | territory                           | 1994  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Swaziland (various opposition groups)*  | government vs. PUDEMO, SWAYOCO, SFTU, COSATU   | system/ideology, national power     | 1998  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Swaziland - South Africa*   | Swaziland vs. South Africa   | territory                           | 1902  | •                   | 1                      |
| Tanzania (CUF / Zanzibar)*  | CUF vs. government   | secession                           | 1993  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Togo (ANC)*   | ANC vs. government   | national power                      | 2002  | ↗                   | 2                      |
| Uganda (ADF, NALU)*   | ADF, NALU vs. government   | subnational predominance, resources | 1987  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Uganda (Baganda / Buganda)*   | Kingdom of Buganda vs. government  | autonomy, resources                 | 1995  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Uganda (LRA)  | LRA vs. government   | subnational predominance            | 1987  | •                   | 4                      |
| Uganda (opposition movement)  | government vs. opposition  | national power                      | 2001  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Uganda - DR Congo (Lake Albert)*  | Uganda vs. DR Congo  | territory, resources                | 2007  | •                   | 2                      |
| Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M – ZANU-PF)   | MDC-T, MDC-M vs. Zanu-PF   | national power                      | 2000  | •                   | 3                      |

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## ANGOLA (FLEC / CABINDA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: **FLEC vs. government**  
Conflict items: **secession, resources**

The conflict between the Front for Liberation of the Enclave Cabinda (FLEC) and the government, concerning secession and resources, continued. Four human rights activists who had been jailed on the accusations of perpetrating the FLEC attack on the Togolese football team in January 2010 were released on 12/22/2010. Meanwhile, another suspect in this case was sentenced to 24 years in prison on 12/29/2010. Between January 8 and 17, six people had been arrested without warrant for collaborating with FLEC. On February 4, FLEC rebels declared the independence of Cabinda from Angola and presented the charter of the new Republic Cabinda. On February 28, FLEC rebels attacked a logistic convoy in Bucu-Zau, Cabinda. An unknown number of people died on both sides in a responding operation by government forces against FLEC hideouts between March 1 and 3. One week later, the government offered FLEC reconciliation - which was declined by the rebels. Within the first three weeks of March, two leaders of FLEC were found murdered in Cabinda, but it remained unclear who was to be held responsible. On March 19, FLEC rebels and government forces clashed in the northern Cabinda province, resulting in an unknown number of casualties on both sides. On May 3, government forces crossed the border to the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to carry out a military operation against FLEC rebels. On June 7, the self-declared Republic of Cabinda established the Service of Intelligence of the Republic of Kabinda (SIRKA) and the Black Command Army to support FLEC in their struggle for independence. On July 31, new clashes between government forces and FLEC were reported near the Mediakoko forests, causing numerous people to flee. In late December, the AU agreed to investigate the claims of the Cabindans, which had been filed more than five years ago.

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## BURUNDI (FNL)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **FNL vs. government**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The national power struggle between the National Front for Liberation (FNL) and the government, led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, continued. Attacks by suspected FNL supporters against security forces, as well as alleged executions of FNL members by security forces were reported throughout the year. They intensified from March onwards, finally occurring on a daily basis according to local rights groups. Furthermore, numerous attacks by small armed groups on police posts, members of the ruling party National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), and civilians were attributed to the FNL by international

observers. Most affected were the capital, Bujumbura, and Bujumbura Rural province. The provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza, Makamba, Ruyigi, and Cankuzo were also targeted. For instance, a local CNDD-FDD official was shot dead in Kabezi near Bujumbura on May 4. The following month, three people were killed in an assault on a police post in Bujumbura. At least nine people were killed in skirmishes between gunmen and security forces in Cibitoke province on July 19 and 20. According to intelligence sources, dozens of armed FNL members raided a bar in Gatumba, Bujumbura, on September 19, leaving 39 people dead. The UN repeatedly expressed its concerns over extrajudicial executions of FNL affiliates by security forces. Among the victims were three leading FNL figures killed in July, August, and September. Rwasa accused the security forces of having executed 169 of his followers between January and the end of August. At the end of November, rights groups estimated that approx. 300 demobilized FNL fighters had been killed by government forces since July. The UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) set the number of extrajudicial killings between January and November at 57. On December 20, the UN extended BINUB's mandate to February 2013.

According to a UN report published in late 2010, the former presidential candidate and FNL leader Agathon Rwasa had assembled around 700 fighters in the Sud Kivu province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The FNL collaborated with the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba of the Bembe community in the Fizi territory [→DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. The Congolese army confirmed clashes with FNL fighters in Sud Kivu on January 25 and 26 in which six people were killed. Operations by Burundian and DRC military in the Burundian and Congolese areas of the Rukoko forest in December 2010 and January dispersed FNL further south in the DRC. On October 5, militias attacked a minibus near the town of Fizi, Sud Kivu. After identifying several Banyamulenge-Tutsi among the passengers, at least seven of them were killed. Local officials suspected the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba and the FNL of being responsible for the attack.

A hitherto unknown group named Burundi National Front – Tabara (FRONABU-Tabara) claimed responsibility for an attack on two bridges in Bujumbura in July and for some previous violent incidents. According to a TV report broadcasted in December, which was denied by the government, FRONABU-Tabara was based in Sud Kivu, DRC.

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## BURUNDI (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **UPRONA, FRODEBU, FORSC, CNDD vs. government**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The national power struggle between several opposition groups and the government, led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, remained violent. Throughout the year, security forces arrested several opposition supporters, while many oppositional leaders went underground or into exile. For instance, authorities arrested Isidore Ruyikiri, president of the Burun-

di Bar Association, on July 27, after pleading for an arrested lawyer on a rally. Additionally, journalists were harassed after they had published reports criticizing the government or supporting the opposition. Patrick Mitabaro, chief editor of a citizen radio, was summoned to court several times, e.g. after airing an interview with an exiled opposition leader in May. On April 8, police in Bujumbura blocked a demonstration aimed at demanding an inquiry into the case of assassinated anti-corruption activist Ernest Manirumya. On April 30, the senate passed a law regulating political parties, thereby making it harder for opposition parties to gain legal status. In early September, a document bearing the title *Safish*, the Swahili word for cleaning, was published by a local human rights organization. It listed the names of 60 government opponents, including members of the National Liberation Front (→Burundi (FNL)). The government denied allegations that the document was a hit list. On October 26, security service arrested opposition politician William Munyembabazi, secretary general of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD).

In November, the Force for the Restoration of Democracy (FRD), a recently formed armed group, accused the government of numerous extrajudicial killings and corruption and declared its aim to overthrow the government. On November 21, clashes between FRD and security forces in Cankuzo and Ruyigi left eighteen people dead.

mwe

## CAMEROON (INSURGENTS / BAKASSI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **AMC, BFF vs. government**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between Cameroon and insurgent-groups over resource-rich Bakassi peninsula continued. Attacks against facilities of the Cameroonian government continued, while Nigeria and Cameroon intensified joint military action against armed insurgents (→Nigeria – Cameroon (Bakassi)). On February 7, gunmen of the Africa Marine Commando (AMC), a pirate insurgent group, killed two policemen in a military outpost in Kombo Etindi and took thirteen Cameroon officials hostage in coordinated attacks, trying to force the government to release all Nigerians in their custody. Furthermore, they demanded monthly compensation payments of the five oil multinationals exploiting the Bakassi oil fields. Nevertheless, Cornelius Edonde, mayor of Kombo Etindi, suspected the militant faction Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) of being the heavily armed raiders. After nine days of hostage-taking the kidnapped were released, while it was unknown whether the government fulfilled the insurgents claims. On February 11, a soldier and a rebel were killed in a further attack at Isagnele, but no group claimed responsibility, although the attack was attributed to the AMC. Subsequently to these attacks, the Prime Minister met with an Nigerian delegation to hold talks about joint border patrols. The AMC was also blamed for a bank raid in Douala on March 18, in which nine people were killed, although the location was not part of the general field of operation of the AMC. Furthermore, ahead of the general elections in Cameroon, the displaced people in Bakassi ac-

cused the Cross River State Government of disregarding their requirements for resettlement. On February 22, several hundred people seized the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission in Calabar, alleging the commission of fraud in the voters registration process, especially by excluding 90 percent of Bakassi's indigenes.

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## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (VARIOUS REBEL GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**


Conflict parties: **CPJP vs. government, UFDR**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The power conflict between the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), on the one hand, and the government and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), on the other, continued. Tensions rose due to the legislative and presidential elections in January. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), UFDR, and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) stuck to the peace agreements of 2007 and 2008. The CPJP continued to fight UFDR and the government. UFDR complained about a lack of government support in their fight against CPJP. While the Security Council extended the mandate for the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) until January 2013, MINURCAT troops had withdrawn in late 2010. On January 13, President François Bozizé appointed six rebel leaders counselors to supervise the disarmament process. Ten days later, Bozizé's was reelected president. On February 11, seven people died in clashes between CPJP rebels and government forces. In a CPJP attack on two villages near Ndele, Bamingui-Bangoran, seven civilians were killed and 150 houses burnt on March 21. On April 10, up to 27 rebels and soldiers were killed in a fight between CPJP and the army with UFDR forces in Sissikebe, Bamingui-Bangoran. After holding peace talks with the government, CPJP signed a ceasefire agreement on June 12. Notwithstanding the peace deal, fights between UFDR and CPJP caused the death of 43 people between September 11 and 14 near Bria, Haute-Kotto. On September 24, six people were killed in a CPJP attack on a vehicle carrying UFDR members and civilians. On October 8, CPJP and UFDR signed a ceasefire and subsequently withdrew from the area around Bria.

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## CÔTE D'IVOIRE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↑ | Start: **2000**



Conflict parties: **supporters of Ouattara, FN vs. supporters of Gbagbo**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The national power struggle between supporters of Alassane

Ouattara and supporters of Laurent Gbagbo escalated to a war. The presidential elections of 11/28/2010 led to the eruption of violence due to Gbagbo's refusal to hand over power to the internationally recognized winner Ouattara. An estimated 3,000 people were killed in the following five months, while about one million people were displaced. Main site of the violence was Abidjan, Lagunes region.

Despite a night-time curfew, due to the increased tensions, four people were killed in an attack on an office of Ouattara in Abidjan on 12/02/2010. A few hours later, the electoral commission declared Ouattara winner of the elections. Gbagbo and the Constitutional Council contested the result, accusing Ouattara and his followers of fraud in the northern country. Shortly thereafter, the military closed the borders and cut international media. On 12/04/2010, both candidates were simultaneously sworn in as president, accompanied by protests on the streets. On 12/13/2010, troops loyal to Gbagbo surrounded Ouattara's headquarters in Abidjan, which was protected by 800 UN troops. By the end of 2010, 200 people had been killed in clashes between supporters of both candidates, several hundred had been abducted and about 14,000 had fled their homes. After the UN had recognized Ouattara as legitimate president in mid-December, Gbagbo demanded the withdrawal of all 10,000 international peacekeepers. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon rejected the request and stated that several Liberian mercenaries were supporting Gbagbo by harassing certain parts of the population on 12/21/2010. In response to a request of local UN peacekeeping chief Alain Le Roy, the Security Council on January 19 voted to send additional 2,000 troops to Côte d'Ivoire.

Since February 24, violence had also spread to the northern part of the country, where members of the New Forces (FN) in support of Ouattara fought against pro-Gbagbo forces [→ Côte d'Ivoire (FN)]. On March 2, water and electricity were cut from the FN dominated northern regions. In early March, the houses of several officials appointed by Ouattara were looted by pro-Gbagbo youth groups. By mid-March, at least 365 people had been killed and an estimated 450,000 people had fled Abidjan, while another 70,000 fled the western part of the country, most of them to neighboring Liberia. Meanwhile, fighting spread from the suburb of Abobo to further areas of Abidjan. Thousands of Gbagbo supporters registered for the army after an appeal by a Gbagbo ally in late March. By the end of the month, approx. one million people had fled the violence in Abidjan and western parts of the country according to UNHCR. In late March and early April, fighting between Ouattara-affiliated FN members and Gbagbo supporters in Duekoue, Moyen-Cavally, resulted in the death of at least 800 people and caused another 30,000 to flee within one week. In reaction to the advances of Ouattara supporters, Gbagbo called for an immediate ceasefire on March 29. Two days later, Gbagbo's army chief Edouard Kassarate defected to Ouattara. In an offensive starting on March 31, forces supporting Ouattara attacked the presidential residence in Abidjan's Cocody district, Gbagbo's last stronghold. On April 3, French forces took control of the airport in Abidjan, after sending an additional 300 troops to the country. One day later, French and UN helicopters conducted air strikes against military camps of Gbagbo supporters. In reaction to the increasing violence, further thousands of people fled Abidjan. On April 5, fighting stopped for some hours to

hold UN mediated talks. Gbagbo's troops used the rest period to gain ground and attacked Ouattara's base on April 9. The next day, the international forces started a new helicopter offensive against Gbagbo's base and military camps, while French troops also entered Abidjan in armored vehicles on April 11. The same day, Gbagbo surrendered and was brought to Ouattara's headquarters.

However, sporadic clashes in Abidjan continued. In mid-April, human rights organizations urged Ouattara to stop the house-to-house raids searching for Gbagbo supporters. Thereafter, Ouattara ordered all soldiers to stop fighting and return to their barracks. After Ouattara's troops had gained control over the whole city of Abidjan in early May, international aid organizations discovered at least 70 bodies in the streets of the city. On May 6, Ouattara was officially sworn in as president. In early May, a mass grave was discovered in Abidjan's Yopougon suburb, burying the bodies of 50 men, who had allegedly been killed the day after Gbagbo's arrest. Another 200 people were killed in the first week of May in the western region when retiring pro-Gbagbo militias headed towards the Liberian border. UN denounced executions of 26 people throughout July, mainly conducted by Ouattara troops.

By mid-August, all key figures supporting Gbagbo had been charged, while Gbagbo stayed under house arrest in Korhogo, Savanes department. On September 5, Ouattara appointed the members of the Truth, Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission that had been established to investigate the post-election violence. On November 30, Gbagbo was extradited to The Hague, where he was charged with crimes against humanity, becoming the first former head of state to appear at ICC. The parliamentary elections on December 11 were marked by a low turnout and a boycott by the Gbagbo's party. Ouattara's party won 127 out of 255 parliament seats.

The conflict also spilled over to France as two people were injured in clashes between Gbagbo loyalists and Ouattara supporters in Paris on 12/19/2010.

Several mediation efforts by ECOWAS and AU between December and April failed. In early December 2010, ECOWAS and AU suspended the Ivorian membership. After three days of discussion in the Security Council, the UN recognized Ouattara as the legitimate new president on 12/09/2010. On 12/21/2010, the UN Security Council prolonged the mandate of ONUCI for another six months. Also in December 2010, EU and UN imposed travel bans on Gbagbo, his family, and several of his associates. The same month, Nigeria offered exile to Gbagbo. Meanwhile, the World Bank froze its loans to the country and the Central Bank of West African States denied Gbagbo access to the country's funds by handing over full control to Ouattara. Switzerland also froze Gbagbo's assets. nch

## DR CONGO (FDLR)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **FDLR vs. government**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda



(FDLR) and the government escalated to a highly violent conflict. FDLR were a Hutu rebel group that originated from the Interahamwe who were held responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda [→Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)]. Although FDLR fighting capacity dropped to around 3,500 men, they remained the most active and most violent rebel group, according to the UN Group of Experts on Congo. FDLR allied with smaller groups, such as Mayi-Mayi and National Liberation Forces (FNL) in Sud Kivu and northern Katanga [→DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi), Burundi (FNL-Rwasa)].

FDLR took control over large parts of the provinces of Sud and Nord Kivu after several local regiments of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) had been withdrawn from their positions for restructuring purposes in January. Since March, FDLR pushed their area of influence westwards as far as Maniema province, attacking villages and causing the population to flee, such as on April 11 and 12. Furthermore, FDLR occupied several mining sites throughout the year. For instance, UN sources reported that FDLR occupied the mining sector of Muhangi in Nord Kivu.

On January 24, FDLR attacked government soldiers in Virunga National Park in Nord Kivu, resulting in the death of five soldiers and three rangers. On May 7, FDLR attacked a vehicle carrying the minister of higher education Leonard Mashako Mamba, in Rutshuru, Nord Kivu. The driver was killed, while the minister escaped unharmed.

On July 16, FDLR attacked the village of Hombo in Sud Kivu, causing the population to flee. According to a local NGO, another 10,000 families in Shabunda, Sud Kivu, had to flee from FDLR attacks in June and July. In early August, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Janvier took the town of Mutongo in Nord Kivu, causing approx. 7,000 people to flee. On August 14, FARDC deployed a battalion to northern Katanga in order to fight the coalition of Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, FDLR, and FNL. On August 24, they recaptured Katanga, killing 160 rebels according to army statements. On September 24, FDLR attacked the village of Kwakitumba and occupied a nearby mining site. Consequently, fights between FARDC and the rebels erupted, causing 700 people to flee. In the course of September, the regrouped FARDC brigades returned to the Kivus. On November 1, the army spokesman announced to deploy thirteen additional regiments to the Kivus in order to secure the November 28 presidential elections.

Increased attacks by FDLR prompted the emergence of several self-defense groups and sporadic fights between Mayi-Mayi groups and FDLR. In one of these clashes on November 20, Mayi-Mayi Cheka members killed FDLR Colonel Evariste Kanzegehura alias Sadiki.

Starting in May, MONUSCO launched several operations to fill the security void caused by the withdrawal of the FARDC troops. Between May and November, MONUSCO and FARDC conducted the three-phased joint operation "Jua Mupia" in Nord Kivu, resulting in the death of approx. 20 rebels. On June 30, the UN Security Council renewed MONUSCO's mandate for another year.

In March, negotiations between the government and the FDLR about the relocation of FDLR headquarters to Maniema and disarmament, in exchange for financial compensation, failed.

Throughout the year, several hundred FDLR members defected, among them Lieutenant Colonel Bisengimana, who had been responsible for the FDLR's recruitment.

On May 4, the trial against former FDLR president Ignace Murwanashyaka and former FDLR vice president Straton Musingi, accused of crimes against humanity, opened in Stuttgart, Germany. Similarly, the military tribunal of Bukavu brought eight members of FDLR to trial, sentencing two of them to 30 years and life in prison, respectively, on August 16. This was the first time members of the rebel group were charged with crimes against humanity by the Congolese judiciary. *fb*

## DR CONGO (ITURI MILITIAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: **FARDC, FRPI, Popular Front for Justice in Congo**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict regarding predominance and resources between Ituri militia groups, mainly the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI) and the Popular Front for Justice in Congo (FPJC), and the government continued. In the course of the year, FRPI and FPJC carried out several attacks in Ituri district, Orientale province. The militias mainly looted small villages and provisory camps, causing thousands of people to flee their homes to surrounding areas. On January 10 and 11, heavy clashes between government armed forces (FARDC) and FRPI in Anyati left two soldiers and nine militia fighters dead. In a fire-fight between FARDC and FPJC on April 15, two militia fighters were killed. Approx. 30,000 people reportedly fled the town of Gety, which was captured by FRPI fighters on October 20, but recaptured by FARDC the same evening. On November 5 and 6, FRPI troops invaded gold mining locations in Tchelekeshe and Alungu. Seven civilians were killed, twelve injured and 20 abducted. FARDC recaptured the sites the next day. FRPI attacked military barracks near Kagaba on December 3. After they had dispersed the stationed soldiers, the attackers looted goods and set neighboring houses on fire, killing six civilians. *clb*

## DR CONGO (MLC ET AL.)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **MLC, UNC, UPDS vs. government**

Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between several opposition parties and the government turned violent. The main contestants to President Kabila in the November 28 elections were Etienne Tshisekedi, of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), and Vital Kamerhe, of the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC). Formerly a member of the ruling alliance Presidential Majority (MP), Kamerhe formed the UNC in December 2010. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of the oppositional Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), could not run for president, as he was tried by the ICC for crimes against humanity in the Second Congolese Civil War. On July

4, at least one person died in clashes between the police and UDPS sympathizers, protesting against fraud in the electoral preparations in Kinshasa. UDPS submitted a memorandum to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), voicing the same concerns. On August 1, the UDPS headquarters in Lubumbashi were attacked by the youth wing of the National Union of Congolese Federalism (UNAFEC), a party allied to the ruling MP. On September 1, the police and the national army (FARDC) clashed with UDPS members in Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa, leaving two people dead and 44 injured. On November 5, several people were injured during a fight between militants of UNAFEC and UDPS in Lubumbashi. A UN report on the election process published in early November criticized the electoral preparations and cited several incidents impeding the oppositional campaign, such as arbitrary arrests or bans on public speeches. According to human rights sources, lots of votes were discarded by CENI because of electoral violence, mainly in opposition strongholds. In the run-up to the elections, the government imposed a ban on political rallies in Kinshasa. In protest to several incidents of electoral fraud, groups of armed men attacked polling stations in Kasai Occidental and Katanga. Furthermore, Tshisekedi's supporters clashed with the presidential guard and Kabila supporters in the capital of Kinshasa. The violence on the election weekend left at least 25 people dead. The final count was presented on December 9, declaring Kabila winner with 50.3 percent of the votes. Three days later, Vital Kamerhe submitted a file to the Supreme Court, accusing the government of fraud. On December 15, the court dismissed the accusations on the ground of a lack of evidence. Consequently, Joseph Kabila was declared president by the court one day later. On December 20, police dispersed a rally organized by UDPS, UNC, and MLC in Bukavu, arresting several people. In protests against the election results between December 9 and 14, at least 20 people were killed by security forces in Kinshasa. *fb*

## ETHIOPIA (OLF / OROMIYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: **OLF vs. government**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the government continued. Throughout the year, OLF stated to have conducted several attacks on security forces in Oromiya region, which were neither confirmed nor denied by the government. On 12/14/2010, members of the armed wing of the OLF, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), allegedly clashed with government troops, leaving 14 people dead. According to OLF sources, OLA fighters killed 34 government troops in two operations in East Harerge Zone on February 5 and 18. In further clashes on March 12, 17, and 19, OLA members reportedly killed 22 government forces. Furthermore, OLA members claimed to have killed thirteen government troops in the Kuyu district on May 2. In another two attacks on military camps in North Shewa Zone on June 16, and the East Harerge Zone on June 19, OLA fighters reportedly killed six troops. In November, the OLA claimed to have killed further

twelve government forces in two operations in Kuyu and Yava Gulele county. Another six troops were allegedly killed in a clash in North Shewa Zone on December 19.

Several OLF members were arrested on charges of planning a bomb attack on the AU summit in Addis Ababa in late January. Furthermore, the government officially designated the OLF as a terrorist organization on June 14. According to a UN report released in July, the foiled attack had been coordinated by the Eritrean government [→Ethiopia – Eritrea]. In a protest letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in August, OLF denied their involvement in the planned assault.

Throughout the year, several international organizations criticized the 2009 terrorism law for enabling the imprisonment of independent journalists and oppositional politicians on charges of supporting OLF. In early December 2010, an OLF leader was captured in the Kenyan district Moyale after leaving his unit's hideout in Nairobi. On March 3, three OLF members were sentenced to life imprisonment for the killing of thirteen persons, while 200 opposition members, suspected of being OLF supporters, were arrested in Addis Ababa on March 19. In September and November, more than 50 suspected OLF members were arrested. *psc, nch*

## ETHIOPIA - ERITREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: **Ethiopia vs. Eritrea**  
Conflict items: **territory, other**

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea concerning their common border and the reciprocal support of armed groups continued. In December 2010, the AU Panel of the Wise expressed its concerns about the stagnating peace process. On February 3, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi accused Eritrea of having backed a foiled bomb attack on a recent AU summit in the capital Addis Ababa [→Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya)]. The accusations were verified by a UN report in June, but repeatedly denied by Eritrea. On December 5, the UN Security Council decided to extent sanctions against Eritrea. In response, the latter warned that the sanctions would heighten tensions and further aggravate conflict and instability in the region. On April 21, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hailemariam Desalegn declared that Ethiopia was seeking to topple the Eritrean government by supporting armed groups. In response, on April 26, Girma Asmerom, Eritrea's ambassador to the AU, requested the international community to condemn Ethiopia's aggression and to call for its withdrawal from Eritrean territory. At a meeting with the Russian special envoy on December 17, the Eritrean president pointed out that the final decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) had not yet been implemented. *gsz*

## GABON (UN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: **UN vs. government**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The power struggle between the National Union (UN), an alliance of the main opposition parties, and the government of Ali-Ben Bongo Ondimba continued. Opposition parties openly criticized the constitutional changes of 12/07/10 for strengthening Ondimba's power. On January 25, National Union Secretary General André Mba Obame declared himself president and named a parallel cabinet. Within the next two days, the government dissolved the National Union and shut down a television broadcaster owned by Obame, who subsequently took refuge in the UNDP office in Libreville until February 27. Security forces fired tear gas at hundreds of anti-government protesters in front of the building on January 27. Several people were injured and up to 30 arrested. On May 5, the parliament lifted Obame's parliamentary immunity. Opposition groups requested the adjournment of parliamentary elections in order to introduce biometrical cards for the vote, which was refused by the Constitutional Court in July. Thereupon, thirteen opposition parties backed out of the Electoral Commission on July 15 and called for a boycott of the elections. On December 13, Prime Minister Paul Biyoghe Mba prompted the population to ignore the opposition's call. On December 17, the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party won 114 of 120 parliament seats with a recorded turnout of 34.8 percent. *sab*

## GUINEA (UFDG)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **UFDG vs. government**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between the government of Alpha Condé, president since 12/21/10, and the Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG), led by Cellou Dalein Diallo, continued. On 12/03/10, the Supreme Court had declared Condé winner of the November presidential elections, with Diallo accepting the decision and calling on his supporters to remain calm. The state of emergency imposed on 11/17/10 was lifted on 12/10/11. In March, ECOWAS and the EU subsequently lifted sanctions imposed on Guinea after the military coup in 2008. The AU also reinstated Guinea's membership. Soldiers recruited by former President Moussa Dadis Camara demanded to be integrated in the armed forces, and a proper salary. Approx. 5,700 Dadis Camara recruits had remained unregistered. On March 7, riots erupted at a recruits' military camp in Kissidougou, Faranah region. On April 3, security forces violently dispersed a gathering of Diallo supporters. Four people were killed and dozens injured. Between May 3 and 5, Malinké supporting Condé and Peul supporting Diallo clashed violently in the region of Nzérékoré, in the southeast of the country, leaving at least 25 civilians dead and numerous

houses destroyed. On July 19, at least three people were killed in a grenade attack targeting the president in his residence. Condé blamed UFDG members including former army chief General Thiam. In the aftermath, 39 people were arrested and referred to the court, some of them closely allied to the former military junta. On August 15, Condé pardoned 37 opposition members detained following the April demonstrations. In late September, security forces dispersed another opposition protest, killing three and injuring around 40. Subsequent raids and arrests in the capital Conakry were reported. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called on the government to cease violent crackdowns on opposition forces. Following an ECOWAS-brokered agreement with opposition leaders, on November 15, the president announced a further postponement of parliamentary elections to be held in December. On December 19, the electoral commission temporarily suspended its activity and postponed legislative elections indefinitely. *som*

## KENYA (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: **Samburu vs. Turkana vs. Pokot vs. Borana vs. Merille**  
Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict over resources between various ethnic groups in northeastern Kenya continued. Most of the violent incidents were related to cattle rustling. In early December 2010, the Pokot raided a village in the Turkana South district, Rift Valley, and stole more than 600 goats. Nine people were killed in the incident. On 12/28/2010, one Samburu was killed in a gun battle between Turkana and Samburu in Rift Valley. In January, armed Toposa raiders, from South Sudan, attacked a Turkana village in Turkana South, leaving one person dead, and stealing more than 200 livestock. At least 24 people died on May 3, when the Merille from Ethiopia attacked members of the Kenyan Turkana community in the border region. In an attack on June 19, three security officers were killed and three other injured, when more than 200 Pokot raided a Turkana community in Rift Valley and stole cattle. After two further policemen had been killed in June in Rift Valley, security forces carried out an operation, resulting in 2,000 refugees from Turkana and Pokot counties. In August, at least eight people died in further Merille attacks in the border region. At least twelve people died in clashes between the Pokot and Turkana in Pokot North and Turkana South in August and September. Furthermore, hundreds were displaced and over 300 herds of cattle were reportedly stolen. In the Eastern province seven Borana were killed by Samburu in September. Between October 13 and 18, Borana and Turkana clashed in Rift Valley, leaving at least fourteen people dead. After a further series of attacks in November, more than 3,000 families fled the Eastern province. On December 15, more than 500 armed Pokot members killed seven residents and stole more than 1,000 goats and camels in Rift Valley. *thg*

## KENYA (MUNGIKI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties: *Mungiki vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, subnational predominance*

The conflict over predominance between the banned Mungiki group and the government deescalated. On 12/15/10 and again on September 30, Luis Moreno Ocampo, prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, had accused the Minister for Finance Uhuru Kenyatta of mobilizing and financing Mungiki to attack the opponents of President Mwai Kibaki's purported electoral victory, in the country's Central Rift region, in December 2007 [→Kenya (opposition)]. The post-election violence had left more than 1,100 people dead and up to 600,000 displaced. Kenyatta and the other accused, among them the Head of Civil Service Francis Muthaura and former Commissioner of the Kenya Police Mohammed Hussein Ali, denied the allegations. On June 27, police arrested 52 alleged Mungiki members in Kutus, Kirinyaga District, after allegedly extorting money from public bus operators. Two days later, police arrested another thirteen alleged Mungiki members in Kiambu District. On September 28, the Mungiki clashed with over 500 public minibuses operators in the Nakuru District, after the sect had tried to extort money from them, leaving two people injured and several buildings destroyed. On December 29, thirty alleged Mungiki members were arrested in Kutus. One day later, another 31 were brought before court in Kerugoya, Kirinyaga District. *kaa*

## MALI (AQIM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: *AQIM vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, other*

The conflict between the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government remained violent. Throughout the year, AQIM repeatedly kidnapped foreigners to achieve ransom payments and the withdrawal of foreign troops from certain countries. At the end of November 2010, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger established a common command to fight AQIM [→Niger (AQIM), Mauritania (AQIM), Algeria (AQIM)]. On March 3, a Malian who had been kidnapped last year was released by AQIM. On March 21, AQIM demanded 90 million euros of ransom and the release of imprisoned AQIM fighters in exchange for five French hostages. The foreign ministers of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met on May 20 in Bamako to discuss further cooperation in the fight against AQIM. On June 14, the presidents of Mali and Niger agreed on deploying military units to their common border. Ten days later, Malian and Mauritanian troops attacked an AQIM base in the Wagadou forest, close to the Mauritanian border. The combined operation was supported by airstrikes and resulted in the death of approx. twenty people, most of them AQIM members. On July 22, soldiers arrested fifteen su-

spected AQIM members close to the Mauritanian border. In a Mauritanian airstrike in the Wagadou forest on October 20, at least sixteen people were killed, among them AQIM top official Teyeb Ould Sidi Aly. On November 24, two French citizens were abducted from their hotel in Hombori, Mopti province. One day later, four foreign citizens were kidnapped in a restaurant in the center of Timbuktu. One of them was killed when he resisted entering the getaway car. The following day, the government evacuated remaining tourists from Timbuktu. On December 8, AQIM claimed responsibility for the November abduction of the five foreigners and released pictures of them, demanding the withdrawal of all French troops from Muslim countries. Four days later, the security service arrested four Malians suspected of kidnapping the two French nationals. According to the government, they belonged to a group which had sold the abductees to AQIM. Canadian troops had been sent to Mali in the middle of the year to train the country's military and thereby support it in their fight against AQIM. *fr*

## MALI (TUAREG / KIDAL)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *ANM, MTNM, MNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *autonomy, resources*

The autonomy conflict between several Tuareg rebel groups and the government continued. In the course of the year, two new rebel groups were formed. Several hundred Tuareg returned heavily armed to Mali in August, after they had fought in Libya [→Libya (opposition)]. In mid-September, the Azawad National Movement (ANM) accused the government of harming the rights of the Tuareg by building up a military infrastructure in the northern part of the country under the pretext of fighting the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [→Mali (AQIM)]. In early October, the North Mali Tuareg Movement (MTNM) and ANM merged into a new rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The group announced to fight back AQIM in the Tuareg territories. In mid-October, Interior Minister General Kafougouna Kona led a delegation to Kidal and Gao to negotiate with Tuareg leaders. Later that month, MNLA announced that thousands of their members had gathered and that they attempted to declare a new state. They threatened to fight the government if their requests were not fulfilled, issuing an ultimatum until November 5. In a meeting with President Amadou Toumani Touré on December 3, Colonel Wake ag Ousad, member of the Tuareg group Imrad, offered military support to the government. In December, the emergence of a further Tuareg rebel group, the Ansar al-Din, was reported. Its leader, former diplomat Lyad Ag Ghali, announced that he had already gathered several hundred men to fight not only for the rights of the Tuareg people, but also for the implementation of the Sharia. *fr*



## NIGER (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: **opposition groups vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **national power**

The national power conflict between oppositional groups and the government remained violent. After the election date had been postponed from January 3 to 31, opposition leader Mahamadou Issoufou won the first election round with 36 percent of the vote. On March 12, Issoufou also won the run-off vote with 58 percent. His inauguration on April 7 marked the last step in the process of transferring power from the military forces to a civil government. On May 10, former President Mamadou Tandja, who had been ousted in a military coup in 2010, was released from prison after being exempt from corruption accusations against him. Between July 16 and 20, five soldiers and two civilians were arrested for allegedly planning to assassinate Issoufou. They were suspected of being members of the National Council for the Restoration of Popular Democracy. On December 6, security forces fatally shot two people at a pro-opposition demonstration in the city of Zinder. In subsequent riots, lasting three days, a local police station was destroyed and official buildings were despoiled. *shj*

## NIGERIA (BOKO HARAM)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↑ | Start: **2003**



Conflict parties: **BH vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The system conflict between the Jama'at Ahlu as-Sunna lid-Dawa wal-Jihad, mostly referred to as Boko Haram (BH), and the government escalated to a war.

The Islamist group was radically opposed to secular ideals and modern education and aimed at the implementation of the Sharia all over Nigeria. Throughout the year, the Boko Haram launched over 80 attacks, both on single persons and on buildings in ten states, while the majority of attacks was concentrated on the north-east of the country. The group was based in Maiduguri, Borno State, where BH had been launching several attacks per week throughout the year. Most of all, police stations, churches, politically relevant buildings, and crowded public places were the target of bombings. In the majority of cases, police officers, soldiers, priests, and politicians were the victims of BH assassinations and assaults. In the first half of the year, most actions consisted of drive-by attacks; while in the second half BH launched several highly destructive bomb attacks on public buildings. Throughout the year, at least 560 people were killed in BH attacks and in shootouts between the group and police forces. Furthermore, over 90,000 people fled their homes in northern Nigeria due to BH violence.

For instance, members of BH had detonated two bombs in

the city of Jos, Plateau State, on 12/24/2010, killing 38 people. In January, BH members killed Fannami Modu Gubio, gubernatorial candidate for the All Nigerian Peoples Party, and six others in Maiduguri. BH launched their first suicide attack on August 26, when a car loaded with explosives rammed through the barrier of UN Headquarters in the capital Abuja, killing at least 23 people and wounding another 70. On November 4, BH launched coordinated attacks on the cities of Damaturu and Potsikum in Yobe State and Maiduguri, bombing several churches, police stations, military buildings, and a housing estate, leading to the highest death toll of at least 180. On December 24, BH members simultaneously attacked the cities of Abuja and Damaturu, as well as Jos, in Plateau State, leaving at least 40 people dead.

In order to fight BH, the government established a Joint Task Force consisting of members of the army, navy, airforce, police, and the State Security Service in June. Since September, several groups, including the Akhwat Akhwop and the Oodua's People Congress, had announced to fight BH unless they ceased their attacks. According to national security services, some members of BH were trained by the Somalian al-Shabaab [→Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Throughout the year, the government repeatedly tried to commence dialogue with the group. For instance, former President Obasanjo met with the head of the BH founding family, Babakura Alhaji Fugu, on September 15, to discuss conditions for ceasefire. BH demanded the omission of judicial harassment and payments of compensation. Two days later, Fugu was shot by suspected BH members.

After the attack on the UN Headquarters, the USA, Great Britain, and Israel offered assistance in counter-terrorism to the government. On November 28, a US congressional report called BH a potential threat to their own country. Furthermore, the report stated that BH leaders and leaders of the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had confirmed their mutual support [→Algeria (AQIM) i.a.].

On December 31, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe, Niger, and Plateau. *sel*

## NIGERIA (IJAW GROUPS / NIGER DELTA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**


Conflict parties: **MEND, NDLF, IRA, et al. vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict over autonomy and the distribution of oil revenues between several Ijaw rebel groups in the Niger Delta and the government remained violent. In early December, the military operation "Restore Hope" reached its climax when fighting in Ayakoromo, Delta State, reportedly resulted in at least 100 deaths. According to human rights sources, the operation overall caused 150 deaths and thousands of refugees in the affected area. On 12/17/2010, the Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) attacked three foreign oil production facilities with remotely activated bombs. In late December 2010, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) announced to abandon the amnesty program it had joined in 2009. Rejecting Kingsley Kuku as new presidential advisor on the Niger Delta, MEND and NDLF threatened to conduct further attacks on oil facilities.



ties. In mid-March, MEND attacked a further on-shore facility. Nevertheless, MEND announced the suspension of its attacks in order to allow the April presidential elections to proceed. The victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, stemming from the Niger Delta himself and enjoying considerable popularity there, sparked a widespread post-election violence in the northern country [→Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)]. NDLF and the Ijaw Revolutionary Army (IRA) thereupon threatened with reprisals if the violence against Jonathan supporters would not stop immediately. After the death of NDLF leader John Togo in late May, 536 of his fighters and five military leaders surrendered and handed over their weapons to the military in Edo State and Delta State. In June, the government announced the closure of the ongoing amnesty program, due to an overload of applicants and insufficient financial resources. In early December, several hundred former militants blocked the Okene-Lokoja-Abuja expressway, protesting against this decision. *bkm*

## NIGERIA (NORTHERNERS - SOUTHERNERS)



The decades-long tensions between the northern and the southern part of Nigeria escalated to a war.

Although Nigeria was a unity state, it had been divided into two parts mainly along ethnic, cultural, and economic cleavages since its independence in 1960. After the death of President Umaru Yar'Adua, a Fulani from the northern Katsina State, in May 2010, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the southern Bayelsa State, succeeded him in office in accordance with the constitution. Frictions between Northerners and Southerners arose, when Jonathan announced to run for president in the 2011 elections, thereby breaking an informal agreement within the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) to shift power every two terms between a Northerner and a Southerner. His main opponent was Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) candidate Muhammad Buhari, also a Fulani from Katsina State, who already had been president between 1983 and 1985. Due to Boko Haram bomb attacks and clashes in the city of Jos, tensions were further fueled ahead of the elections and escalated into violence between mainly Muslim Northerners and mainly Christian Southerners residing in the northern regions [→Nigeria (Boko Haram), Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)].


Throughout the year, an estimated 800 people were killed and approx. 65,000 displaced in the northern states of Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa, Niger, and Katsina. On February 9, police violently dispersed protests against Jonathan in Lafia, Nasarawa State, and arrested CPC gubernatorial candidate Umaru Tanko Al-Makura. On March 3, three people were killed when a bomb detonated at a rally of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). In the week before the April 2 parliamentary elections, the government deployed tens of thousands of security forces

to prevent violent escalation. However, officials postponed the elections twice, due to organizational problems, finally scheduling them for April 9. In 15 senatorial districts, elections had to be delayed for a third time, based on the absence of results sheets. Subsequently, Jonathan's government was suspected of electoral fraud. Meanwhile, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) stated that more than 40 people had been arrested in the Niger Delta, among them ACN gubernatorial candidate James Akpanudoedehe. On April 8, a bomb hit the electoral commission's office in the town of Suleja, Niger State, leaving at least six people dead. The April 9 elections were accompanied by a bomb attack on a polling station in Maiduguri that killed three people, and the assassination of a local politician in Borno State.

The presidential elections on April 17 resulted in a clear majority for Jonathan with 59 percent of the vote. While international observers classed the elections as free and fair, opposition members accused PDP of electoral fraud and announced to legally challenge the results. Subsequently, Buhari supporters torched several houses of Jonathan supporters in the northern city of Kano on April 18. Simultaneously, they clashed with security forces and burned the house of Jonathan's running mate Namadi Sambo in the city of Kaduna. Buhari condemned the violent incidents. In the course of clashes between both parties, the town of Zonkwa, Kaduna State, was burned down on April 19. At least 300 residents were killed. Despite ongoing violence, state governor elections were held as scheduled on April 26.

On May 6, at least sixteen people were killed in an attack on a village in Bauchi. On May 29, Jonathan was inaugurated. Within the next 24 hours, two bombs exploded in the city of Zaria, Kaduna, hometown of Vice President Sambo. In early May, CPC legally challenged the presidential election, but the petition was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court in late December, confirming Jonathan's victory. *nch*

## RWANDA (VARIOUS HUTU REBEL GROUPS)



The conflict between Hutu-dominated rebel groups, on the one hand, and the Tutsi-dominated government of President Paul Kagame, on the other, continued on a violent level.

Throughout the year, the capital Kigali was hit by grenade attacks. Police suspected Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) to be responsible for the attacks [→DR Congo (FDLR)]. On February 19, one civilian was killed and eighteen others injured in three simultaneous bomb attacks on a restaurant, an office building, and a train station. On March 1, a grenade attack injured ten civilians. One day later, a grenade smuggler on behalf of FDLR, was arrested by security forces. His capture led to the arrest of four men who allegedly had planned attacks in Kigali. In the period under observation, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found key Hutu figures of the 1994 genocide guilty of crimes against humanity. Among those convicted were the former army General August

tin Bizimungu, the former mayor of Kivumu, Western province, Gregoire Ndahimana, the former Minister of Civil Service Proser Mugiraneza and the then Minister for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. *nbe*

## SENEGAL (MFDC / CASAMANCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1982**


Conflict parties: **MFDC vs. government**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the government remained on a violent level. Between 12/26/10 and 12/29/10, eight soldiers were killed by alleged MFDC members in Ziguinchor region. Reportedly, a high number of rebels also died. Another clash between the military and suspected MFDC in the same region on January 11, left two soldiers dead and one wounded. Two days later, army and MFDC clashed at Magnora, Sedhiou region. At least two soldiers died and three civilians were injured. On January 28, MFDC shot one civilian in Bignona. In three separate incidents in Ziguinchor on February 20, 21 and 26, eight soldiers were killed and at least ten injured. In reaction to this, at least 430 people fled to neighboring Gambia. On April 19, May 27, and July 29 alleged MFDC members raided villages in Ziguinchor and seized money. In the attacks, one civilian was killed and another injured. In the forest of Diagon, Ziguinchor, alleged rebels killed ten civilians on November 21.

In an attack on a military camp in Kabeumeu, Ziguinchor, on December 13, four soldiers died. Further attacks on military positions in December raised the death toll among the soldiers to 30. At least twelve of them were killed in a single attack on December 20. Furthermore, a total of twenty soldiers was kidnapped in December. After the attacks, President Abdoulaye Wade told his military to pursue MFDC, even in Gambia. In reaction to the increase of violence, about 400 people went to the streets in Mangacounda, Sedhiou, on December 27. They demanded troop deployment to protect the population. On February 14, MFDC leader Ansoumane Badji called on the AU to organize a self-determination referendum in Casamance. The appeal, however, was rejected by the government. On May 11, a Gambian court released twenty MFDC members, among them former MFDC Secretary for Internal Affairs, Abdoulaye Diédhiou. *am*

## SOMALIA (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**



Conflict parties: **Hizbul Islam, al-Shabaab vs. TFG, ASWJ**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The ideology and national power conflict between the Islamist groups Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab, on the one hand, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ahlu Sunna wal

Jama'a (ASWJ), on the other, continued on the intensity level of a war for the sixth year running.

The TFG was supported by AMISOM forces. On March 10, the Burundian army sent additional 1,000 troops to Somalia, bringing the AMISOM contingent up to 4,400 Burundian and 4,600 Ugandan troops. On March 29, the EU announced a 92.2 million euros donation to AMISOM. In December, several hundred Ethiopian military personnel returned to Somalia. Three days later, Kenyan parliament agreed to integrate its forces in Somalia into AMISOM. On 12/23/10, Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab officially announced their merging [→ Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)]. On July 20, the UN officially declared famine in al-Shabaab controlled regions of Somalia. National and international efforts to aid several hundred thousands threatened by starvation were severely hampered by al-Shabaab. Throughout the year, war and famine caused 286,000 Somalis to flee the country and 330,000 to be internally displaced, bringing the total number of refugees to almost 1 million and the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to 1.5 million. UNHCR reported that at least 50,000 people were forced to flee Somalia due to the ongoing fighting in the first quarter of the year.

Throughout the year, numerous highly violent clashes exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Approx. 100 died in heavy clashes between TFG forces, backed by AMISOM soldiers, and al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam militants in Mogadishu between 11/28/10 and 12/05/10. From 12/15/10 to 12/18/10, al-Shabaab attacked various TFG and AMISOM positions in Mogadishu. Another 44 people died and more than 90 were injured in the heavy fighting which included artillery shelling. After the TFG had proclaimed its 100-day-plan to crack down the insurgents, on-and-off-fighting in Mogadishu, between AMISOM backed TFG forces and al-Shabaab, allegedly led to more than 65 deaths in January and February. Between February 22 and 26, TFG forces, AMISOM soldiers, and ASWJ members backed by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops launched a coordinated attack on al-Shabaab militants in Mogadishu, Beledweyne, near the Ethiopian border, and Belet Hawo, near the Kenyan border. According to TFG, the fighting resulted in the death of 49 civilians, 60 rebels, and 53 AMISOM soldiers and left at least 275 wounded. TFG recaptured Beledweyne on February 25, while ASWJ seized Bulo Hawo on March 5, and the district of Luq in Gedo region one day later. On March 15, al-Shabaab attacked TFG and AMISOM positions in Mogadishu leading to three days of heavy mortar exchange and the death of at least 53 people. ASWJ tried to recapture Dhobley in Southern Somalia on April 1, resulting in the death of ten. TFG forces backed by ASWJ and al-Shabaab militants clashed again on May 11. More than thirteen people were killed and dozens injured.

Between June 2 and 4, the TFG and AMISOM gained control of approx. 60 percent of the capital. 27 people were killed in the offensive. On June 10, Interior Minister Abdi Shakur Sheikh Hassan was killed in a suicide attack, reportedly carried out by al-Shabaab. In late June, heavy fighting between joint TFG and ASWJ forces and the al-Shabaab in Gedo region led to more than fifteen deaths. At least twenty people were killed and 35 wounded in a TFG operation backed by AMISOM between July 28 and 30 in Mogadishu. On August 6, al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage admitted the withdrawal from Mogadishu due to tactical reasons. Between September 28 and 30, more than 1,000 al-Shabaab fighters attacked ASWJ members in the regions of Gedo and Jubada Hoose, causing more than 43 deaths. Al-Sha-

baab detonated a truck filled with explosives at a TFG compound in Mogadishu, killing over 100 people on October 4. Following the kidnapping of several foreigners in Kenya by al-Shabaab, Kenya started military operations in Somalia on October 16. The operations allegedly lead to the deaths of at least 67 al-Shabaab fighters, eight Kenyan soldiers, and eight civilians. *tg*

## SOMALIA (PUNTLAND - SOMALILAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: *autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland*  
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, headed by Ahmed Silanyo, and the autonomous region of Puntland, headed by Abdirahman Farole, over the regions of Sanaag and Sool, as well as Togdheer's Cayn section, escalated. In December 2010, Puntland increased recruitment and training of their armed forces, while stressing that this policy was only targeting piracy. After Puntland had demanded the withdrawal of Somaliland troops stationed in Kalshaale, Togdheer region, fighting with artillery and mortars between troops from both sides erupted in the city on January 30, leaving at least five people dead. On March 7, Somaliland troops clashed with their Puntland counterparts in Ganbara, Sool, causing the death of at least eight people. In May, Somaliland was accused by Puntland of cooperating with militants in order to destabilize the latter. According to local sources, heavy fighting between the conflict parties erupted in Tukarak, Sool, on May 31, resulting in a high number of casualties on both sides. On June 9, Silanyo and Farole met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, signing a preliminary agreement to resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, Somaliland criticized Puntland on June 26 for blocking the streets towards Sanaag. Puntland argued to block only those streets that Somaliland was using to support militants linked to al-Shabaab, led by Muhammad Sa'id Atam [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. On June 30, Puntland militias attacked the convoy of a Somaliland delegation on the way to Widwid, Sool. The next week, Puntland representatives met with ministers and deputies from the disputed regions in Garowe, Nugaal, to discuss security issues. Puntland announced to establish special security forces to stabilize the regions. Clashes erupted in Taleh, Sool, on August 10, after Puntland forces attacked a Somaliland delegation, killing at least three people. In late August, a Puntland court sentenced four Somaliland officials to 10 years in prison for illegally entering Puntland territory. *mlu*

## SOUTH AFRICA (XENOPHOBES - IMMIGRANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *xenophobic gangs in South Africa, immigrants in South Africa*  
 Conflict items: *other*

The conflict between South African xenophobes and immi-

grants continued on a violent level. On the background of a difficult situation on the job market, tensions between parts of the South African population and different immigrant groups sparked violence. Altogether, twenty deaths, 40 injured people and 200 plunderings among immigrants were reported in the first quarter of 2011. On May 25, xenophobes attacked Somali and Pakistani shop owners, burning the shops of 40 Somalis in Motherwell, Eastern Cape. In Johannesburg, a group of South Africans, mostly women, protested against xenophobia on June 2 after the Greater Gauteng Business Forum had asked Somali and Pakistani shop owners to close their shops and leave the city. A local human rights organization asked the African National Congress (ANC) to investigate xenophobic violence after a Zimbabwean immigrant had been stoned to death for alleged murder, and an ANC councilor in Seshgo had been arrested for xenophobic statements at the beginning of June. On July 5, two Somali shop owners reportedly had been robbed and killed near Cape Town, Western Cape. Throughout the year, several incidents of harassment and discrimination were reported. In October, homeless people threatened to attack foreigners if they stayed in houses provided by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in Alexandra. On November 10, President Jacob Zuma called for peace between South Africans and foreigners. *bh*

## SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**



Conflict parties: *JEM, SLM/A-AW, SLM/A-MM, LJM, JEM-KI, SPLM/A-North vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources in the Darfur region between several rebel groups, on the one hand, and the government and Janjaweed forces, on the other, continued on a highly violent level. UN reports estimated that 400 people had been killed in the first four months of the year alone and confirmed 80 air strikes by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for this period. At least 180,000 people were reportedly displaced between December 2010 and April. In accordance to the South Sudan Referendum, the government established two new administrative units in central and southeast Darfur in May [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan), Sudan – South Sudan]. The government violated the Status of Forces Agreement by denying UNAMID forces access to the conflict area.

Throughout the year, SAF conducted dozens of air strikes and attacks, most of them in the first half of the year. For instance, two consecutive air strikes killed thirteen civilians in South Darfur in May. Antonov bombers and helicopters supported 70 vehicles of government forces in an attack on Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) forces in June, killing 35 civilians and causing hundreds to flee in the Jebel Marra area. Between July 9 and mid-July, SAF conducted combined air raids and ground attacks with tanks in South Darfur. In res-


ponse, members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) faction led by al-Hilu and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched joint attacks on SAF in South Kordofan, killing 150 soldiers in mid-July according to rebel sources. On July 11, SAF captured JEM military chief Brigade General Al-Toom Toto during clashes in South Kordofan. On November 11, the UNHCR strongly condemned a SAF airstrike after two bombs had hit the Yida refugee camp. On December 12 and 13, alleged Janjaweed militia looted villages near El-Fasher, Northern Darfur, stealing some 2,500 cattle. On December 22, thirty JEM members were killed in a clash with SAF. One day later, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim was supposedly killed in an air strike that destroyed nearly half of his fleet of 200 armed vehicles according to government sources. The government accused JEM of attacking several villages on the border between Darfur and Kordofan. Furthermore, attacks on peacekeeping forces resulted in the death of six UNAMID peacekeepers throughout the year.

While some rebel groups merged into new alliances, several other groups signed peace agreements with the government. In December 2010, Minni Minawi refused to integrate the forces of his SLM/A-faction (SLM/A-MM) into SAF in accordance with the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and was therefore replaced as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. On July 14, the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed an agreement committing themselves to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Meanwhile, UNHCR and the Sudan Humanitarian Aid Commission started repatriating refugees in accordance to the DDPD. In late July, the Bedouin and the Masarat Alliance, as well as the Contemporary Generation Front, defected from the SLM/A faction led by Abdul Wahid an-Nur (SLM/A-AW) and signed a peace agreement with the North Darfur State Government (NDSG). In August, the Field Splitting Alliance, a group of eighteen field commanders of the JEM faction led by Khalil Ibrahim and the SLM/A-MM, signed a peace agreement with the NDSG and integrated their troops into the regular forces in exchange for amnesty. On August 23, al-Bashir declared a unilateral two week ceasefire in South Kordofan. Later that month, al-Bashir established the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office headed by Amin Hassan Omer. In September, LJM leader Tijani Sese was appointed head of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) in compliance with the DDPD. On October 3, former LJM member Mahgoub Hussein and his Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic (SBRL) joined the JEM. On November 12, JEM, SLM/A-AW, SLM/A-MM, and SPLM-North announced the establishment of their new alliance, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North)]. In early December, JEM and the Sudanese Liberation Movement for Justice (SLMJ) officially signed an accord on founding a new alliance to merge all forces in order to topple the government.

In early June, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo brought charges against al-Bashir accusing him of crimes against humanity, including genocide. While the arrest warrant against al-Bashir had not been fulfilled by the end of December, two rebel leaders had already been brought to the ICC. In December, Moreno Ocampo requested an arrest warrant against the Minister of Defense Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein for crimes against humanity. On July 29, the UN Security Council extended the UNAMID mandate for another year, which was oppo-

sed by al-Bashir. The UN, AU, and Darfur stakeholders started to develop a new roadmap for peace in Darfur in late October. In November, US President Barack Obama declared to uphold bilateral sanctions against Sudan, despite pledges to *hka* remove them after the South Sudan Referendum.

## SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE), SINCE JULY SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)



Conflict parties: *Murle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Dinka-Bor vs. Turkana vs. Toposa vs. Mundari*  
Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict concerning subnational predominance between various ethnic groups, especially between the Murle and the Lou Nuer, escalated to a highly violent level. Violence mainly erupted over cattle stealing, the abduction of people, and general disputes over natural resources. Throughout the year, at least 1,700 died in clashes in the Jonglei state, most of them in the months of June and August. On February 6, at least four people were killed in a fight between Murle and Lou-Nuer in Pamai village. One week later, a group of Murle killed one Lou-Nuer and abducted another in Makuach village. A fight over a cattle herd between Murle and Dinka in Anyidi payam district on February 23 resulted in one death. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the UN initiated a peace contract between the two rivaling groups, which was signed on April 10. Between April 19 and 24, at least 69 people were killed and 5,000 displaced in clashes between gunmen of the Murle and the Lou-Nuer in Pibor county. On May 1, alleged Murle cattle rustlers killed two Dinka in Twic East. On May 16, an attack by Murle in Ayod South area left six Lou-Nuer dead. Further eight people were killed in a clash between Murle and Lou-Nuer, in Iyod county on the same day. On June 4, alleged gunmen of the Murle raided Akobo, killing four Lou-Nuer. Simultaneously, another two people were killed when Murle attacked Makuach village. On June 13, members of the same group killed six people in Thuman village. The same day, a clash between Toposa and Turkana left fifteen people dead. Between June 15 and 24, approx. 900 people, most of them Murle, died in attacks by reportedly thousands of men from the counties of Akobo, Ayod, Duk, Nyirol, Twic East and Uror. On August 18, another highly violent fight between Lou-Nuer and Murle erupted. After three days of violence, UN sources reported about 640 deaths, 258 cases of abductions, 9,000 burned houses, and 26,000 displaced persons. Subsequently, UN sent a team to the region to investigate the incidents. On December 5, another 45 people died in fightings between Lou-Nuer and Murle in Jonglei. A joint dialog conference between Murle and Lou-Nuer, which had been scheduled for December 12 to 14, was postponed until January 2012. In late December, Lou-Nuer took control of the Murle cities of Likwan-gule and Pibor, causing tens of thousands to flee. Consequently, UN sent troop reinforcements for its battalion in Pibor. *jpu*







al-Bashir declared on April 27 that the Abyei area belonged to Sudan, the Draft Transitional Constitution of South Sudan claimed the Abyei area to be part of its territory. An attack on a SAF convoy in Abyei area left 22 soldiers dead on May 19. While GoS blamed the SPLM/A, GoSS stated the incident to be an individual, unauthorized action of one of its troops. In response to this assault, SAF troops led a massive military offensive in the Abyei area on May 20, killing 110 civilians according to the SPLM/A. The UN put the number of displaced persons in Abyei to 110,000, among them the 30,000 inhabitants of the area's main settlement, Abyei town, which reportedly had been looted by SAF and allied Misseriya forces.

Following international pressure, the conflict parties agreed on June 20 to withdraw all troops from the disputed area. The process was to be monitored by the Joint Military Observer Committee (JMOC), the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), and the UN led Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The UN Security Council had established UNISFA on June 27, encompassing 4,200 military, as well as 50 civilian and police personnel, most of them supplied by Ethiopia. While the general question of border demarcation remained contested, the conflict parties signed an agreement on border security on June 26. It established a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), extending 10 km in each direction from the border of 1956. The SDBZ was to be monitored by a Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), encompassing observers from both conflict parties, and supported by UNISFA. rs

## SUDAN (SPLM/A-NORTH / SOUTHERN KORDOFAN, BLUE NILE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: ***SPLM/A-North vs. government***  
Conflict items: ***autonomy, system/ideology***

A highly violent conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the Sudanese government erupted in the Sudanese provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Issues of the confrontation were the status of the two provinces and the role of the SPLM/A-North. The SPLM/A-North succeeded the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which had been active in these provinces during the Second Sudanese Civil War and became the governing party of South Sudan after its independence on July 9 [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / Southern Sudan), Sudan – South Sudan]. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, both provinces were to remain part of Northern Sudan in the case of Southern Sudan's independence. In exchange, the two provinces were granted partial autonomy. Final arrangements on the devolution, the distribution of wealth and cultural rights, were to be determined in the Popular Consultation Process (PCP). However, no conclusive results were reached by July 2011, the end of the interim period of the CPA. Following the failed PCP, SPLM/A-North stated that the narrow and contested victory of ICC defendant Ahmet Haroun of the northern ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in South Kordofan's state elections had been the result of electoral fraud. Subsequently, the conflict escalated in early May. Ac-

cusing SPLM/A-North of instigating violence in the province, the national government demanded the demobilization of all rebel forces. Starting on May 5, SPLM/A-North troops clashed with government forces all over South Kordofan. While the SPLM/A-North gained control of the towns of Heiban, Boram and Um Durein, government forces held Talodi and Kadugli as well as important supply roads. Mediated by the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the conflict parties reached an agreement on June 28, comprising SPLM/A-North's legalization as a political party and the demobilization of its troops. Nevertheless, heavy fighting, including aerial bombardment, was reported south of Kadugli between June 30 and July 5. In a report, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in August accused the government of violating human rights and humanitarian law in this military campaign, which was rejected by the government. On July 7, the government backed out of the agreement with SPLM/A-North. On August 23, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire for South Kordofan. However, fighting continued. On September 2, the conflict spilled over to Blue Nile after the government had declared a state of emergency for this province and had dismissed Governor Malik Agar, member of the SPLM/A-North. Furthermore, Sudanese authorities banned SPLM/A-North from being a political party on September 5.

Throughout the following months, heavy fighting was reported in both provinces. For instance, the conflict parties clashed in Dindiro area, Blue Nile, on September 21. Aerial bombardments by government forces in Kurmuk locality, Blue Nile, were reported for September 24 and 25. On October 31, the government claimed to have killed several hundred SPLM/A-North troops in the fight for the town of Teludi, South Kordofan. The town of Kurmuk was conquered by government forces on November 3. In order to pursue SPLM/A-North forces, and due to the suspicion of South Sudanese support for the SPLM/A-North, the army intensified its cross-border operations on South Sudan's territory [→ Sudan - South Sudan].

On November 22, government forces seized Beim Mansour, Blue Nile, reportedly inflicting heavy losses on rebel forces. Violent clashes also erupted in Warni on December 12. According to SPLM/A-North sources, 84 people were killed in intense battles at Bao locality, Blue Nile. Throughout the year, approx. 400,000 people were internally displaced in the course of the conflict, another 80,000 fled to neighboring countries. On November 11, SPLM/A-North announced an alliance with the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) factions of Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM) and Abdul Wahid an-Nur (SLM/A-AW), as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), forming the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. The Beja Congress, one of the central groups of the Eastern Front, joined SRF on November 14 [→ Sudan (Eastern Front)]. rs

## SUDAN - SOUTH SUDAN

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: ***Sudan vs. South Sudan***  
Conflict items: ***territory, resources***

A highly violent interstate conflict between Sudan and South

Sudan succeeded the former secession conflict after the independence of South Sudan on July 9.

The question of the Abyei area's future affiliation could not be solved prior to Southern Sudan's secession [→Sudan (SPLM/A-South Sudan)]. Consequently, this issue remained central to the new conflict between the two independent countries.

Relations between the conflict parties further deteriorated when Sudan started aerial bombardments of South Sudan's border regions in November. On November 7, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) bombed the New Guffa village in South Sudan, killing seven people, followed by a similar attack on Pariang County, Unity State, on November 10. The same day, an SAF attack on the Yida refugee camp and clashes in Kuek left five dead and another 26 wounded. Sudan justified its military action as part of its fight against rebels in southern Sudanese provinces and accused South Sudan of supporting these rebels [→Sudan (SPLM/A-North/Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. South Sudan denied this accusation. On December 3, SAF forces reportedly invaded the South Sudanese border town of Jau in Unity State, which both conflict parties claimed for themselves. Four days later, South Sudan stated to have repelled all SAF forces from Jau, which was denied by Sudan. On December 29, renewed intense fighting over Jau was reported. The same day, seventeen people were reportedly killed when SAF forces conducted air raids in Bahr al-Ghazal state.

According to the UN, 113,000 people had been displaced in the Abyei area throughout the year. The personnel of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), established by the UN Security Council on June 27, reached a number of 3,400 by the end of the year. UNISFA had been deployed to monitor the situation in the border region and protect the civilians there, if necessary with the use of force. On December 23, the UN Security Council prolonged the UNISFA mandate for further five months, extending its task to assisting the conflict parties in the implementation of its agreement on border security of June 29. In two reports on August 19 and October 6, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Atul Khare claimed that the conflict parties had not completely withdrawn their forces from the area, thereby violating the Abyei agreement of June 20.

Citizenship also became a focal point of discussions when the Sudanese Parliament enacted an amendment to its Nationality Act on July 13, stating that holding South Sudan's citizenship was incompatible with being a citizen of Sudan. Nevertheless, the government declared to delay the amendment's implementation by nine months. Also, the issue of transferring fees for southern oil exports remained unresolved. South Sudan's oil production accounted for 75 percent of the total Sudanese oil production, but depended on Sudan's infrastructure and territory for its export. On November 28, Sudan blocked South Sudan's oil exports, demanding outstanding transit fees of 727 million US dollars. After the AU had mediated talks on November 30, Sudan agreed to resume the transit of southern exports in exchange for a 23 percent share of the exported oil for an interim period. Under the auspices of the AU High Implementation Panel, the conflict parties agreed on December 20 to continue their negotiations on the contentious issues in 2012.

rs

## UGANDA (LRA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: **LRA vs. government**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance in central Africa between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government remained violent. In recent years, the field of LRA operation had changed from Northern Uganda to the border triangle of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan [→Sudan (SPLM/A–LRA), since July 2011 South Sudan (LRA)]. In 2011, the border area with DRC's province Orientale was affected the most. The majority of LRA forces was supposed to be based in DRC's Haut-Uélé region, while CAR remained the presumed LRA major base. As in the years before, LRA tactically concentrated its operations on civilians, leaving an estimated 150 dead and 530 abducted. With less than 500 fighters, the group had displaced approx. 440,000 people across the three countries in recent years.

Between late December 2010 and mid-January, LRA advanced from 80 km west of Mboki in CAR to 12 km west of Mboki, leaving four dead and nineteen abducted in a series of attacks. The LRA launched several attacks in DRC's Orientale province and the CAR village of Madabuzuma in January and February, resulting in the death of eleven and the abduction of some 30 in Banangnana and Milagba, DRC. Between April and June, 92 LRA attacks were reported within the border triangle, with the DRC being the most affected with 81 attacks, 39 civilian deaths and 98 abducted. In response to a series of attacks on Doruma town, on April 23, MONUSCO deployed its special forces to Doruma for the seven-day operation "Easter Shield" to protect the population from further attacks. One day after the operations end, the LRA returned, abducting four people. In June, 52 LRA attacks were reported within the DRC, resulting in 29 deaths and 38 abductions. On July 25, fifteen armed LRA fighters reportedly abducted 12 persons in Kiliwa, Haut Uélé, and forced them to attack their own village. Since September, there had been a significant drop of LRA attacks in the affected areas.

Throughout the year, international aid organizations had been attacked repeatedly by the LRA, leading to the dislocation of aid agencies in DRC's Orientale province in January and February. On March 6, LRA attacked a convoy containing 240 tons of food from the UN World Food Program in Bas Uélé district. A further LRA attack east of Doruma in mid-April left two people dead and all aid looted. Further attacks in May and June resulted in the death of another three people and the destruction of the entire supply of polio vaccines for the Haut Mbomou region.

Minor formations of the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) continued to track LRA activity in DRC and CAR. However, in January, CAR restricted operations of larger UPDF formations and confined UPDF troops to bases in Djemah and Obo, southern CAR. Additionally, on January 16, Congolese authorities denied UPDF permission to send an intercepting force into Banda to pursue LRA leader Joseph Kony and his LRA force of 100. In March, Congolese armed forces and LRA clashed both

near Dungu and Banda, DRC, with an estimated total of eleven killed. By the end of May, Uganda decreased its presence in LRA affected areas to 1,500 to secure Ugandan elections and fulfill its commitment to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). [→Uganda (opposition), Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Between May 5 and 12, MONUSCO conducted the operation "Tiger paw" around Doruma. Simultaneously, the UN peacekeepers' Ituri brigade and Congolese forces commenced their joint operation "Falcon Eye," aimed at protecting civilians in the area of Gangala na Bodio, Orientale province. On June 13, Southern Sudan, CAR, DRC, and Uganda agreed to deploy a joint military force to be managed by the AU. On October 14, US President Barack Obama sent 100 combat-equipped troops to Uganda to advise the African units with the objective to track down Joseph Kony. The African Union officially designated the LRA as a terrorist group on November 22. On December 21, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) until January 2013. *cke*

## UGANDA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: **government vs. opposition**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The national power struggle between oppositional groups and the government turned violent. During the campaign for the February 18 presidential elections, security forces reportedly harassed critical journalists and members of opposition parties. President Yoweri Museveni won 68 percent of the votes. The opposition, led by Kizza Besigye accused the government of election fraud. On April 11, protests led by Besigye started in the capital Kampala, criticizing the food and fuel prices. Four days later, police forces tried to disperse the demonstration of approx. 300 people using tear gas, batons, and live ammunition. Several people were injured. Throughout April, Besigye was arrested four times. In further clashes between demonstrators and security forces in Kampala and five other cities, at least nine people were killed and another 90 injured in May. As opposition members were also protesting against the implementation of a new law introducing death penalty for homosexuality, police fired water cannon with a pink colored cohesive dye on May 10. At Museveni's inauguration on May 12, protesters threw stones at the convoy of Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan. In ensuing clashes between police forces and some 1,000 protesters, five people were killed. On July 5, opposition members publicly displayed Museveni's age of 73 on a birthday cake. However, the government was pretending that he only had turned 68, because otherwise he could not run again for president in 2016. Security forces abandoned the gathering immediately. A mourning rally for the victims of the protests in April and May was violently dispersed by security forces on August 17. Starting in October, protests against high food and oil prices continued until December. Police dispersed protests with tear gas, water cannon, and rubber bullets. Besigye was held under house arrest during the new protests. Four executive members of Besigye's party Forum for

Democratic Change were charged with treason for organizing the October protests. *sad*

## ZIMBABWE (MDC-T, MDC-M – ZANU-PF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: **MDC-T, MDC-M vs. ZANU-PF**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The power struggle between the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by President Robert Mugabe, remained violent. The MDC had been part of a power-sharing government since 2009 and consisted of two factions, headed by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Welshman Ncube (MDC-M), respectively. Despite continuing violence and lack of reforms, Mugabe repeatedly announced to hold general elections. MDC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) rejected this pronouncement, stating that the conditions for elections according to the General Political Agreement (GPA) were not yet fulfilled.

Throughout the year, MDC supporters were repeatedly harassed by security forces and attacked by youth groups and veterans linked to ZANU-PF. In most of these cases, police did not intervene. News sources also reported about the existence of torture camps and forced evictions. The violence was concentrated on the provinces of Harare, Midlands, Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, and Masvingo. For instance, nine MDC supporters were injured with sticks and stones by ZANU-PF youths in Mbare, Masvingo, in early February. In July, two MDC-T officials were abducted and seriously wounded by ZANU-PF youths at a torture camp in Mbare. The same month, ZANU-PF supporters attacked parliamentarians and journalists at a public hearing on the Human Rights Commission Bill in Harare, injuring four people. While Mugabe was holding a speech about zero tolerance of political violence in parliament on September 6, members of the ZANU-PF were beating up MDC supporters next to the parliament building, injuring eleven of them. In early November, police officers dispersed a MDC-T demonstration in Matabeleland. Later that month, ZANU-PF youths blocked an MDC rally in Harare by attacking MDC supporters. In late December, a bomb attack destroyed ZANU-PF offices in Gweru, Midlands. The ZANU-PF accused the MDC of being responsible for the attack.

Throughout the year, many MDC supporters were arrested. After a wave of arrests in February, Tsvangirai accused ZANU-PF of conducting a campaign of violence and intimidation against his supporters. On June 2, twenty-four MDC activists were detained after police officers broke up their meeting. The nascent confrontation resulted in the death of one policeman. Furthermore, 30 MDC-M youths were arrested in September. *thg*

## THE AMERICAS



In the region of the Americas, the total number of conflicts remained at 46. Two conflicts ended in 2011, one interstate [→ Colombia - Ecuador] and one intrastate [→ Canada (Bloc Québécois / Quebec)]. Compared to 2010, the number of highly violent conflicts has increased from three to four. With the conflict between Colombian paramilitary groups and the government escalating from violent crisis level, the number of limited wars rose to three [→ Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels), Colombia (FARC), Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)].


The war between the Mexican government and drug cartels remained the sole war in the Americas for the second consecutive year. Besides the two conflicts related to drug violence, that resulted in at least 12,000 deaths in 2011, the conflict with the APPO accounted for the third violent domestic conflict. Apart from Mexico, the countries with the highest number of violent intrastate conflicts were Colombia and Chile. In Colombia, in addition to the two limited wars, one conflict deescalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Colombia (FARC - ELN)], while another armed conflict remained a violent crisis [→ Colombia (ELN)]. In the course of its fight against armed groups, the government managed to kill Alfonso Cano, the top leader of the country's most active guerilla FARC. Due to domestic conflicts, at least 3.6 million people were counted as internally displaced in Colombia. In Chile, two secession and the social movement conflict became violent in 2011. However, the total number of violent conflicts decreased from twenty in 2010 to nineteen. While five conflicts eased to a non-violent level, four others escalated to violent conflicts, two of them by two levels [→ Brazil (MST), Chile (social movement)].

As in previous years, resources were the prevalent conflict item in the Americas, followed by system/ideology. Furthermore, subnational predominance accounted for ten intrastate conflicts. All nine interstate conflicts over territory were carried out non-violently, such as the conflict between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. However, Costa Rica established an armed border patrol after more than 60 years without armed forces [→ Nicaragua - Costa Rica (Río San Juan)].


Among resources, illegal drugs have been most prone to generate violent conflicts. In this context, illicit substances were the

driving force in at least nine cases. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) focused on shipping drugs from the main coca-producing countries in the Andes to lucrative markets, especially in the USA. The range of illegal substances, producing countries, and production methods has shifted, with a growing demand for other drugs than cocaine, such as poppy and methamphetamines. In producing regions and along trafficking passages, conflicts have been prone to result in violent confrontations between DTOs and governments, as well as between rivaling DTOs. Colombia accounted for most of the conflicts with DTOs in the region. The crackdown on formerly dominant cartels such as the Medellín Cartel had led to an atomization of the drug trade in Colombia in the 1990s. Since then, smaller groups have taken over control of the drug business. Eventually, the most important guerrilla groups in the country, FARC and ELN, have intensified their involvement in the drug trade, shifting their ideological aims to rather commercial ones, e.g. control over coca production areas. The transnational void evoked by the crackdown has been filled by Mexican cartels, which thus evolved into the main distributors on the continent. The most dominant DTOs, such as the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas, nowadays control almost the entire supply chain from cultivation over trafficking to street sale. They have established regional cells or make use of local cartels or street gangs, such as the Maras in countries throughout Central America. These days, the isthmus has to deal with the world's highest murder rates - a significant number of homicides is connected to organized crime. In Honduras, 20,000 soldiers were deployed in 2011 to fight crime. The newly-elected president of Guatemala announced to follow the Mexican strategy: to militarize anti-crime enforcement operations, triggered by incursions of Los Zetas on Guatemalan territory such as the May massacre in the Petén region. Mexico being the narrow point on the trail to the end consumer has faced two different conflicts: The "War on Drugs" by the government, and the "Drug War" between cartels and paramilitary groups. Both conflicts have been fueled by automatic weapons, purchased in the US. In turn, spill-over effects from these conflicts have affected the US at and beyond the common border. The US State Department declared in 2011 that Mexican DTOs now posed the biggest threat to US national security.

### CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE AMERICAS IN 2011 COMPARED TO 2010



### FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 IN THE AMERICAS BY INTENSITY GROUPS





## CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                          | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>   | Conflict items                                       | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|---|--|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Argentina - Iran (AMIA)*                               | Argentina vs. Iran  | other  | 1994  | •                   | 1                      |
| Argentina - United Kingdom (Malvinas/Falkland Islands) | Argentina vs. United Kingdom  | territory, resources                                 | 1833  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Bolivia (opposition)*                                  | opposition vs. government   | system/ideology, national power                      | 1983  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Bolivia - Chile (access to sea)*                       | Bolivia vs. Chile   | territory, resources                                 | 1883  | •                   | 1                      |
| Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)                | drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government                                     | subnational predominance                             | 2010  | •                   | 3                      |
| Brazil (MST)   | MST vs. government  | resources  | 1996  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Canada (Bloc Québécois / Quebec)                       | Bloc Québécois vs. government   | secession  | 1867  | END                 | 1                      |
| Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)*                           | Mapuche groups vs. government   | secession, resources                                 | 2008  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)*                      | Rapa Nui vs. government   | secession  | 2010  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Chile (social movements)                               | Confech, Fech, CUT vs. government   | system/ideology                                      | 2006  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Colombia (ELN)   | ELN vs. government  | system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources | 1964  | •                   | 3                      |
| Colombia (FARC - ELN)*                                 | FARC vs. ELN  | system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources | 2006  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Colombia (FARC)  | FARC vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources | 1964  | •                   | 4                      |
| Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)           | paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government  | subnational predominance, resources                  | 1983  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| Colombia (various indigenous groups)*                  | various indigenous groups vs. government  | resources  | 2005  | •                   | 2                      |
| Colombia - Ecuador                                     | Colombia vs. Ecuador  | international power                                  | 2005  | END                 | 1                      |
| Colombia - Venezuela (system)*                         | Colombia vs. Venezuela  | system/ideology, international power                 | 2004  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Dominican Republic - Haiti*                            | Dominican Republic vs. Haiti  | other  | 2009  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Ecuador (opposition groups)*                           | opposition groups vs. government  | system/ideology                                      | 1980  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Guatemala (opposition groups)*                         | militant groups vs. government  | system/ideology, national power                      | 1985  | •                   | 2                      |
| Guatemala (various drug cartels)*                      | drug cartels vs. government   | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2009  | •                   | 3                      |
| Guatemala - Belize (territory)*                        | Guatemala vs. Belize  | territory  | 1981  | •                   | 1                      |
| Haiti (opposition groups)                              | opposition groups vs. government  | national power                                       | 1986  | •                   | 3                      |
| Honduras (opposition)                                  | opposition vs. government   | system/ideology, national power, resources           | 2009  | •                   | 2                      |
| Jamaica (drug gangs)                                   | drug gangs vs. government   | subnational predominance                             | 2010  | •                   | 3                      |
| Mexico (APPO)  | APPO vs. government   | system/ideology                                      | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Mexico (drug cartels)                                  | drug cartels vs. government   | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2006  | •                   | 5                      |
| Mexico (EPR / Guerrero)*                               | EPR vs. government  | autonomy, system/ideology                            | 1995  | •                   | 2                      |
| Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)                                | EZLN vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other          | 1994  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)    | Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. various independent cartels vs. paramilitary groups | subnational predominance, resources                  | 2005  | •                   | 4                      |
| Mexico (opposition)*                                   | opposition vs. government   | national power                                       | 2006  | •                   | 1                      |
| Nicaragua (opposition groups)                          | opposition groups vs. government  | system/ideology, national power                      | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)*                     | Nicaragua vs. Colombia  | territory, resources                                 | 1825  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Nicaragua - Costa Rica (Río San Juan)                  | Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua  | territory  | 1858  | •                   | 2                      |
| Panama (opposition)                                    | opposition vs. government   | system/ideology, resources                           | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)                     | EPP, agrarian movements vs. government  | system/ideology, resources                           | 1989  | •                   | 3                      |
| Peru (opposition movements)                            | opposition movements vs. government   | system/ideology, resources                           | 2008  | •                   | 3                      |
| Peru (Shining Path)                                    | SL vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources | 1980  | •                   | 3                      |

## CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>          | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup> | Conflict items                       | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Peru - Chile (border)*                 | Peru vs. Chile                | territory, resources                 | 1883  | •                   | 1                      |
| United Kingdom - Chile (Antarctica)*   | United Kingdom vs. Chile      | territory, resources                 | 2007  | •                   | 1                      |
| USA - Cuba (Guantanamo)*               | USA vs. Cuba                  | territory                            | 1959  | •                   | 1                      |
| USA - Cuba (system)*                   | USA vs. Cuba                  | system/ideology, international power | 1960  | •                   | 2                      |
| USA - Mexico (border security)         | USA vs. Mexico                | other                                | 2005  | •                   | 2                      |
| USA - Venezuela*                       | USA vs. Venezuela             | system/ideology, international power | 2001  | •                   | 2                      |
| Venezuela (opposition)*                | opposition vs. government     | system/ideology, national power      | 1992  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Venezuela - Colombia (Monjes Islands)* | Colombia vs. Venezuela        | territory, resources                 | 1871  | •                   | 1                      |

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description

<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## ARGENTINA - UNITED KINGDOM (MALVINAS/FALKLAND ISLANDS)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1833**

Conflict parties: **Argentina vs. United Kingdom**  
Conflict items: **territory, resources**

The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) over the territory of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas continued. While the Argentine government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner repeatedly expressed its claims, the British government of Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the sovereignty of the Falklands was not negotiable. On 12/02/10, a British exploration company announced the discovery of oil deposits off shore the Falklands. In June, Fernández asked UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to urge Cameron into dialog about the sovereignty issue. On September 21, she spoke in front of the UN General Assembly, demanding UK to abide by UN resolutions and citing, in particular, the missile tests conducted by UK in May and June.

On June 9, OAS adopted a declaration calling for negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falklands. On December 23, Cameron condemned that member states of MERCOSUR closed their ports for vessels flying the flag of the Falklands. *seb*

## BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: **drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government**  
Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations Comando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Comando (TC), Amigos dos Amigos (ADA), and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) as well as the biggest militia Liga da Justiça, on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, remained violent. The main goal of the government remains to permanently reestablish control over communities that are currently under the rule of drug trafficking organizations and militia groups, especially in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Throughout the year, police and military forces carried out anti-drug trafficking operations, resulting in several arrests and deaths of suspects and the seizure of weapons and narcotics. On June 22, eight suspects died in an intense shootout between police and alleged drug traffickers in Engenho da Rainha favela, Rio de Janeiro. Two days later, CV threatened to launch a revenge attack against security forces. The same night, two policemen were injured and one severely wounded by a hand grenade during a confrontation with drug traffickers in Morro da Coroa favela. On November 9, police captured one of the leaders of ADA, Antônio Francisco "Nem" Bonfim Neto. Four days later, 2,600 police and Marine forces supported by tanks occupied the communities Vidigal, Morro do Céu, and ADA-dominated Rocinha.

Following the August 12 killing of judge Patrícia Aciolo, known for convicting members of drug gangs, measures against Rio de Janeiro's militia groups intensified. On September 1, a number of 150 security forces carried out "Operation Pandora," resulting in the arrests of five members of the Liga da Justiça, three of them former members of the military police. After renewed death threats from militia groups, Marcelo Freixo, one of the principle public figures in the fight against Rio de Janeiro's militias, left the country for temporary exile on November 1. Freixo and José Mariano Beltrame, Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Security, repeatedly had denounced the militias as the greatest threat to public security.

Gang activities also affected neighboring Paraguay. On May 3, PCC gunmen freed six fellow gang members from a prison in Pedro Juan Caballero in Paraguay's Amambay department. A week later, about ten PCC members took a bank manager hostage and robbed the bank in Salto del Guairá, Canindeyú. On October 19, Alexander Mendes da Silva, leader of the CV in the Northern Zone of Rio, was captured in Pedro Juan Caballero. *jva*

## BRAZIL (MST)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1996**

Conflict parties: **MST vs. government**  
Conflict items: **resources**

The conflict over land between landless organizations, headed by the Landless Workers' Movement (MST), and the government escalated. In the course of the year, MST emphasized their demands for agrarian reform and expropriation of land for the settling of landless people. MST continued to take over land, in turn facing numerous expulsions from occupied ground. In many of these occasions, police set fire to the settlers' barracks or demolished their belongings after their expulsion. On April 7, military police shooting rubber bullets injured five settlers in an attempt to remove approx. 400 families from a settlement in the metropolitan area of Recife, located in the state of Pernambuco. About 50 members of the military police of the state of Ceará expelled an estimated 80 families from an occupied estate on July 11. Four settlers were wounded and three arrested. All over the country, MST organized occupancy of local branches of the governmental National Institute of Colonization and Land Reform (INCRA) and municipal governments. Approx. 4,000 members of the MST and other member organizations of the landless movement Via Campesina seized the Ministry of Economics in the capital Brasília on August 23. *jva*

## CANADA (BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS / QUEBEC)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **1867**

Conflict parties: **Bloc Québécois vs. government**  
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Bloc Québécois and the government ended. Since the House of Commons recognized Quebec as a nation within a united Canada in 2006, tensions

with Bloc Québécois eased. As a result of the May 2 federal elections, Bloc Québécois lost its party status since it gained less than 12 seats in the Parliament. Whereas it still won 49 seats in the 2008 Parliamentary elections, it only gained four in 2011. Two years ago, in a nation-wide survey, 55 percent of the Quebecers answered that political sovereignty was not achievable, banning the issue from the political agenda. The party's political program for the 2011 elections did not include sovereignty, but rather cultural issues. *seb*

## CHILE (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **Confech, Fech, CUT vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The conflict between various social movements, led by the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH) as well as the teachers' union College of Professors, and the government, turned violent. Demands for educational reforms regained momentum in June after students and teachers had already protested in 2006 during the "Revolución Pingüina." Students went on strike in thousands of public schools and universities, demanding lower tuition fees and more expenditures for public education. Protests turned violent as police used tear gas and water cannon against demonstrators, while protesters threw stones at police officers and a few vandalized public and private property. In the course of the protests, Education Minister Joaquín Lavín stepped down in July and was replaced by Felipe Bulnes. After CONFECH, led by Camila Vallejo, had repeatedly rejected reform proposals by the government, over one million Chileans demonstrated in Santiago in August against the reform plans. Backing students' demands, the Workers' United Center of Chile (CUT), including the country's main trade unions, began their two-day general strike on August 24. Simultaneously, nightly riots became increasingly violent and police arrested hundreds of protesters. Many people were injured and shots were fired at police officers. The following week, demonstrations continued all over the country as both sides could not reach an agreement on the issue. The protests turned violent again in Santiago between October 18 and 20. After protesters had set a bus ablaze, Chile's Interior Minister Rodrigo Hinzpeter implemented the Law of State Security on October 18, expanding police powers. The following two days, demonstrators set up barricades and burned cars. Furthermore, they fired shotguns and threw petrol bombs at security forces. Police reacted with tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannon. On October 21, dozens of students interrupted a meeting in the Senate headquarters in Santiago, causing Bulnes as well as other participants to leave the building. During November, the protests escalated further as a petrol bomb was thrown on uninvolved policemen by demonstrators from an occupied school in Santiago on November 3. One week later, due to the pressure on the government, the parties met again to work out a deal to end the six months of protest, including new proposals for an educational reform. Additionally, government and opposition approved a five percent wage increase for public sector employees. On November 16, of the 24 traditional uni-

versities, 21 reported that most of the students had returned to class. Nevertheless, negotiations between students and the government broke down again. On December 7, Gabriel Boric was elected new leader of CONFECH. After demonstrations had subsided, due to the summer holiday period starting in December, Boric announced the continuation of the protests beginning in March. On December 30, after six months in office, Bulnes resigned. He was replaced by Harald Beyer. *kcr*

## COLOMBIA (ELN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: **ELN vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources**

The subnational predominance conflict, also concerning resources, between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the government continued on a violent level. An intelligence report released on September 30 stated that the ELN had an estimated strength of at least 1,200 active members and mainly operated in the Venezuelan border region and on the Pacific coast. It further asserted that the ELN had ties to the paramilitary group Los Rastrojos [→ Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. On June 18, a car loaded with 70 kg of explosives detonated at a police checkpoint in Popayán, Cauca. The bomb was allegedly set off by the ELN. As a result, one person died and sixteen were severely injured. Additionally, the blast damaged several houses and caused a blackout in parts of the city. On September 12, ELN forced a three-day standstill in seven municipalities in the departments of Arauca, Boyacá, and Casanare. ELN blocked public transport and ordered local petroleum businesses to stop their activities for 72 hours. On May 7, ELN attacked the municipality of Sucre, Cauca, with grenades and explosives in a day-long siege. As a result, several houses were destroyed and the local hospital damaged. In April, ELN leader Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista alias "Gabino" published an open letter, urging the government to initiate peace talks. In July, he reiterated ELN's willingness to hold peace talks. In reaction, President Juan Manuel Santos stated that the government would not negotiate as long as ELN continued its illegal and terrorist activities.

The air force bombed an ELN camp in Bolivar on December 21, killing seven rebels. Five days later, the guerrilla stated it would continue to fight the government. *meq*

## COLOMBIA (FARC)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: **FARC vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources**

The system conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government remained highly violent. The Marxist-Leninist FARC exerted considerable influence in the

departments of Arauca, Santander, Norte de Santander, Caquetá, Tolima, Huila, Cauca, Putumayo, Nariño, and Chocó. Counting approx. 7,000 to 9,000 members, the guerrilla financed its activities mainly through drug trafficking and extortion.

In a New Year's message released on January 7, FARC leader Guillermo León Sáenz alias Alfonso Cano announced that FARC would redouble its actions in 2011. The same day, FARC tried to take over San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá. Five FARC members, three security forces, and one civilian died as the guerrillas attacked the local police station.

In mid-February, the government deployed further 2,000 soldiers, including special forces, to Huila and Caquetá, a traditional FARC stronghold and a key passing point from the illegal crop growing regions to the Pacific.

In an operation in Chocó on March 24, security forces bombed four FARC camps, killing ten FARC members. Two days later, a FARC unit engaged in combat with the army in Cauca. 15 FARC members were killed, as the army received air support. Between July 7 and 12, a series of attacks by FARC in several municipalities of the same department left at least ten dead and 100 wounded. Mostly affected was the town of Toribío, where a bus loaded with more than 100 kg of explosives was set off, damaging more than 460 houses. Three days later, FARC harassed the town again. In an air strike on October 11, government forces bombed a FARC camp in Norte de Santander, leaving fourteen FARC combatants dead. In the lead-up to the regional elections at the end of October, the FARC ambushed a military unit near Tumaco, Nariño, killing ten soldiers and injuring six on October 21. In a separate attack by FARC one day later, another ten soldiers died in Arauca.

On November 4, President Juan Manuel Santos confirmed the death of Alfonso Cano. Earlier that day, government forces launched a series of bombings on Cano's camp in Cauca, which had been located prior to the operation by police intelligence. The bombardment was followed by the deployment of special forces on the ground, holding firefights for several hours and finally shooting the rebel leader dead. At least nine other FARC members were killed. On November 15, FARC announced that Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri alias Timochenko had been unanimously elected new supreme commander by its secretariat.

Throughout the observed period, an increased number of anti-personnel mine victims had been reported, both civilian and combatant. On 12/17/10 for instance, five soldiers died and two others were wounded in a minefield set by FARC in Meta. On January 20, seven soldiers were killed in another FARC minefield in Putumayo.

Between February 9 and 16, FARC released two politicians and four members of the security forces who had been held hostage. On March 7, a group of 23 Colombian employees of a Canadian oil firm were kidnapped in Vichada. Security forces subsequently launched a successful operation to free the hostages. In the course of a separate rescue operation by government forces on November 26, FARC executed four members of the security forces which had been held prisoners for more than twelve years. In total, about 80 persons, including ten other members of the security forces, remained in FARC captivity.

The bilateral relations approach on security issues of the Santos government led to the extradition of key FARC figures to Colombia, by both Ecuador and Venezuela [→ Colombia - Venezuela (system), Colombia - Ecuador]. Among them was Joaquín

Pérez Becerra, in charge of a news website closely linked to FARC. fbl

## COLOMBIA (PARAMILITARY GROUPS, DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: *paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between several paramilitary groups and drug cartels, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. The government identified seven main groups, including Los Rastrojos, Los Urabeños, Popular Revolutionary Anti-terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC), and the Envigado Office. On February 7, President Juan Manuel Santos declared these armed groups, labelled by the government as criminal bands (BACRIM), to be the biggest threat to national security. On the same day, he announced the start of "Plan Troy" to fight the increasing influence of paramilitary groups in northern Colombia. Approx. 10,000 soldiers were dispatched to the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba and Sucre. On May 4, Santos announced "Plan Troy Pacific," a similar effort targeting the departments Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño. On 12/25/10, Pedro Oliveiro "Cuchillo" Guerrero Castillo, leader of ERPAC, was shot during a police raid in the Meta department. Almost a year later, on December 24, his successor Guerreros José Eberto "Caracho" López Montero and more than 260 other ERPAC members surrendered to authorities in the same department. On April 11, seven members of Los Urabeños died in fights with the army in San José de Uré, Córdoba. In the course of "Operation Hunter," conducted by the National Police, seven members of Los Rastrojos were shot in Nariño on September 23. On November 27, a joint operation of the Colombian police intelligence and the Venezuelan counter-narcotics police led to the capture of Maximiliano "Valenciano" Bonilla Orozco, head of the Envigado Office in Maracay, Venezuela. Four days later, a police spokesman announced a major offensive against this drug trafficking organization, dispatching 500 additional police officers to Medellín.

Further, paramilitary groups were held responsible for causing forced displacement of civilians. Independent sources counted approx. 90,000 internally displaced throughout the country in the first semester of 2011. More than 34,000 of them in Antioquia, where several paramilitary groups involved in narcotic trade were present. meq

## COLOMBIA - ECUADOR

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: *Colombia vs. Ecuador*

Conflict items: *international power*

The conflict over international power between Colombia and Ecuador was resolved. After the Colombian attack on a Revo-



lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp in northern Ecuador in 2008, the Ecuadorian government broke off diplomatic relations and listed five conditions that Colombia had to meet in order to restore relations: ending accusations that the Ecuadorian government had ties to FARC, expansion of military presence on the Colombian side of the border to enhance border security, provision of detailed information concerning the 2008 incident, handover of information retrieved from confiscated FARC computers, and financial support to the UNHCR to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador. The Colombian government met these conditions in 2009 and 2010. Less than a month after the restoration of diplomatic relations in November 2010, both countries appointed new ambassadors. During bilateral meetings, held on 12/15/10 in Cali and on May 5 in Bogotá, the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, and his Colombian counterpart, Juan Manuel Santos, agreed to enhance diplomatic relations. On July 22, the countries' foreign ministers agreed on the reinforcement of the Colombia-Ecuador Neighborliness and Integration Commission, which is responsible for strengthening bi-national cooperation. During a further summit on September 29, the presidents of both countries signed several agreements extending cooperation in security and other issues. For the first time since 2008, a Colombian president visited his Ecuadorian counterpart on December 20. The presidents discussed issues concerning commercial and border security cooperation and also agreed to sign a maritime border treaty which will be drafted by a joint technical team.

ird

## HAITI (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: *opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *national power*

The national power struggle between various opposition groups and the government, backed by UN mission MINUSTAH, continued on a violent level. National elections at the end of November 2010, left Mirlande Manigat from the Rally of Progressive National Democrats (RDNP) in first place, followed by President René Préval's INITÉ Party candidate Jude Célestin and popular singer Michel Martelly of the Farmers' Response Party. In the aftermath, clashes arose on 12/08/10 between supporters of INITÉ and Farmers' Response Party throughout the whole country, leaving at least four protesters dead and hundreds injured. In addition, rioters threw stones at UN peacekeepers, plundered stores, and built up barricades. In Les Cayes, Sud department, numerous administrative buildings were set on fire. The same day, in Port-au-Prince, the INITÉ headquarters was torched and the international airport had to be closed for several days. On March 20, the second round of presidential elections was held. In sporadic clashes between partisans of rival political factions, in different rural areas, two people were shot dead. After preliminary results displayed Martelly winning 68 percent of the vote on April 4, Manigat accused the electoral council of falsifying the results. Violent protests broke out in several cities after the results had been confirmed on April 21. In Belladère, Centre depart-

ment, a government building was set on fire, reportedly by an association of oppositional parties. One person died in the flames. Simultaneously, protests erupted in Léogane, Ouest department. Martelly's inauguration on May 14 was also accompanied by clashes between his supporters, protesters, and police. On September 5, a video emerged showing UN soldiers harassing an eighteen-year-old Haitian. The incident triggered protests against MINUSTAH in Port-au-Prince throughout September. President Martelly condemned the incident at the UN General Assembly on September 23 and repeated his will to replace the peacekeeping mission by rebuilding own military forces.

js

## HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power, resources*

The system and national power conflict between the oppositional umbrella group National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP) and the government continued. FNRP was led by former President Manuel Zelaya, ousted in 2009. After the Supreme Court had announced the drop of criminal charges against Zelaya on March 25, President Porfirio Lobo and Zelaya signed the Cartagena Agreement on May 22. It ensured a safe return to the ex-president and his exiled members of staff. On May 28, Zelaya arrived at Tegucigalpa Airport, giving a speech to more than 100,000 supporters, announcing his intention to return to national politics. On June 13, he expressed his support for the peasants' efforts to regain land in Bajo Aguán, Colón department, and condemned the deployment of special forces to the area. On June 26, FNRP agreed to Zelaya's proposal to create a political party and to call for a constituent assembly. On September 8, a pro-Zelaya activist was killed in the capital Tegucigalpa. Zelaya condemned the killing as a violation of the Cartagena Agreement and called it a declaration of war. Official investigations concluded the murder had been a criminal assault rather than a politically motivated crime. On November 16, FNRP registered as an official party called Freedom and Refoundation Party (LIBRE) and announced the presidential candidacy of Zelaya's wife, Xiomara Castro.

lug

## JAMAICA (DRUG GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: *drug gangs vs. government*  
Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict between various armed drug gangs and the government over subnational predominance remained violent. In the aftermath of the detention of Shower Posse gang leader Christopher "Dudus" Coke in 2010, military forces remained deployed in gang-dominated areas throughout the country. Among a vast number of others gangs, Clansman as well as One Order remained the country's most active crimi-

nal syndicates, dominating different regions. Throughout the year, authorities killed or arrested several gang members, and dismantled criminal activities of more than 50 major groups across the country. On January 8, Southside Kingston gang leader Horace Ramsay was killed in a joint police and military operation. He was suspected of being involved in drug trafficking as well as several shootings. On March 4, in an effort to arrest them, police killed three alleged Clansman members in Spanish Town, Middlesex County. One week later, members of Clansman gang attacked the responsible police station. They shot at the building and attacked mobile police patrols in the area, using a power outage as cover. No one was injured in the attack. Prime Minister Andrew Holness announced further dismantlement of criminal syndicates for 2012. *als*

## MEXICO (APPO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **APPO vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The system conflict between the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) and the government, led by President Felipe Calderón, continued on a violent level. After the APPO-backed candidate Gabino Cué Monteagudo of the Convergence Party had become governor of Oaxaca on 12/01/10, supporters of APPO demanded indigenous rights and education programs in the center of Oaxaca City. Indigenous groups approved Cué's program for government and declared their support, since he was the first non-Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governor of Oaxaca in eight decades. However, a visit by Calderón to Oaxaca led to violent protests. On February 15, hundreds of supporters of the regional APPO-associated National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) tried to prevent Calderón's arrival at the presidential palace in Oaxaca City. Protesters armed with clubs and stones later clashed with police. At least twelve protesters and eight policemen were injured and several vehicles burned. Reportedly, a journalist was injured by police gunfire. The following days, SNTE organized work stoppages and demonstrations to protest against federal and state educational policy. *jok, peh*

## MEXICO (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2006**



Conflict parties: **drug cartels vs. government**  
Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The war over subnational predominance between the main drug cartels Sinaloa, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (CDG), and factions of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), on the one hand, and government forces, on the other, continued. The number of military personnel and federal police, permanently deployed in

fifteen of 32 federal states, had been significantly increased. Throughout the year, attacks against security personnel took place almost daily, including the use of heavy weapons and car bombs. Security personnel managed to temporarily cut back cartel influence in various regions. In the first semester, more than 200 police officers were assassinated all over the country.

In those states bordering the USA, heavy clashes between cartel members and federal forces led to the deployment of four new battalions, including 2,790 additional soldiers to Tamaulipas in late June. Between January and April, 338 cartel members and five soldiers were killed in confrontations during "Operation NORESTE." In Monterrey, Nuevo León, 115 people died in drug-related violence in January, including twelve police officers. Four of them were killed by machine gun fire in an attack on two police stations and the mayor's office on January 8. As a result, police forces in and around Monterrey were ordered to remain in their barracks until violence ceased. On January 28, the government deployed army personnel and equipped police forces with army weaponry. On June 27, about 30 gang members in police uniforms stormed a police station in a Monterrey suburb, killing the police chief in his office. On July 14, more than 50 special forces pursued and killed nine cartel members near a cartel training camp in the city's outskirts. Two days later, "Operation Northern Lynx," including more than 4,000 soldiers, 700 armored vehicles and 23 airplanes, was launched in the border states. More than 190 alleged cartel members were arrested and over a thousand weapons seized. On August 25, after 52 civilians had died in an arson attack by Los Zetas on a casino in Monterrey, President Felipe Calderón denounced it as a terrorist act and deployed 3,000 additional soldiers to the city. Subsequently, the third-in-command of Los Zetas was arrested in Saltillo, Coahuila for being responsible for the attack. On October 20, a car bomb targeting security forces exploded in downtown Monterrey. It was the second similar attack after the January 17 bombing of a police station. In a raid on a cartel weapon facility in Camargo, Tamaulipas in June, two members of the CDG were killed. Security personnel seized two sophisticated self-made tanks armed with 40 mm grenade launchers.

In the Pacific state of Michoacán, heavy fights broke out due to the split of the former dominant regional LFM cartel into two rival factions (→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)). On 12/09/10, a joint operation involving federal police and military personnel in Apatzingán had resulted in the death of LFM leader Nazario "El Más Loco" Moreno González. Moreover, five federal police officers, three LFM members, and three civilians had died. On May 24, a police helicopter was forced down by gunfire as security forces tried to regain control of Apatzingán. Two police officers were injured. For several days, security forces and members of rivaling drug cartels were involved in heavy fighting that led to the evacuation of 2,500 residents from the nearby Tierra Caliente region. Local authorities temporarily withdrew from the municipality of Buenavista Tomatlán. As a result, federal forces including more than 400 marines were sent to the region. On May 27, a joint military operation in nearby Jilotlán de los Dolores led to a shootout with alleged members of LFM that left 15 cartel members dead. On June 21, police arrested the leader of one of the LFM factions, José "El Chango" Mendez Vargas in Zaca-

texas. Fights re-intensified in early July. On July 2, about 40 cartel members attacked the police headquarters of Morelia, Michoacán, with grenades and automatic weapons. Three attackers died and three police officers were injured. On July 9, an additional 1,800 federal police officers supported by 170 armored vehicles and four helicopters were deployed to Michoacán. Fights between security personnel and Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) as well as other LFM factions endured in the second semester. In late October, heavy clashes with security forces resulted in the death of at least 21 LCT members. In the run-up to Michoacán's gubernatorial elections in November, 18 municipal candidates received threats and one mayor candidate was killed.

In other Pacific states, drug-related violence was also widespread. In reaction to the eradication of a 120 acres marijuana plantation of the Sinaloa Cartel in Baja California, eleven state police officers and a civilian were shot dead in an ambush on the convoy of Sinaloa public security chief near Guasave on July 15. In Zacatecas, marine soldiers killed fifteen members of Los Zetas in an intense firefight near San Jose de Lourdes on July 2. Six marines suffered injuries and another seventeen Los Zetas members were arrested.

In the Gulf state of Veracruz, some hundred soldiers were engaged in a shootout with cartel members in Xalapa on January 13. Twelve cartel members and two soldiers died. On July 17, eleven Los Zetas members died in a confrontation with the army near Xalapa. From October onward, "Operation Veracruz Seguro" led to a sharp rise in military presence. Marine forces replaced the entire local police in late December.

Cartel operations also affected the neighboring US and Guatemala. On October 31, police officers and alleged members of CDG exchanged gunfire in the course of a traffic control in Hidalgo County, Texas. One attacker was killed and one deputy sheriff injured. In November, Los Zetas killed an associate of the US Drug Enforcement Agency in Houston, Texas. Members of the same cartel massacred 30 peasants in Guatemala's Petén region in May [→ Guatemala (various drug cartels)]. The same month, more than 100,000 Mexicans demanded demilitarization of the conflict in nationwide protest marches. In response, Calderón declared drug-related violence and attacks on security personnel an open threat to democracy and announced in December that military forces were to remain deployed.

peh

## MEXICO (EZLN / CHIAPAS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: **EZLN vs. government**

Conflict items: **autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other**

The conflict concerning ideology, autonomy, and resources between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the government deescalated. EZLN still bore control over several self-declared autonomous governments in five regions in Chiapas while upholding demands for autonomy of the whole federal state. EZLN and its spokesman "Subcomandante Marcos" repeatedly declared their willingness to find a peaceful solution. However, EZLN accused the federal government

of President Felipe Calderón and the local government of Chiapas of supporting and financing paramilitary forces in criminal acts against indigenous people. On September 21, EZLN issued a communique, condemning unsolved homicides and disappearances of their supporters and announcing to defend EZLN-controlled regions at all costs. Moreover, EZLN repeatedly condemned the detainment of indigenous people without trial, inappropriate prison conditions and the forbearance of detailed penal procedures. In the largest mobilization since 2003, around 20,000 EZLN supporters protested against the government's anti-drug policy in San Cristobal, Chiapas, on May 7 [→ Mexico (drug cartels)].

lef

## MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. various independent cartels vs. paramilitary groups**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The subnational predominance and resources conflict between several drug cartels, as well as more than 150 paramilitary groups, remained highly violent. The number of organized crime syndicates kept increasing due to the splitting of drug cartels and the ascent of new groups. Cartels and paramilitaries fought for regional influence and control over smuggling routes to the USA. Apart from the most important northern border cities, inter-cartel confrontations increased. Remnants of the local Arellano Felix Organization reportedly called a truce with the Sinaloa Cartel in Tijuana, Baja California, coinciding with a drop in drug-related murders. In heavily contested Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, the murder rates in connection with inter-gang rivalries also significantly decreased compared to last year's 3,100 victims. In contrast, as much as seven different cartels and their enforcers fought for control of strategically important cities like Acapulco in the Pacific state of Guerrero.

After the death of their leader Nazario Moreno González on 12/09/10, the La Familia Michoacana (LFM) cartel violently split. Confrontations took place all over Michoacán and neighboring states after a faction of LFM proclaimed Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) had separated. Heavy fighting between the factions in late May led to the evacuation of several villages near Apatzingán, leaving 2,500 people temporarily homeless. On June 8, more than twenty dead bodies were scattered in Morelia with messages by LCT, claiming responsibility for their murder. Several days later, another fourteen bodies were found in the same town. In November, after government sources had announced that LFM had ceased to exist as a cartel, LCT declared to be its successor claiming the LFM turf [→ Mexico (drug cartels)].

In the Gulf state of Veracruz, a key drug-trafficking corridor with four major cartels battling for control, a paramilitary group called Matazetas or Zeta-Killers emerged. On September 20, thirty-five dead bodies were placed on a street in downtown Veracruz with a message by Matazetas, stating that the dead were connected to Los Zetas. On October 6, another 32 bodies were found in a safe house in Boca Del Rio. In a previous-

ly published video message, the Matazetas had announced to enforce Los Zetas members, but spare security and state forces. In the following months, up to fifteen murders a day were registered in connection with inter-gang fighting.

The predominance of the Sinaloa Cartel was challenged in several regions by various rivals. On May 20, Los Zetas encountered a group of Sinaloa associates in Florencia de Benito Juárez, Zacatecas. In the ensuing firefight, eighteen gang members were killed with automatic assault rifles and hand grenades. In an ambush on a street near Ruiz, Nayarit on May 25, Sinaloa Cartel members intercepted a convoy of fourteen partly armored cars of Los Zetas with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, killing 29. Two mass murders in November indicated that Los Zetas had begun to invade Sinaloa Cartel turf. On November 23, seventeen charred bodies were placed in two abandoned vehicles in Culiacán, Sinaloa state. The next day, another 26 bodies were found in Guadalajara, Jalisco. The bodies were abandoned with messages including the letter "Z" written on them, indicating revenge murders for the Zeta members killed in Veracruz in September.

In the central state of Guanajuato, five dismembered bodies were found together with a message in early June. The text stated that the so-called *Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación* declared war on all other Mexican cartels.

The northeastern states of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas were the main sites of battles between the Gulf Cartel (CDG) and their former enforcers Los Zetas. On January 18, five dismembered bodies signed by the CDG were dumped in Matamoros, Nuevo León, triggering a wave of retaliation killings. A massive shootout between rival gang members left eighteen dead in Abasolo, Tamaulipas on March 7. About 400 bodies were found in mass graves in Durango and Tamaulipas in March. Throughout the country, more than 12,000 people were killed in drug-related violence. *peh*

## NICARAGUA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power struggle between various opposition groups and the government of President Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) continued on a violent level. On April 5, the Supreme Electoral Council approved Ortega's second presidential candidacy that had been granted by the Supreme Court in 2009. Opposition supporters demonstrated against the alleged unconstitutional procedure. On August 4, a demonstration against presumed irregularities in the run-up for the presidential elections resulted in violent riots. About 300 members of oppositional parties and an equal number of FSLN supporters clashed in San Fernando, Nueva Segovia. As a reaction, military forces were deployed to San Fernando the next day. On November 6, presidential elections were held. Two days later, Ortega declared his victory, although official results were not published by the Supreme Electoral Council until November 15. On November 9, preliminary results were released and violent confrontations

in San José de Cusmapa, Madriz, and Siuna, Atlántico Norte, left three opposition supporters and at least one member of Ortega's FSLN dead, as well as seven people injured. In the capital Managua, FSLN members attacked people who opposed the election results. In the clashes, 46 police officers were injured, six of them by gunshots. On November 16, oppositional parties announced to bring the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On December 3, Fabio Gadea, presidential candidate for the main opposition group Independent Liberal Party, declared himself legitimate president and requested the international community not to recognize Ortega's re-election. *stt*

## NICARAGUA - COSTA RICA (RÍO SAN JUAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1858**

Conflict parties: *Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua*  
Conflict items: *territory*

The territorial conflict between Nicaragua and Costa Rica continued on a non-violent level. Both countries lay claim to the small Calero Island, located at the border river San Juan. On 12/14/10, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega rejected a resolution by the OAS to withdraw security personnel from the border region, as well as the mediation role of the OAS. Two days later, Costa Rican Security Minister José María Tijerino announced to reactivate border police. In the following days, Nicaragua reported aerial and marine violations of its territory by Costa Rica, sending patrol boats to the border in response. Costa Rica denied the alleged incursions and protested against the presence of Nicaraguan vessels on 12/24/10. In reaction, the Costa Rican government intensified efforts on the construction of a defense network, including roads and heliports near the disputed area. In March, Costa Rica deployed the nation's first border police unit, consisting of 153 forces. In a provisional ICJ ruling on March 8, both nations were requested to withdraw any personnel from the disputed area. Nicaragua withdrew its soldiers, but nonetheless members of the Sandinista youth movements "Movimiento Guardabarranco" and "Juventud Sandinista" occupied Calero Island several times with up to 100 persons. After the construction of a road on Costa Rican territory, parallel to San Juan River, had begun, Ortega announced on November 25 to send another complaint to the ICJ. A final judgment by ICJ is scheduled for 2012. *stt*

## PANAMA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, resources*

The system conflict between the main opposition umbrella group Frenadeso and the government of President Ricardo Martinelli continued. Frenadeso declared solidarity to the Ngöbe-Buglé natives, protesting against reforms in the mining



legislation. These reforms would allow foreign investments and thus cede native-inhabited territory to foreign companies. On February 8, indigenous protested on motorways in the western departments of Veraguas, Bocas del Toro, and Chiriquí. Police struck against 3,000 protesters with tear gas, birdshot, and rubber bullets in San Felix, Chiriquí. At least eleven people were injured and nineteen arrested, while several went missing. On February 10, Congress approved a new mining law, triggering massive nationwide demonstrations by Frenadeso. About 25 protesters, as well as four policemen, were injured. After ongoing protests, the conflict parties signed an agreement on February 27. The treaty involved the ban of mining exploitation in the Ngöbe-Buglé municipality. The government released arrested protesters and did not follow up people involved in the riots. On June 28, the Electoral Tribunal registered Frenadeso, supported by the trade union SUNTRACS, as a political party called Broad Front for Democracy (FAD). On September 2, FAD supporters protested in front of the National Assembly against a presidential initiative to reform the electoral system in 2012.

lug

## PARAGUAY (EPP, AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *EPP, agrarian movements vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, resources*

The conflict over land reform between the People's Army of Paraguay (EPP) and farmers, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. These groups demanded integral agrarian, social, and political reforms. Especially the confrontation between EPP and security forces intensified. On January 12, two bombs exploded outside a TV station in the capital Asunción. EPP claimed responsibility for the attack, additionally warning the media not to side with the government. Four days later, four policemen were seriously injured and significant material damage was caused when a bomb exploded outside a police station in Horqueta, Concepción province. On January 20, security forces arrested fifteen people at an EPP training camp in Alto Paraná province. In response to the growing threat by EPP, the government set up a counterterrorism force called León Piru in April. Another five suspected EPP members were arrested in the provinces of Concepción and Lambaré in May. Two EPP attacks were carried out in Concepción province in September. On September 19, an explosive device was thrown at the Horqueta office of state prosecution. Two days later, two policemen were killed in a raid on a local police station with grenades and assault rifles. On October 10, in response to the September attacks in Horqueta, the government declared a 60-day state of emergency for the provinces of San Pedro and Concepción, sending 1,800 additional security officers to the region. However, two police officers were wounded by snipers on October 24. Additionally, farmers' protests and land occupations significantly increased. On July 12, peasant farmers attacked and injured two farm proprietors in San Rafael del Paraná. Only a few days later, farmers blocked an important highway at Alto Paraná.

ank

## PERU (OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *opposition movements vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, resources*

The system conflict between various opposition groups and the government remained violent. According to a report released on June 21 by the national ombudsman's office, at least six of the 227 identified domestic social disputes turned violent in the course of the year. On April 4, protests against the Tía María copper mine project, located in the department of Arequipa and owned by foreign investors, became violent. Local residents demanded to stop the project due to fears that it would affect water supplies or cause pollution. In clashes between protesters and police, one person was killed and at least ten others were seriously injured. Three days later, two protesters were fatally shot and at least 40 injured. After the deadly incident, the government cancelled the copper mining project on April 8. Protests against another mining project turned violent on May 26 in the city of Puno, Puno. Fearing contamination of Lake Titicaca by the Santa Ana silver mining project, hundreds of protesters demanded its cancellation. They damaged government buildings and burned police cars. On June 24, about 1,000 protesters tried to storm Juliaca airport. At least five people died and another 30 were injured when riot police fired into the crowd. Protests against the Conga gold mining project in the department of Cajamarca turned violent at the end of November. After talks between local leaders and government officials reached no results, President Ollanta Humala declared a sixty-day state of emergency in the provinces of Cajamarca, Celendin, Hualgayoc and Contumaza on December 4. Further conflicts over natural resources also became violent in the departments of Madre de Dios, Ancash, and Apurímac.

mgm

## PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: *SL vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources*

The subnational predominance and ideology conflict between two factions of the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (SL), on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, remained violent. The first faction, the Center Regional Committee (CRC), was active in southern Peru, especially in the Apurímac and Ene river valley (VRAE). The second faction, the Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH), operated in the Huallaga valley region north of Lima. The government accused both factions of being involved in drug trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels. Throughout the observed period, SL fighters clashed with police or military forces about a dozen times. SL fighters launched four attacks on military helicopters and killed about 20 soldiers, predominantly in the



VRAE, while police and military killed two SL fighters. In the deadliest incident, CRC ambushed a military patrol in VRAE on June 5, the day of the presidential run-off elections, killing five soldiers and injuring six. On December 5, CRH leader Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala alias "Comrade Artemio" admitted the group's defeat and proposed peace negotiations. A week later, fighters of the CRC killed one soldier, and wounded five others in the Ayacucho department. *mgm*

## USA - MEXICO (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **USA vs. Mexico**

Conflict items: **other**

The conflict between the USA and Mexico over border security continued. Strategies to end illegal immigration and cross-border drug and weapon trafficking remained disputed. On January 14, the US announced to stop the construction of a virtual fence along the border, and implemented individual security approaches to the needs of each border region. Throughout the year, the US Department of Homeland Security increased the number of agents, fences and sensors at the border. On March 3, US President Barack Obama and his Mexican counterpart Felipe Calderón agreed on closer cooperation including the use of US drones on Mexican territory. On June 23, Calderón condemned the death of a Mexican, who was shot by a US Border Patrol agent during an attempt of illegally crossing the border. On August 18, Washington announced a case-by-case deportation of illegal immigrants. Furthermore, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement published statistics on October 18, showing that almost 400,000 illegal immigrants have been deported in 2011, most of them Mexicans. Two days later, Calderón rejected the US practice to drop deported immigrants at the border. In an interview published on September 20, Mexican Attorney General Marisela Morales criticized "Operation Fast and Furious" by the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. US authorities had allowed automatic weapons to be smuggled into Mexico whereupon said arms later appeared on murder scenes involving Mexican drug cartels. Morales said that she had not been notified about the operation and called it an attack on the safety of Mexicans. On October 31, a US sheriff in Hidalgo County stated that the October 30 injury of a US deputy on Texas territory by suspects involved in drug trafficking was the first evidence of cross-border violence related to the Mexican drug war [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. Despite this notion, the Obama administration announced on December 20 to start reducing the number of 1,200 National Guard troops to 300 in January. *las*

ASIA AND OCEANIA



With a total of 124 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the world's conflicts. Most conflicts concerned system/ideology and subnational predominance, followed by resources, national power, autonomy, and secession. The most violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology and subnational predominance, while conflicts regarding territory and international power were comparatively peaceful. In 2011, three wars were observed in Asia, two in Pakistan and one in Myanmar, compared to one in Pakistan the previous year. The number of limited wars observed declined from eight in 2010 to five in 2011.

In South Asia, as in previous years, Pakistan was affected by several highly violent conflicts simultaneously. The government's war against various Islamist militant groups continued in 2011 and claimed the lives of more than 4,200 people. In addition, attacks of Pakistani Taliban, particularly on Shiites, and clashes between Taliban and pro-government tribal militias, as well as in-fighting between Taliban factions, resulted in the death of over 800 people [→Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups), Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes), Pakistan (TTP - LI)]. While the USA supported Pakistan against Islamist militants, US drone attacks and the May 2 operation against Osama bin Laden strained bilateral relations [→USA - Pakistan]. Another war occurred in Pakistan's Sindh province, where communal clashes between the Mohajir, Pakhtu, Balochi, and Sindhi ethnic groups and the political parties supporting them, led to approx. 1,400 fatalities in the first eight months of 2011 in Karachi.

With 21 conflicts, India was the most conflict-affected country in Asia. Over 60 percent of these conflicts were carried out in India's Northeast [→India (GNLA et al./Meghalaya), India (MPLF et al./Manipur), India (NSCN et al./Nagaland), India (ULFA et al./Assam) et al.]. India's most violent conflict was the persisting limited war with the Maoist Naxalites in nine central Indian states.

In Central Asia, governments of three countries fought against Islamist militant groups [→Uzbekistan (various Islamist militant groups), Kazakhstan (various Islamist militant groups), Tajikistan (various Islamist militant groups)].


In the People's Republic of China (PRC), fourteen con-

flicts were observed, including ten intrastate and four interstate conflicts. However, only four conflicts were conducted violently, three of which involved ethnic minorities [→China (Tibet), China (Uighurs/Xinjiang), China (Inner Mongolia)]. In addition, peasant protests against local governments turned violent. Several disputes over maritime boundaries continued in the Asia-Pacific area [→China - Vietnam et al. (Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal), Japan - China (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands), Japan - Russia (Southern Kuril Islands) et al.]. Throughout the year, the countries involved continued to upgrade their naval capabilities. Most notably, PRC launched its first aircraft carrier in August. The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il at the end of the year led the Korean Peninsula to a situation of uncertainty [→North Korea - South Korea, North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan].


In South East Asia, Myanmar was the most conflict-ridden country and accounted for ten intrastate conflicts. The highly violent autonomy conflict in Karen and Kayah States escalated to a war, the first in the area over the last years [→Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State)]. However, the conflict de-escalated over the year. In general, tensions between the government and several ethnic armed groups eased after transition from a military rule to a civil government in February [→Myanmar (opposition movement)]. Nevertheless, the autonomy conflict between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one side, and the government, on the other, remained on a highly violent level.

The border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia escalated to a highly violent level in the first months of 2011. After intense fighting, more than 30,000 people fled the disputed area around the Preah Vihear temple in February. Relations between the two countries significantly improved since the July 3 elections in Thailand, with the new Prime Minister Yingluck Thaksin paying a state visit to Cambodia in September. Thailand was also affected by another highly violent conflict: At least 500 people were killed throughout the year in the government's conflict with various Islamist separatists in the southern border provinces.

### CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2011 COMPARED TO 2010



### FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 IN ASIA AND OCEANIA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



## CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>   | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                                       | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|--|--|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Bangladesh (JMB, HuJI-B)  | JMB, HuJI-B vs. government   | system/ideology                                      | 2004  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Bangladesh (AL - BNP)   | AL, government vs. BNP   | national power                                       | 1991  | •                   | 3                      |
| Bangladesh (ICS, Jel - AL, BCL)*  | ICS, Jel vs. Awami League, BCL   | system/ideology, national power                      | 2001  | •                   | 3                      |
| Bangladesh (PCJSS - UPDF)*  | PCJSS vs. UPDF   | subnational predominance                             | 1997  | •                   | 3                      |
| Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF / Chittagong Hill Tracts)*  | Tribes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, UPDF, PCJSS vs. government                       | autonomy   | 1971  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Bangladesh - India  | Bangladesh vs. India   | territory, resources, other                          | 1971  | END                 | 1                      |
| Bangladesh - Myanmar*   | Bangladesh vs. Myanmar   | territory, resources, other                          | 1978  | •                   | 1                      |
| Cambodia (opposition movement)  | CPP vs. SRP, HRP, civil society groups   | system/ideology, national power, resources           | 1997  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Cambodia - Vietnam*   | Cambodia vs. Vietnam   | territory  | 1969  | •                   | 1                      |
| China (Falun Gong)*   | Falun Gong vs. government  | system/ideology                                      | 1999  | •                   | 2                      |
| China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)*  | Hong Kong pro-democracy parties vs. government vs.                                     | autonomy, system/ideology                            | 1999  | •                   | 1                      |
| China (house churches)*   | House Church vs. government  | system/ideology                                      | 1950  | •                   | 2                      |
| China (Hui - Han - Tibetans)*   | Hui ethnic minority vs. Han Chinese vs. Tibetan ethnic minority                        | subnational predominance                             | 1949  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| China (Inner Mongolia)*   | Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. Han Chinese, government                                | autonomy, subnational predominance, resources        | 1981  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| China (opposition movement)*  | opposition movement vs. government   | system/ideology                                      | 1989  | •                   | 2                      |
| China (peasant protests)  | peasants vs. government vs.  | system/ideology, resources                           | 1978  | •                   | 3                      |
| China (Taiwan)  | PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups   | secession  | 1949  | •                   | 2                      |
| China (Tibet)   | Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government                        | secession, system/ideology, resources                | 1950  | •                   | 3                      |
| China (Uighurs / Xinjiang)  | TIP, ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han Chinese                                    | secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance | 1990  | •                   | 3                      |
| China - India*  | China vs. India  | territory, international power, resources            | 1959  | •                   | 2                      |
| China - USA*  | China vs. USA  | international power                                  | 1949  | •                   | 1                      |
| China - Vietnam et al. (Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal) | Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Indonesia vs. Malaysia vs. Philippines vs. Vietnam          | territory, resources                                 | 1945  | •                   | 2                      |
| Fiji (indigenous Fijian multi-ethnicists - indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists)*                                | indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists vs. indigenous Fijian multi-ethnicists             | system/ideology, national power                      | 2006  | •                   | 2                      |
| Fiji (Indo-Fijians - indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists)*  | Indo-Fijians vs. indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists                                   | national power, subnational predominance             | 1970  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Fiji - Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*   | Fiji, Tonga  | territory  | 2005  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (GJM et al. / northern West Bengal, eastern Assam)  | GNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO vs. ABGL, ABAVP, Janachetana, Amra Bangali vs. government | autonomy   | 1947  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)   | HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, UANF, LAEF, GNLA vs. government                                     | autonomy   | 1988  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (GNLA, HNLC - ANVC, UANF)*  | GNLA vs. HNLC, ANVC, UANF  | subnational predominance                             | 1992  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (Hindus - Christians)*  | Bajrang Dal, VHP, Hindus vs. Christians  | subnational predominance                             | 1999  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (Hindus - Muslims)*   | Hindus vs. Muslims   | subnational predominance                             | 1947  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)*   | HPC-D, HNA vs. government  | secession  | 1986  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)  | JeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. government   | secession  | 1947  | ↘                   | 3                      |



## CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                                  | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>   | Conflict items                            | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|---|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| India (MPLF et al. / Manipur)                                  | MPLF, KCP, ZRA, KYKL, PREPAK (Progressive), UPPK vs. government                   | secession                                 | 1964  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (Nagas - Kukis)*   | KNF, KNA, KLA vs. NSCN, UNPC  | subnational predominance                  | 1947  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (Naxalites)  | CPI-M vs. government  | system/ideology                           | 1997  | •                   | 4                      |
| India (NDFB - ACF, BCF)*                                       | Bodos, NDFB vs. Santhals, ACF, BCF  | subnational predominance                  | 1994  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (NLFT, ATTF, BNCT / Tripura)*                            | NLFT, ATTF, BNCT vs. government   | secession                                 | 1978  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)                                 | NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM, NSCN-U, ANSAM, UNC, NNC vs. government                  | secession                                 | 1947  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (NSCN-K - NSCN-KK - NSCN-IM)*                            | NSCN-K vs. NSCN-KK vs. NSCN-IM  | subnational predominance                  | 1988  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (PULF)*  | PULF vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology                 | 1993  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (Sikhs - DSS)*   | Sikhs vs. DSS   | subnational predominance                  | 2007  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| India (Sikhs / Punjab)   | Shiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI, KTF vs. government                            | autonomy                                  | 1947  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (TJAC / Telangana)*                                      | TJAC vs. government   | autonomy                                  | 1969  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)*                       | ULFA, ATTF, NDFB, NLFT, AABYSF, AASU vs. Biharis, Bengalis                        | subnational predominance                  | 1981  | •                   | 2                      |
| India (ULFA et al. / Assam)                                    | ULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs. government                                       | secession                                 | 1979  | •                   | 3                      |
| India (various Islamist militant groups)                       | JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI, HM vs. government                                       | system/ideology                           | 2000  | •                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia (Ahmadiyya)  | Ahmadiyya vs. government, radical Sunni Muslims                                   | system/ideology                           | 1980  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia (Bugis - Dayaks / Kalimantan)*                       | Bugis vs. Dayaks  | subnational predominance                  | 1999  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh - Irwandi camp / Aceh)*            | KPA, Partai Aceh vs. Irwandi camp   | subnational predominance, resources       | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh / Aceh)*                           | KPA, Partai Aceh vs. government   | autonomy, resources                       | 1953  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Indonesia (Muslims - Christians / Moluccas)*                   | Muslims, Laskar Jihad vs. Christians  | subnational predominance                  | 1998  | •                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia (Muslims - Christians / Sulawesi)*                   | Muslims vs. Christians  | subnational predominance                  | 1998  | •                   | 2                      |
| Indonesia (OPM / Papua)  | OPM vs. government  | secession, resources                      | 1961  | •                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia (RMS, FKM / Moluccas)*                               | RMS, FKM vs. government   | secession                                 | 1950  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Indonesia (various Islamist militant groups)                   | Tanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, JAT vs. government                                   | system/ideology, national power           | 1981  | •                   | 3                      |
| Indonesia - Timor Leste*                                       | Timor Leste vs. Indonesia   | territory, other                          | 2002  | •                   | 2                      |
| Japan - China (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands)                      | ROC vs. PRC vs. Japan   | territory, resources                      | 1945  | •                   | 2                      |
| Japan - Russia (Southern Kuril Islands)                        | Japan vs. Russia  | territory                                 | 1945  | •                   | 2                      |
| Japan - South Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands)*                 | Japan vs. South Korea   | territory                                 | 1948  | •                   | 2                      |
| Kazakhstan (opposition)  | opposition vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 2004  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Kazakhstan (various Islamist militant groups)                  | Djund al-Khalifat, diverse Islamist militant groups vs. government                | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz - Uzbeks)*                                  | ethnic Kyrgyz vs. ethnic Uzbeks   | subnational predominance, resources       | 1990  | ↓                   | 2                      |
| Laos (Christians)  | Christians vs. government   | system/ideology                           | 1975  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Laos (Hmong, royalists)*                                       | Hmong, royalists vs. government   | system/ideology                           | 1975  | •                   | 3                      |
| Malaysia (KMM)*  | KMM vs. government  | system/ideology, national power           | 1995  | •                   | 1                      |
| Malaysia (Malay - Chinese, Indian, and Indigenous Malaysians)* | Malay Malaysians vs. Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysians | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 1946  | •                   | 2                      |

## CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                                  | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                                  | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|--|--|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Malaysia (opposition movement)                                 | Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih 2.0 vs. government  | system/ideology, national power                 | 1969  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Malaysia - Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)*                | Malaysia vs. Indonesia, Philippines  | other   | 1998  | •                   | 2                      |
| Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / Rakhine State)*        | Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA vs. government  | secession                                       | 1948  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Myanmar (CNA, CNF / Chin State)*                               | CNA, CNF vs. government  | secession                                       | 1988  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)                              | KIA, KIO vs. government  | autonomy  | 1961  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP / Kayah State)*                       | KNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. government   | autonomy  | 1948  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State) | KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs. DKBA, Karen BGF, government  | autonomy  | 1948  | ↗                   | 5                      |
| Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP / Mon State, Karen State)*                 | MNLA, NMSP vs. government  | secession                                       | 1948  | •                   | 3                      |
| Myanmar (opposition movement)                                  | opposition vs. government  | system/ideology, national power                 | 1962  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO / Rakhine State)*                     | Rohingyas, ARNO vs. government   | other   | 1948  | •                   | 2                      |
| Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N / Shan State)                            | SSA-S, SSA-N vs. Government  | autonomy  | 1952  | •                   | 3                      |
| Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)*                             | UWSA, NDAA vs. government  | autonomy  | 1988  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Nepal (Kiratis/Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)*                       | Khumbuwan National Front, Limbuwan National Liberation Front, Kirant National Front, Federal Limbuwan State Council, Kirat Janawadi Workers Party vs. government | autonomy  | 1992  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)                                      | JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMM-M, ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM, MJF, TMDP vs. government  | autonomy  | 2004  | •                   | 3                      |
| Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*                               | NDA, Ranabir Sena, Bishwo Hindu Youth Federation, RPPN vs. government  | system/ideology                                 | 2006  | •                   | 2                      |
| Nepal (UCPN-M Bhattarai - Dahal factions)*                     | UCPN-M Bhattarai faction vs. UCPN-M Dahal faction  | subnational predominance                        | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Nepal (UCPN-M)*  | UCPN-M vs. government  | system/ideology                                 | 1994  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Nepal - Bhutan*  | Bhutan vs. Nepal   | other   | 1985  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| North Korea - South Korea                                      | North Korea vs. South Korea  | territory, system/ideology, international power | 1948  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan                          | North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan  | system/ideology, international power, other     | 1990  | •                   | 2                      |
| Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)                            | Baloch and Brahui tribes, BSO, BPLF, JWP, BLA, BRA, BLUF, BNP, LeB, BMDT vs. government  | secession, resources                            | 1948  | •                   | 3                      |
| Pakistan (Mohajirs - Balochis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)              | Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP, Balochis, PPP, Sindhis  | subnational predominance                        | 1947  | ↗                   | 5                      |
| Pakistan (opposition)*   | opposition vs. government  | national power                                  | 1998  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)                            | TTP, LI vs. various tribes   | system/ideology, subnational predominance       | 2001  | •                   | 4                      |
| Pakistan (TTP - LI)*   | TTP vs. LI   | subnational predominance                        | 2010  | •                   | 3                      |
| Pakistan (TTP, LeJ, SSP - various religious groups)            | TTP, LeJ, SSP vs. various religious groups   | system/ideology, subnational predominance       | 1985  | ↘                   | 3                      |
| Pakistan (various Islamist militant groups)                    | various Islamist militant groups vs. government  | system/ideology, national power                 | 2001  | •                   | 5                      |
| Pakistan - India*  | Pakistan vs. India   | territory, international power                  | 1947  | •                   | 3                      |

## CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                                       | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                        | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Papua New Guinea (Agarabi - Kamano)*                                | Agarabi vs. Kamano   | subnational predominance              | 1975  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Papua New Guinea (Highlanders - Lowlanders)*                        | Highlanders vs. Lowlanders   | subnational predominance              | 1975  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Philippines (Abu Sayyaf / Mindanao)                                 | Abu Sayyaf vs. government  | secession, system/ideology            | 1991  | •                   | 3                      |
| Philippines (CPP, NPA)*   | CPP, NPA vs. government  | system/ideology                       | 1968  | •                   | 3                      |
| Philippines (MILF - BIFM)   | MILF vs. BIFM  | subnational predominance              | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Philippines (MILF - MNLF)*  | MILF vs. MNLF  | subnational predominance              | 2009  | •                   | 3                      |
| Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)*                                      | MILF vs. government  | secession, system/ideology, resources | 1977  | •                   | 3                      |
| Philippines (MNLF / Mindanao)*                                      | MNLF vs. government  | autonomy, system/ideology, resources  | 1969  | •                   | 3                      |
| Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah)*  | Jemaah Islamiah vs. government                                       | system/ideology                       | 1999  | •                   | 1                      |
| Singapore - Malaysia*   | Singapore vs. Malaysia   | territory                             | 1963  | •                   | 1                      |
| Solomon Islands (ethnic tensions)*                                  | Islanders of Guadalcanal, IFM, Islanders of Malaita, MEF             | subnational predominance, resources   | 1978  | •                   | 1                      |
| Sri Lanka (Buddhists - Hindus, Muslims, Christians)*                | Buddhists vs. Hindus, Muslims, Christians                            | subnational predominance              | 1948  | •                   | 1                      |
| Sri Lanka (Muslims)*  | Muslims, SLMC vs. government   | other                                 | 1948  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Sri Lanka (Sinhalese nationalists)*                                 | JVP, JHU vs. Eelam Tamils, government                                | system/ideology                       | 1948  | •                   | 1                      |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils - Muslims)*                                       | Eelam Tamils vs. Muslims   | subnational predominance              | 1948  | •                   | 1                      |
| Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*                                       | Upcountry Tamils, CWC vs. government                                 | other                                 | 1948  | •                   | 1                      |
| Tajikistan (opposition)*  | opposition vs. government  | system/ideology, national power       | 1997  | •                   | 2                      |
| Tajikistan (various Islamist militant groups)                       | UTO, HuT, al-Qaeda, IMU vs. government                               | system/ideology, national power       | 1997  | •                   | 3                      |
| Thailand (Northern Hill Tribes)*                                    | Northern Hill Tribes vs. government                                  | other                                 | 1955  | •                   | 1                      |
| Thailand (UDD, PTP - PAD)   | UDD, PTP vs. PAD   | national power                        | 2006  | •                   | 3                      |
| Thailand (various Islamist separatists / southern border provinces) | various Islamist separatists vs. government                          | secession, system/ideology            | 1902  | •                   | 4                      |
| Thailand - Cambodia (border)  | Thailand vs. Cambodia  | territory, international power        | 1954  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| Thailand - Myanmar*   | Thailand vs. Myanmar   | territory, other                      | 1948  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Timor-Leste (veterans)*   | Veterans vs. government  | other                                 | 2006  | •                   | 1                      |
| Timor-Leste - Australia*  | Timor Leste vs. Australia  | resources                             | 2002  | •                   | 1                      |
| USA - Pakistan  | USA vs. Pakistan   | other                                 | 2003  | •                   | 3                      |
| Uzbekistan (opposition)*  | opposition vs. government  | system/ideology, national power       | 2005  | •                   | 1                      |
| Uzbekistan (various Islamist militant groups)*                      | IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir, diverse Islamist militant groups vs. government | system/ideology, national power       | 1991  | •                   | 2                      |
| Uzbekistan - Tajikistan*  | Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan  | resources                             | 2010  | •                   | 1                      |
| Vietnam (Montagnards)   | Montagnards vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology             | 1958  | ↘                   | 2                      |

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↗ or ↘ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↘ or ↗ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## BANGLADESH (AL - BNP)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: **AL, government vs. BNP**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between the governing Awami League (AL) and the oppositional Bangladesh National Party (BNP) continued on a violent level. During the year, a large number of AL and BNP activists died or were injured in violent clashes. On July 3, arrest warrants were issued against Tarique Rahman, son of BNP leader Khaleda Zia, and eighteen others, some of them BNP members, for their alleged involvement in the 2004 grenade attack on an AL rally. BNP suspected political interests behind these allegations. After the parliament had abolished the caretaker government arrangement, which had been part of the constitution for 15 years, BNP proclaimed country-wide hartals, i.e. a general strike and shutdown, on July 6 and 7. During the hartals, policemen allegedly assaulted BNP chief whip Zainul Abidin Faroque. In reaction, BNP called for an eight-hour hunger strike on July 13 to protest against the arrests and alleged torture of opposition members. On July 24, one person died and 40 were injured when BNP and AL activists clashed in Magura district in Kulnar division and vandalized some 25 houses. In October, BNP started road marches in different parts of the country calling for the re-establishment of the caretaker system. On December 18, two persons died and several vehicles were destroyed when BNP and other oppositional activists clashed with police in the capital Dhaka and Sylhet. In response, police arrested more than 200 activists. One day later, BNP called on a rally to protest the violence against the opposition, but law enforcers kept the party from starting the scheduled protest.

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## BANGLADESH (JMB, HUJI-B)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: **JMB, HuJI-B vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The conflict over ideology and the orientation of the political system between the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, deescalated. JMB and HuJI-B aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh through armed struggle. On January 5, JMB threatened to bomb the central jail and court building in Chittagong District, demanding the release of detained militants. One day later, militants threatened to kill Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and to bomb a prison in Chittagong city to demand the release of detained militants. On May 26, the Rapid Action Battalion secured 16 improvised explosive devices, 24 Molotov cocktails and bomb-making chemicals in Dhaka District, presumably belonging to HuJI-B. Throughout the year, JMB and HuJI-B members were arrested and sentenced for their suspected involvement in various acts of violence and for the alleged

possession of jihadi and Islamist media.

kbl

## BANGLADESH - INDIA

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: **Bangladesh vs. India**  
Conflict items: **territory, resources, other**

The conflict between Bangladesh and India over resources and territory ended. Although questions regarding the boundary, border control, as well as cross-border resource management remained on the agenda, relations had significantly improved due to many high level visits and meetings and the signing of legal contracts. In January, the interior ministers of both countries met in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to discuss security-related issues, aiming at reducing tensions along the border. On March 9, border guards from both countries came together for a five-day meeting to discuss cross-border crime and killings, as well as joint border management. In June and July, the foreign ministers met. In July, the two countries started to carry out the first joint census in each other's numerous enclaves in order to finalize a deal to exchange the enclaves as part of the long-standing border negotiations. In August, Bangladesh and India agreed on consolidated maps, thereby demarcating the 4,156 km long land border. During the first visit by Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in twelve years, a series of protocols concerning trade and border issues were signed. Furthermore, a deal that would swap 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India and 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh was put in motion in September. By contrast, no considerable progress was achieved concerning the issues of water resources and of granting India overland access to its northeastern states through Bangladesh. Military cooperation was strengthened as well. On August 19, the Indian Army Chief visited Bangladesh to consolidate bilateral defense cooperation and military ties. In October, joint exercises and training programs were held. Trade relations had likewise improved. In November, Bangladesh Railway signed contracts with Indian companies to improve infrastructure and establish better train connections.

cs

## CAMBODIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **CPP vs. SRP, HRP, civil society groups**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power, resources**

The conflict between the opposition, comprising political parties, especially the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), civil society groups and the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen escalated. In April, exiled SRP leader Sam Rainsy was sentenced in absentia, raising his total prison term to 14 years. After months of tense relations, SRP revoked its intention to merge with the oppositional Human Rights Party (HRP), which allegedly cooperated with CPP. In November, SRP announced to withdraw its members of parliament in order to cause a constitutional crisis. Throughout the year, nu-

merous protests on labor and union rights were prevented or suppressed by police forces. Strikes were staged in several garment factories. In late March, police clashed with around 1,000 garment workers in a factory in the capital Phnom Penh, leaving 50 people injured. In May, 2,000 protesting garment workers tried to block a road in the capital. At least fifteen people were injured when police forcefully intervened. Three women were injured when armed police forces ended a strike of 500 protesters in another garment factory in July. Throughout the year, the eviction of hundreds of residents in different provinces from their farmlands sparked violent protest. In total, rights groups stated that more than 280 land disputes remained unresolved. In June, when protests in the province of Kampong Speu turned violent, at least eleven civilians were severely injured. Likewise, numerous development projects in the capital forced thousands of residents to leave their homes without adequate compensation. Security forces violently dispersed protests of hundreds of Boeung Kak Lake residents using electric batons and arrested dozens. In response to the government's eviction policy, the World Bank suspended further loans to Cambodia. Therefore, Hun Sen decreed that residents would receive compensation. The first 259 families received land titles in December. In addition, recruitment agencies, sometimes with political cover, exploited and mistreated thousands of migrant workers and coerced them into debt bondage or forced labor.

som

unrest after land expropriations by the local government, beginning on September 20. In the following four days, villagers injured more than a dozen policemen. In December, tensions increased after clashes with the police and the death of one protester during detention.

axt

## CHINA (TAIWAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: **PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups**

Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict between the government of the Republic of China in Taipei (ROC) and the government of the People's Republic of China in Beijing (PRC) regarding the political status of Taiwan continued despite further progress in economic relations. Both governments insisted on the 1992 Consensus indicating that they had recognized the existence of only one China. While the PRC government continued to claim to be the only legitimate government of all China, the ROC government strove to maintain the status quo. Pro-Taiwan independence groups continued to demand an independent Taiwan. Due to upcoming political and military power shifts in both entities in 2012, PRC and ROC adopted a wait-and-see-approach, thereby postponing major breakthroughs in bilateral relations.

During his presidential election campaign, in October, ROC President and Kuomintang (KMT) leader Ma Ying-jeou raised the issue of negotiating a peace agreement with Mainland China. The candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen criticized the remarks. She repeatedly reiterated her disapproval of the 1992 Consensus, e.g. during the presentation of DPP's Mainland China program on August 24, and announced to maintain a pro-independence policy if getting elected. Until the end of the year, the presidential race remained open with slight advances for KMT. Economic relations between PRC and ROC continued to improve substantially. On January 6, both sides announced the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), comprising the Mainland Chinese Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). The ECC was formed after Taipei and Beijing had signed the landmark Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in June 2010. ECC met on February 22 in Taoyuan, Taiwan, and on November 1 in Hangzhou, Mainland China, and agreed on economic cooperation in multiple areas. In addition, an agreement on nuclear safety was signed on October 20 in Tianjin, Mainland China, during the seventh ARATS-SEF meeting. However, military relations remained tense. On August 10, PRC officially announced the completion of its first aircraft carrier after earlier confirming the deployment of new missiles facing Taiwan as well as the upgrade of its naval capabilities. On September 21, US President Barack Obama announced an arms sale of 5.85 billion dollars to upgrade ROC's fleet of F-16 fighter jets. As in previous arms sales, PRC condemned the proposition, yet abstained from abandoning military-to-military talks with the US [→ China - USA]. According to an annual ROC military intelligence report, 1,600 missiles were targeting

## CHINA (PEASANT PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: **peasants vs. government**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, resources**

The system and resource conflict between peasants and local governments over land expropriations continued on a violent level. The rural population faced existential hardship due to ongoing land seizures leading to massive protests within the People's Republic of China. Throughout the year, several thousand of individual protests occurred. On 12/25/2010, Qian Yunhui, former village head of Zhaiqiao, died in an accident in his village in Zhejiang province. Residents suspected a homicide to stop him from petitioning against expropriation. The handling of the incident by officials led to protests in January. On May 26, three bombs detonated in and next to government buildings in Fuzhou, Jiangxi province, killing three people and injuring ten. According to the perpetrator, the attack was motivated by the expropriation of his land and his lack of success in the subsequent lawsuit. On June 9, the death of local government official Ran Jianxin triggered riots with 1,500 participants in Lichuan, Hubei province. Ran opposed land acquisition and was allegedly killed during police interrogation. On June 14, the beating of a village chief who tried to renegotiate land compensation fees triggered a gathering of thousands of villagers in Taizhou, Zhejiang province. After land seizure and leveling of 66 acres, three peasants set themselves on fire, in Hebei province on November 3. The largest incident was reported in Wukan village, eastern Guangdong, where thousands of villagers staged three months of



Taiwan. The report further estimated their number to increase to 1,800 by 2012. mr

## CHINA (TIBET)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1950**

Conflict parties: *Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology, resources*

The secession conflict, also concerning ideology and resources, between Tibetan separatists and the Tibetan government-in-exile, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. In March 11, the Tibetan spiritual and political leader, the Dalai Lama, formally announced his intention to retire from his political office. On April 27, the Tibetan government-in-exile announced the election of Lobsang Sangay as the new prime minister. Sangay pledged to follow the middle way approach of the Dalai Lama in the conflict.

In the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), Zhang Qingli was replaced as chief of the Communist Party of China in the TAR by Chen Quanguo on August 25. In protest against the Chinese rule over Tibet, a monk immolated himself on March 16, the 52nd anniversary of the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the third anniversary of the 2008 unrests near Kirti monastery in Ngaba/Aba, Sichuan province. The incident triggered widespread protests. Police forces arrested and beat several Tibetan monks. On April 24, two Tibetan civilians were killed as paramilitary troops stormed Kirti monastery, detaining 300 monks. In June, police forces repeatedly raided several monasteries in Kardze/Ganzi prefecture and Ngaba/Aba, Sichuan, and arrested dozens of monks and demonstrators. These had been commemorating the monk's death, protesting for Tibetan independence, religious freedom, and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. Between August 15 and November 4, ten people, most of them monks and nuns, set themselves on fire in Kirti and Kardze/Ganzi in protest against ongoing repression, leading to the death of five. During protests in Kardze/Ganzi on October 17, police forces shot two Tibetans after quarrels over the release of detained demonstrators. On October 26, an improvised explosive device was detonated by Tibetans at a municipal office in Gama, Qamdo/Changdu county, TAR. In nearby Karma, a twelfth Tibetan immolated himself on December 1. axt

## CHINA (UIGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: *TIP, ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han Chinese*  
 Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance*

The secession conflict between the Uighurs, a Muslim minority in the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, and the government remained violent. On 12/24/2010, a court sentenced an Uighur official radio journalist to life imprisonment for trans-

mitting information on the 2009 Xinjiang riots. In February and March, courts sentenced eleven Uighurs to death for their role in a series of attacks in Xinjiang between August and November 2010. On April 19, a Uighur man stabbed six people and killed himself in the city of Kashgar, Xinjiang. On July 18, a group of Uighurs attacked and set fire to a police station in Hotan, northwestern Xinjiang, leaving four people dead, among them two security personnel. The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) claimed that the violence erupted after security forces had opened fire on a peaceful Uighur demonstration. On July 30, two Uighurs hijacked a truck, killed its driver, and drove into a crowd of pedestrians in Kashgar, western Xinjiang. Six people, as well as one attacker died, further 27 were injured. The next day, armed Uighurs raided a restaurant in Kashgar, killing at least six people and injuring fifteen. The police killed five suspects in the ensuing shootout and later two others who initially had escaped. Riot police locked down the city and patrolled the streets until August 4. On September 8, the Pakistan-based Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a militant Uighur organization, claimed responsibility for the attack as well as for the attack in Hotan in July. Later in September, courts sentenced four men to death and two others to prison for their involvement in those attacks. Also in September, Pakistan promised China maximum support in fighting Muslim separatists. On December 28, a group of Uighurs took hostage two shepherds in Pishan county, southern Xinjiang. In the subsequent standoff, police shot dead seven suspects. Throughout the year, the government responded to a perceived terrorist threat emanating from radical Muslims in Xinjiang inter alia. In May, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan conducted a joint anti-terror training in Xinjiang. Furthermore, the government introduced a comprehensive two-month security measure to Xinjiang in August and deployed more than 3,000 special police forces to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in November. Late in October, the state council submitted a draft terrorism act to the National People's Congress. Defining terrorism, the bill allowed a renewed campaign against terrorist threats in cooperation with other countries. jd

## CHINA - VIETNAM ET AL. (SPRATLY ISLANDS, PARACEL ISLANDS, PRATAS ISLANDS, MACCLESFIELD BANK, SCARBOROUGH SHOAL)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1945**

Conflict parties: *Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Indonesia vs. Malaysia vs. Philippines vs. Vietnam*  
 Conflict items: *territory, resources*

The conflict over territory and resources in the South China Sea, also known as East Vietnamese Sea or West Philippine Sea, between Brunei, the governments of People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam continued. Both Chinese governments reiterated their territorial claims on most of the South China Sea, while the other governments reaffirmed their claims on parts of the disputed territories. The conflicting par-

ties repeatedly accused each other of territorial violations. On March 24, PRC announced that it held indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. The Philippines, Vietnam, the PRC, and ROC intensified their efforts to enhance their naval capacities in the area. PRC deployed patrol boats into the disputed waters in June. On August 10, it announced the completion of its first aircraft carrier.

On March 2, Philippine news agencies reported two PRC patrol boats harassing a seismic survey vessel operating in Philippine-claimed waters. In response, the Philippines sent military planes to the area. In late June and late October, the USA and the Philippines engaged in two-week military drills, including a beach-assault exercise near the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, the US announced infrastructure and equipment support for the Philippines.

On May 26 and June 9, Vietnamese news agencies reported two incidents involving PRC patrol boat, which disabled the seismic survey cables of a Vietnamese oil exploration vessel. PRC, however, accused Vietnam of having illegally entered its territory. The incident sparked six weeks of anti-PRC protests in the capital Hanoi. On August 22, Vietnamese police forces cracked down the protests. On September 15, PRC voiced its objections to Indian firms engaging in oil and gas exploration projects in an area claimed by Vietnam as well as China. On October 18, PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement to hold discussions twice a year in order to resolve their differences and to set up a hotline between the two governments.

On the multilateral level, PRC signed an agreement for guidelines regarding the launch of regular talks on the South China Sea dispute at the ASEAN conference on July 21. The dispute reappeared on the agenda at the November ASEAN meeting. No major breakthroughs were reached. During the Sixth East Asia Summit on November 19, every claimant except PRC called for a multilateral solution. *mr*

## INDIA (GJM ET AL. / NORTHERN WEST BENGAL, EASTERN ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: **GNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO vs. ABGL, ABAVP, Janachetana, Amra Bangali vs. government**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The conflict over autonomy between the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), its breakaway faction Gorkha National Liberation Front-C.K. Pradhan (GNLF-C), the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM), the Indian Gorkha People's Power (IGPP), and the Gorkha Liberation Organization (GLO), on one side, the All India Gorkha League (ABGL), Amra Bangali, Janachetana, the All Bengal Adivasi Bikash Parishad (ABAVP), on another, and the government, on the third side, over the creation of a separate state of Gorkhaland in the Dooars region, encompassing areas in northern West Bengal state and eastern Assam state, continued on a violent level. On February 8, police fatally shot at least three people during a GJM rally in Jalpaiguri district, West Bengal. Following the incident, GJM enforced a nine-day long bandh, i.e. a general strike and shutdown, in Darjeeling

city. At the same time, about 11,000 people flooded police stations ostensibly to surrender, thereby protesting harassment of GJM members by security personnel. Furthermore, GJM enforced a tea export embargo during February. In March, the West Bengal state government sent additional troops of the Reserve Police to Darjeeling, West Bengal. On June 6 and 7, GJM and West Bengal's government resumed their talks after a six-month break. The resulting agreement promised the Gorkhas in West Bengal more administrative and economic autonomy. This was criticized by the All India Gorkha League, considering the agreement a betrayal of their goal of a separate state within India. On July 15, Amra Bangali called a five-day bandh in West Bengal. Ten other non-Gorkha organizations, among them ABAVP and Janachetana, fearing Gorkha domination and Nepali influence, joined the protest against the agreement. On July 18, the federal government, the government of West Bengal, and GJM signed the deal, giving the new Gorkhaland Territorial Administration more powers than the former administrative body of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, established in 1988. The government further announced to provide GTA with 6 billion Indian rupees over a period of three years for the development of the region. A possible territorial extension of the authority is to take place in 2012. *ls*

## INDIA (GNLA ET AL. / MEGHALAYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: **HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, UANF, LAEF, GNLA vs. government**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between various militant groups in the state of Meghalaya, among them the Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (HNLC), the People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M), the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), the United Achik National Front (UANF), the Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF), and the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, GNLA members surrendered to, or were arrested by, police. Security forces killed a militant during a raid of a GNLA training camp in East Garo Hills district on January 26. On August 4, suspected GNLA militants fatally shot a village council chief in West Garo Hills district. Five days later, state police killed four GNLA fighters, including their deputy commander-in-chief, a police deserter. Another seven days later, two truck drivers were shot dead by alleged GNLA members for not observing a bandh, a general strike and shutdown. On September 27, GNLA ambushed a police patrol in South Garo Hills district, leading to a heavy exchange of fire. In October five policemen, one rebel, and one civilian were killed in the conflict. On December 18, security forces killed two GNLA militants in East Garo Hills district. Alleged GNLA militants opened fire on a police truck in East Garo Hills district on December 20, injuring four policemen. On October 1, the 2004 tripartite ceasefire agreement between the government, the state government of Meghalaya, on the one hand, and ANVC, on the other, was extended by another year. *ve*

## INDIA (JEM ET AL. / KASHMIR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: **JeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgent groups, namely Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. In the course of the year, at least twenty paramilitary security forces (SF) and policemen, respectively, 50 militants, and 25 civilians were killed. Several militants and police forces and at least 150 civilians were injured. SF arrested more than 160 militants, including six high-level commanders. However, according to state police, J&K saw the lowest number of militancy-related incidents in the last 22 years. Approx. ten people were injured, among them two policemen, in two separate grenade attacks in Pulwama district on 12/14/10. On January 14, the federal government announced to reduce forces in J&K by 25 percent within twelve months. On January 31, two civilians were shot in Baramulla district. One of the two LET militants allegedly involved was shot dead by police during a search operation on March 13. On March 10, police in Srinagar, J&K's summer capital, killed the head of JeM in J&K and his bodyguard. Twenty days later, HM shot dead a leader of the National Conference party in Pulwama district. On April 8, well-known religio-political leader, Maulana Shaukat Ahmed, was killed by a bomb outside a mosque in Srinagar. Twenty days later, security forces killed two top LET commanders in Karnal district. On May 2, suspected LET militants triggered a car bomb explosion on the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway in an attempt to kill an army general. While the general survived the attack, one civilian was killed and another seven were injured. SF killed two JeM militants in an encounter in Baramulla district on May 26. On June 28, SF killed two HM militants in a twelve-hour long gun battle in Pulwama district. On August 4, SF killed three LeT members in gun battles in Kishtwar and Pulwama districts. When the army foiled an infiltration in Kupwara district near the Line of Control, four militants were killed in a shootout that lasted for more than 36 hours on October 1. On November 2, police arrested two HM members, who were allegedly involved in the September 7 blast outside High Court, New Delhi [→ India (various Islamist militant groups)]. On November 7, clashes broke out between anti-Indian protesters and SF in Anantnag district, leaving at least 35 people injured, among them police officers and civilians.

sbo

## INDIA (MPLF ET AL. / MANIPUR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: **MPLF, KCP, ZRA, KYKL, PREPAK (Progressive), UPPK vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between various separatist groups in

the state of Manipur and the government continued on a violent level. The ethnic Meithei groups, United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA) with its political arm Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), People Liberation Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK) with its splinter groups PREPAK-Progressive and United People's Party of Kangleipak (UPPK), as well as Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), tried to enforce an independent Manipur state. UNLF, PLA, RPF and PREPAK united under the label Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF). The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) aspired an egalitarian society in an independent Manipur, whereas the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) sought to unite all Zomi people in one Indian state. Throughout the period observed, security forces (SF) and Assam Rifles (AR) arrested about 245 KCP, 115 PREPAK, 65 PLA, 50 UNLF, and four ZRA members.

On January 20, KCP dropped an improvised bomb near a police camp in Imphal West district. In February, SF killed a KCP member. As part of "Operation Clear-Cut," a campaign by the Lanheiba splinter group of the Military Council faction of the KCP aimed against immigrants, the outfit demanded that non-locals were to leave Manipur and later announced to take action against them. On March 11, KCP claimed responsibility for a bomb attack which had been executed one day earlier in protest of the visit of the Indian president, Pratibha Patil. On October 3, a KCP leader escaped from a police station in Imphal East district. He was shot dead by Imphal West police eight days later.

On July 28, AR reportedly killed one PREPAK member and freed two civilians who had been taken hostage the day before. Furthermore, SF killed five PLA members between February and June. On 12/17/10, some six AR were injured in an ambush by UNLF members. On January 11, UNLF announced to lay down its weapons if a referendum on the status of Manipur took place. Manipur's chief minister welcomed the offer. On October 7, one UNLF militant was killed by SF. Reportedly, on July 13 seven militant groups - UNLF, RPF, KYKL, PREPAK, PREPAK-Progressive, the UPPK and KCP - agreed to coordinate their actions. In September, the army of Myanmar launched an offensive against the bases of several militant groups including PLA, PREPAK, and UNLF in Sagaing Region. To back up 250 members already present in Sagaing, the outfits allegedly mobilized 200 more fighters.

jah

## INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **CPI-M vs. government**  
 Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the government continued on a high level of violence. The Naxalites operated in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka, also known as the "Red Belt". According to media sources, an estimated 20,000 fighters belonged to the Naxalites. The CPI-M was mainly equipped with light weapons such as rifles, shotguns, light machine guns, and landmines, which

were often obtained by raiding police stations.

Encounters between security forces and CPI-M occurred on a nearly daily basis: bomb attacks, abductions, and regional strikes resulted in about 600 fatalities, especially in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Among the dead were some 130 security personnel, approx. 200 Naxalites and about 275 civilians. Government operation "Green Hunt", launched against Naxalites in November 2009, continued, compromising 50,000 federal paramilitary troops and tens of thousands of policemen. The operation led to the arrest of cadres and leading militants.

On 12/17/10, seven villagers were killed in West Bengal, in the district of Purulia, by Maoist militants. In the night from January 1 to 2, police and paramilitaries killed at least five militants and recovered several weapons during a raid in the Jajpur district in Orissa. On January 9, in two shootouts between Maoist fighters and security forces in Rayagada district, Orissa, and Latehar district, Jharkhand, respectively, at least eighteen militants were killed.

On February 16, Maoists abducted a senior official and an engineer in Malkangiri district, Orissa, demanding the release of imprisoned rebels. Both were released within six days, after the government had freed five Maoist militants. Ten days later, security forces killed six Maoist cadres during an encounter in Banka district, Bihar. In a gun battle at a militant hideout in the East Champaran district, Bihar, on March 13, security forces killed six Maoists and arrested at least eight. A Maoist ambush one day later in Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh, left three policemen dead and nine injured. According to police, 30 militants were killed in the attack. On May 3, at least eleven security personnel were killed and at least 25 seriously injured in a Maoist assault in the district of Lohardaga, Jharkhand.

Two different encounters between Maoist fighters and security forces in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra, on May 19, left four police personnel and at least 20 Maoists dead. Four days later, in the Gariyband area at the border between Chhattisgarh and Orissa, Maoist attackers killed at least nine policemen. On June 10, CPI-M killed ten policemen, blowing up an anti-landmine vehicle with a landmine in Dantewada district. On July 1, nearly 50 armed Maoist assailants stormed a village in Munger district, Bihar, killing six and abducting seven. Two weeks later, the Supreme Court called on the government of Chhattisgarh to dissolve civilian militias, which were employed to fight the Naxalites, ruling the militias to be unconstitutional.

In early August, the government of Andhra Pradesh renewed the ban of the CPI-M for another year. On August 19, Maoists killed eleven policemen during an ambush in Chhattisgarh. At least four Maoists were also killed. On October 3, Maoist militants in West Bengal agreed on a month-long ceasefire, after the newly elected chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, started negotiations. However, Maoist leader Asim Mandal called off the ceasefire on November 15, arguing the government was continuing military operations. Nine days later, in a clash between CPI-M and paramilitary forces on the West Bengal-Jharkhand border, top Maoist leader Koteshwar Rao was shot dead. In reaction, Maoists called for a two-day strike on December 4 and 5, resulting in bomb attacks on mobile phone towers, railway stations, and schools. On December 3, Maoist militants attacked a convoy of a member of parliament, killing ten policemen and one civilian in Jharkhand. vk

## INDIA (NSCN ET AL. / NAGALAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: *NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM, NSCN-U, ANSAM, UNC, NNC vs. government*  
Conflict items: *secession*

The secession conflict between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), NSCN-Khole Kitovi (NSCN-KK), NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), NSCN-Unification (NSCN-U), the All Naga Students' Association Manipur (ANSAM), the Naga National Council (NNC), and the United Naga Council (UNC), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. All groups wanted to establish a Greater Nagaland in the Northeast. NSCN-K represented the Konyak tribe and NSCN-IM the Tangkhul tribe. NSCN-U resulted from a split in the NSCN-IM in 2007. NSCN-KK split off from NSCN-K in summer.

In the observed period, no NSCN members were killed in direct confrontations with the police. However, armed groups reportedly killed at least six security personnel and seven civilians, extorted money, and abducted several. More than 50 Naga militants were detained throughout the year.

On May 10, alleged NSCN-IM cadres abducted and later killed a civilian in Dimapur district, Nagaland state. In reaction to ongoing extortions, truck drivers went on strike in neighboring Assam state on October 31. On April 15, a convoy of a Manipur legislator was ambushed by alleged NSCN-IM militants in Ukhrul district, Manipur state, killing six security guards and two civilians. According to the chief minister of Manipur, NSCN-IM was responsible for a bomb attack in Manipur's Imphal East district on August 1, which had left four civilians and one NSCN-IM cadre dead and at least seven civilians injured. In December, police arrested one NSCN-IM member for his alleged involvement in the bombing. Reportedly, Myanmar army attacked NSCN-K camps in Sagaing Region, Myanmar, on September 14.

Peace talks between NSCN-IM and the Indian government continued throughout the year. The agreement envisaged a special federal status for Nagaland by forming a pan-Naga Supra State Body. However, NSCN-IM's goal of a sovereign Greater Nagaland, encompassing predominantly Naga territories in the states of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh, was not fulfilled. After NSCN-K split into two factions, the ceasefire agreement with the government was extended to both groups, the NSCN-K and NSCN-KK. jlb

## INDIA (SIKHS / PUNJAB)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: *Shiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI, KTF vs. government*  
Conflict items: *autonomy*

The autonomy conflict between Shiromani Akali Dal, Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), Babbar



Khalsa International (BKI), and its splinter group Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. According to police, several Sikh groups tried to revive militancy. On March 13, the eve of Sikh New Year, BKI member Jagtar Singh Tara announced to break away from BKI and establish KTF. Ten days later, police arrested three BKI members in Rajpura, in the state of Punjab. On August 16, police arrested three KLF members at Chennai airport, Tamil Nadu state. In October, police found five kilograms of explosives in a car near Ambala railway station, Haryana state. While KTF stated that the explosives were meant for an attack on a former member of parliament allegedly involved in anti-Sikh riots in 1984, police cited intelligence reports indicating a collaboration between BKI and the Islamist militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba [→India (various Islamist militant groups)] and that the explosives were to be used for attacks in the Indian capital. On October 19, five alleged KZF members were brought before trial in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. They were accused of planning terrorist attacks on Indian politicians and facilities. *lgr*

## INDIA (ULFA ET AL. / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: **ULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict between the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Dimas Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), as well as its breakaway faction the Black Widow, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, over the secession of the state of Assam, continued. The peace process between the government and ULFA made significant progress. On February 14, ULFA leaders met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for the first time. In April, the Ministry of Home Affairs assisted ULFA with 40 million Indian rupees. Additionally, the government agreed to set up nine rehabilitation camps for surrendered ULFA militants. On July 12, the chairman of the ULFA pro-talk faction (ULFA-PTF) declared unilateral and indefinite ceasefire. On September 3, the government, the state government of Assam, and ULFA-PTF signed a tripartite agreement to suspend operations. ULFA Commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah of the ULFA anti-talk faction (ULFA-ATF) rejected both the ceasefire and peace talks. An increasing influence of ULFA-ATF resulted from a significantly higher number of recruits since November 2010 as well as a considerable growth in its cash extortion activity. Although the number of attacks decreased significantly compared to 2010, violence perpetrated by ULFA-ATF continued. Between January and November, ten ULFA-ATF cadres, two civilians, and one security personnel were killed in eight reported ambushes. Since January, 37 ULFA-ATF militants had been arrested and approx. 25 small arms and nineteen improvised explosive devices recovered. Although the chairman of the anti-talk faction of the NDFB (NDFB-ATF) had declared a unilateral ceasefire for six months on January 10, NDFB-ATF-related violence continued. On March 14, NDFB-ATF militants ambushed and killed eight members of the Border Security Force. Two days later,

security forces shot dead one NDFB militant. On April 4, NDFB-ATF cadres killed two security forces. Three days later, security forces killed two NDFB-ATF militants. On June 21 and 24, security forces shot dead, all in all, five NDFB-ATF militants. On June 23, the government extended the ceasefire with NDFB's pro-talk faction for an indefinite period. On June 26, NDFB-ATF declared unilateral indefinite ceasefire with effect from August 1. On July 3, the government announced an extension of the ceasefire with DHD for a period of six months. *dsc*

## INDIA (VARIOUS ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: **JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI, HM vs. government system/ideology**

The system and ideology conflict between the government and the militant Islamist groups Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Indian Mujahideen (IM), Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) continued. SIMI allegedly also operated under the name of the Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD). In total, 45 persons were killed and about 290 injured. In the course of the year, some new light was shed on past terror attacks, especially the 2010 Pune bombing, the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, and the 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane IC-814. Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley, accused of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, claimed that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence was involved in the terror attacks. On 12/07/10, a bomb exploded in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, claiming two deaths and injuring some 35 people, among them six foreigners. A stampede after the blast caused further injuries. Officials claimed IM to be responsible for the attack. On February 27, intelligence agencies stated that 29 LET and IM cadres had crossed the Indian border. Consequently, public authorities were in alert to possible terror attacks on the Cricket World Cup. On May 25, an alleged IM militant triggered a small explosion outside the High Court complex in New Delhi. However, no one was injured. On June 3, two suspected members of SIMI killed an anti-terrorist squad policeman in a gunfight at the Ratlam railway station, Madhya Pradesh. Five days later, six KFD members kidnapped and killed two college students in Mysore, Karnataka. On July 13, Mumbai was hit by three bomb blasts within twelve minutes at the Zaveri Bazaar, the Opera House, and the Kabutarkhana bus stand. In all 26 people were killed and some 130 persons injured, including those who later succumbed to their wounds. Allegedly, IM, LET, and the closely connected Jam-i-yyathul Ansarul Muslimeen were responsible for the attacks. Subsequently, police arrested, among others, twelve IM militants. On September 7, a bomb explosion at the Delhi High Court killed fifteen people and injured about 90. IM and HUJI claimed responsibility. Security were also following trails to HM [→India (JEM et al. / Kashmir)]. *jfr*



## INDONESIA (AHMADIYYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: **Ahmadiyya vs. government, radical Sunni Muslims**

Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The ideology conflict between the Indonesian branch of the Ahmadiyya religious community, on the one hand, and the government and radical Sunni Muslims, on the other, escalated to a violent level. Since the Indonesian Ulema Council had issued a Fatwa in 1980 calling on the government to prohibit the practice of Ahmadi faith, Ahmadiyya members and their installations have suffered from sporadic acts of violence. In several cases throughout the year, groups of radical Sunni vandalized Ahmadiyya facilities at different locations in Java and Sulawesi. On 12/08/10, authorities shut down two Ahmadiyya facilities in Tasikmalaya, West Java province. On February 6, a group of about 1,500 Muslim residents attacked an Ahmadiyya gathering at a private estate in Cikeusik, Banten province. The clashes left three Ahmadis dead and nine people wounded. On July 28, a district court sentenced twelve men, including three Muslim clerics, to minor prison terms for their involvement in the attacks. However, nobody was indicted for the death of the three Ahmadis. On August 15, the same court jailed an Ahmadi community leader involved in the clashes for six months on charges of physical abuse and disobeying a police order. In early March, the provincial governments of East Java, West Java, and South Sulawesi outlawed the practice of the Ahmadi religion in public. nr

## INDONESIA (OPM / PAPUA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: **OPM vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession, resources**

The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and the government over the independence of the Papua region remained violent. During the first half of the year there was a lull in violence, but protests over lenient sentences for military human rights abuses continued. In May, OPM accused the military of conducting a covert hunt for OPM commander Goliat Tabuni. On May 25, an officer was killed at Ilu market in Puncak Jaya, Papua province. June saw an attack against a senior military officer in Mulia airport, Puncak Jaya. In July, military sweeps through the region intensified. On July 7, OPM killed three patrolling soldiers in Kalome, Puncak Jaya, during a raid on Tabuni. On July 12, four civilians were injured during a shootout in the same village. Two weeks later, OPM reportedly ordered a unilateral ceasefire. During the first week of August, several thousand demonstrators in Jayapura, Papua province, peacefully demanded a referendum on Papuan independence. However, on August 1, three civilians and one soldier were killed near Tajakan Gunung Merah, Paniai regency. Police confiscated small weapons at the scene. On August 3, a mili-

tary helicopter was fired at when passing a hill. One soldier was killed and five wounded. In reaction, the military vowed a crackdown on OPM activities. During another lull in violence in September, the government created the Presidential Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua under retired General Bambang Dharmono to facilitate peace. A special envoy met with members of OPM's political wing. Violence re-escalated on October 19, in Abepura, Jayapura, when demonstrations of approx. 5,000 people were forcefully dispersed by police and military. The participants had hoisted the Morning Star flag, a symbol for Papuan independence. Around 300 protesters were arrested, six later charged with treason. Three demonstrators were found dead in the vicinity of the demonstrations shortly after the police action. Five days later, a local police officer was shot at Mulia airport, Puncak Jaya, by two unknown assailants. Seven soldiers were detained on November 2. They were accused of torturing twelve residents of Kurulu, Papua province, during an investigation of OPM links. In a firefight between police officers of the Brigade Mobile special operations force (Brimob) and miners allegedly connected to OPM, one miner was killed in Paniai regency on November 12. During an arrest twelve alleged OPM members, believed to be behind recent attacks in Mulia, police killed one suspect trying to flee. On November 30, OPM set fire to offices and destroyed several bridges in Paniai district, Papua province. In the run-up to National Flag Day on December 1, around 2,000 Brimob officers were mobilized in the region. On and after that day, several policemen and demonstrators were injured during attempts to take down Morning Star flags. The deployment of additional Brimob officers to Paniai regency caused more than 500 residents to flee to adjacent areas. On December 13, a prolonged shootout in Paniai regency in the course of a raid on an OPM hideout injured one Brimob officer and 20 OPM members, sympathizers, and civilians. plo

## INDONESIA (VARIOUS ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: **Tanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, JAT vs. government**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The conflict between various Islamist militant groups, fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia, and the government continued on a violent level. Various Islamist militant cells, loosely connected to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Islamist mass organization Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and among each other, carried out a number of bomb attacks throughout the year. Between 12/01/10 and 12/23/10, militants planted bombs in several police stations, churches, a Catholic shrine, and a mosque in the provinces of Central Java and Yogyakarta. None of the bombs exploded. Two small bombings by the same group targeted a market in Surakarta and a church in Sukoharjo, Central Java, in December 2010. No one was injured. Police arrested the alleged attackers in January. On April 15, a suicide bomber attacked a mosque located in a police complex in Cirebon, Central Java, killing himself and leaving at least fifteen

people injured. On May 14, counterterrorism police killed the suspected mastermind behind the attack and another suspect in Sukoharjo. The gunfight also left a civilian dead. Between April 19 and 28, police detained a cell of 27 militants allegedly behind four small package bombs sent to public figures in mid-March. One of the bombs had injured three people. The same cell was allegedly responsible for a failed bombing of Good Friday celebrations at a church in Serpong, Banten province. On September 25, a suicide bomber attacked a church in Surakarta, Central Java, injuring at least 22 congregants. On August 11, Pakistani authorities extradited Umar Patek, a JI militant, wanted for his alleged involvement in the bombing of a night club in Bali in 2002. Throughout the year, courts handed down verdicts for several members of Tanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, a militant Islamist network allegedly comprising 120 members. In October, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, hard-line cleric and founder of JAT, and Abu Tholut, a leader of Tanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, received sentences of nine and eight years, respectively. Abu Tholut had set up a paramilitary training camp in Aceh province, which had been raided by anti-terror police in February 2010. *nr*

## JAPAN - CHINA (SENKAKU/DIAOYUTAI ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1945**

Conflict parties: **ROC vs. PRC vs. Japan**  
Conflict items: **territory, resources**

The conflict between Japan and the Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei over territory and resources of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands continued. While the Japanese government maintained its de facto control of the islands, the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) reiterated their claims regarding the disputed islands and surrounding gas fields. In March, Japanese coast guards reported several incidents of PRC military vessels and airplanes near the disputed area. For instance, on March 7, a PRC helicopter approached a Japanese destroyer at low altitude. On May 22, PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto met in Tokyo, Japan, where both sides reasserted their territorial claims. On August 4, PRC patrol ships entered Japanese-claimed territorial waters around Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. On August 10, Japan announced that in the event of aggression by another country on the islands, it would exercise its right of self-defense. On August 24, Japan reported the violation of Japanese waters by two fishing vessels from Mainland China. In response, Japan voiced concerns to the PRC ambassador in Japan. However, in October, Japan reported further violations of its claimed territorial waters. *mw*

## JAPAN - RUSSIA (SOUTHERN KURIL ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1945**

Conflict parties: **Japan vs. Russia**  
Conflict items: **territory**

The territorial conflict between Japan and Russia concerning the four southern-most Kuril Islands continued. While both countries reiterated their claims to the Russian-controlled territory, both governments stated that economic relations were not affected by the dispute. On February 4, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov visited the archipelago. Six days later, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced to increase military capacities on the disputed islands. This led to verbal protest by the Japanese government and anti-Russian rallies in front of the Russian embassy in the Japanese capital, Tokyo. It also sparked media attention in Japan. On February 15, Japanese media reported that a Russian coast guard had opened fire on a Japanese fishing vessel in the waters of the southern Kuril Islands. Russia denied the allegation. On May 11, Russian military stated to increase its capacities on the disputed islands. On September 9, Russia announced its readiness to discuss a peace treaty, but ruled out any Japanese claims to the southern Kuril Islands. On December 16, Russia announced the construction of two military posts in the disputed Kuril Islands to be completed in 2013. *aga, mr*

## KAZAKHSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and national power conflict between the opposition and government escalated to a violent level. In January, parliament supported the initiative to prolong President Nursultan Nazarbayev's rule by referendum. However, Nazarbayev rejected the proposition on legal grounds and brought it before the constitutional court, which ruled out the referendum. Nazarbayev then called for early presidential election in April, which he then won with over 95 percent of the votes. OSCE deemed the election as not genuinely democratic. On June 29, several opposition groups announced the formation of the Popular Front movement, which was meant to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

A wage dispute between the employees of several oil facilities, on the one hand, and the government as the owner, on the other, triggered several demonstrations in May in Mangystau province. The demonstrations escalated to violent standoffs in May and December. In August, several leading opposition members were arrested for allegedly joining the protests of oil industry workers. On December 16, at least fourteen people died in clashes between oil workers and police in Zhanaozen, Mangystau province. One day later, another demonstrator was killed in a nearby village. Shortly after, Nazarbayev declared

a twenty-day state of emergency in Zhanaozen. In addition, the government asked the UN to assist investigations of the violent confrontations. Prosecutors opened a criminal inquiry regarding the use of weapons by police. *ayu*

## KAZAKHSTAN (VARIOUS ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *Djund al-Khalifat, diverse Islamist militant groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

A new ideological conflict emerged between the government and various Islamist militant groups. The conflict erupted on a violent level on May 17, after the regional headquarters of the National Security Committee (NSC) intelligence service in Aqtobe were hit by a suicide bomb attack - the first ever in Kazakhstan. On May 24, a car exploded in the proximity of NSC in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The perpetrators of both attacks died in the incidents. It remained unclear whether the attempts had an Islamist background. On July 3, police started to search for suspects involved in the recent attacks and allegedly responsible for the killing of two police officers in Aqtobe Province. In a series of police operations, several militants were killed and eighteen arrested.

In addition, the government banned around 51 Islamist websites as illegal. On October 13, President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed acts dissolving existing religious organizations and introducing tightened registration rules. On October 26, a previously unknown Islamist militant group, Djund al-Khalifat, threatened the government with violent retaliation unless the authorities renounced the controversial laws.

Five days later, a suicide bomber blew himself up in Atyrau; another bomb detonated in a garbage can. No one was injured. Djund al-Khalifat claimed responsibility for the explosions. On November 12, tensions escalated after seven people were killed in clashes between militants and police in Taraz, Jambyl Province. On December 3, five members of Djund al-Khalifat and two officers were killed in a police operation. *ayu*

## LAOS (CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: *Christians vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology*

The ideology conflict between Lao Christians, many of them from the Hmong ethnic group, and the Communist government of the mainly Buddhist country turned violent. Despite the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, authorities persecuted Christians and demanded them to renounce their faith. Throughout the year, the government arrested members of the Christian community. Eleven people were arrested in Khammouan province on January 4. In February, officials allegedly destroyed crops to cut off about 60 impoverished Chris-

tians from their food supply in Salavan province. On March 29, authorities arrested four in Luang Prabang province and further five in Luang Natha and Luang Prabang provinces on July 10. In February, several Christian families were expelled from their village in Saravan province, being forced to live in a temporary camp. Ten more Christians were expelled from their villages in Savannakhet province. On April 15, soldiers from the Laotian and Vietnamese army killed four Christian women in Xieng Khouang province after reportedly having raped at least two of them. The victims' husbands and 26 children have since disappeared. *er*

## MALAYSIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: *Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih 2.0 vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The national power conflict between the pro-democracy opposition, led by Pakatan Rakyat and the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih 2.0), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, turned violent. Pakatan Rakyat is an alliance of the three largest opposition parties Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), and Parti Tindakan Demokratik (DAP). On July 9, Bersih, an alliance of several non-governmental organizations, initiated a rally in the capital, Kuala Lumpur. The demonstration was supported by Pakatan Rakyat. Bersih demanded the Election Commission to ensure free and fair elections and to put an end to electoral fraud. The government of Prime Minister Najib Razak warned against the rally, and police refused to grant permission for the demonstration. However, between 10,000 and 20,000 people gathered in downtown Kuala Lumpur and began to march towards Merdeka Stadium. The protesters clashed with riot police, which tried to disperse the demonstrators. Riot police officers fired tear gas and chemical-laced waters and arrested more than 1,600 demonstrators. Most of the arrested protesters were released on the same day. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was injured when fleeing from tear gas. The death of one demonstrator was reported. Police, however, denied responsibility for the death, stating that the demonstrator died of heart complications. The US government expressed concern over the crackdown, whereas the Malaysian government criticized the demonstrators. Nonetheless, on August 15, Najib announced the formation of a parliamentary select committee to examine the electoral system. One month later, Najib declared the government's intentions to repeal the Internal Security Act. The verdict in the trial of Ibrahim, charged with sodomy, is expected to be returned in January 2012. *sg*

## MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: *KIA, KIO vs. government*

Conflict items: *autonomy*

The autonomy conflict between the Kachin Independence

Organisation (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one side, and the government, on the other, escalated further. On February 7, KIO claimed that KIA had killed a government officer during a minor firefight, after government troops had entered into territory south-east of Bhamo, Kachin State, an area traditionally controlled by KIA. In the following months, the government built up pressure on KIA with increased maneuvers and by firing mortar shells into the vicinity of a KIA camp on May 19. However, KIO-controlled media downplayed these incidents. Tensions increased on June 9, when near Momauk Township, Bhamo District, an hours-long firefight between KIA and government troops erupted, leaving at least three soldiers dead. About 1,000 civilians fled their homes. This incident effectively terminated the ceasefire agreement between the government and KIA that had been in place for the last seventeen years. In reaction, the government deployed hundreds of troops and heavy weaponry including tanks, riverboats and aircraft over the next weeks. On June 17, five government troops were killed in an ambush by KIA combatants in Mohnyin Township. Heavy fighting continued in the following months. At least 28 government and several KIA troops were killed. The number of internally displaced people had risen to up to 20,000 at the beginning of August. Peace talks between KIO and the government started in July, but virtually broke down at the end of the year. KIO demanded to link a possible ceasefire to a substantive political dialogue with the government including autonomy for Kachin State. Three government troops were killed in a clash on August 25 in Namphatkar. In mid-September, two KIA troops died in a firefight in Winemaw Township. Under increased deployment of troops, fighting peaked between September 23 and 25, when clashes left up to 100 troops from both sides dead. In December, the chief minister of Kachin State announced that President Thein Sein had ordered the army to cease offensive actions. However, the government reportedly sent reinforcements to the area. In addition, according to KIA and an independent observer, fighting continued unabated near KIA's headquarters in Laiza. Ongoing fighting raised the number of internally displaced people to a total of at least 34,000 in December. *lr*

## MYANMAR (KNU, KNLA, DKBA BRIGADE 5 / KAREN STATE, KAYAH STATE)



Conflict parties: ***KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs. DKBA, Karen BGF, government***

Conflict items: ***autonomy***

The highly violent autonomy conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and the renegade Brigade 5 of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), on the one hand, and the government and DKBA, on the other hand, escalated to a war. DKBA remnants were transformed into a Border Guard Force (BGF) and renamed Karen BGF. On January 10, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 and

the All Burma Student's Democratic Front formed an alliance against government attacks. On May 24, Karen BGF battalion 1012 stopped wearing BGF uniforms and returned to DKBA Brigade 5. Karen BGF battalions 1011, 1013 and 1014 also left BGF and rejoined Karen resistance in June. In the same month, said Karen BGF battalions, DKBA Brigade 5, and KNLA agreed to cooperate and back up military assistance in government attacks. Altogether, these groups consist of around 7,000 fighters. By April, more than 200 BGF soldiers had defected to KNU and DKBA Brigade 5. In August, further 82 BGF soldiers defected to KNLA. In a meeting between February 12 and 16, the New Mon State Party, the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Organization, KNU, and DKBA formed the United Nationalities Federal Council and agreed on mutual military support as well as to negotiate future peace talks with the government collectively.

Throughout the year, KNU and KNLA fighters, together with DKBA Brigade 5 and Karen BGF splinter groups, were clashing with government troops and Karen BGF forces on an almost daily basis. When KNLA and DKBA Brigade 5 had joined forces in the beginning of November 2010, the conflict became increasingly violent. In the aftermath of the elections on 11/07/10, fights erupted in the whole Karen State and clashes occurred daily. Due to the ongoing fights, more than 20,000 people started fleeing until the end of December 2010. Between 11/23/10 and the end of 2010, 58 people died. The heaviest clashes occurred in Phaluu where DKBA Brigade 5 fought the government, and in Manerplaw where KNU and KNLA attacked government troops. In reaction, the government deployed more than 1,500 soldiers to Karen State in December 2010, and an additional 200 in January. Altogether 200 fighters were killed from mid-December to mid-January. Between January and the end of April, 359 individual clashes were reported in Karen State, leaving more than 617 fighters dead and 855 wounded.

The heaviest clashes in 2011 started on January 10, when the government launched an offensive firing heavy artillery on DKBA Brigade 5 locations. Attacks in Phaluu, Manerplaw, and Kasaw Wah Lay continued until January 17, forcing more than 1,000 people to flee. In a two-day clash, starting on January 26, between DKBA Brigade 5 and some 200 government troops in Kyauk Khet left 35 soldiers dead and forced 200 villagers to flee. In February, DKBA Brigade 5 announced to increasingly employ urban guerrilla tactics. On April 22, fights broke out between Karen BGF battalion 1012 and another Karen BGF battalion, leaving three soldiers dead and a military barrack, as well as an ammunition store destroyed. Until April 30, three civilians had died and eight were injured in further fights in Kya In. From May 1 to 4, clashes in Kyau Inn Seik Gyi between DKBA Brigade 5 and KNLA, on the one hand, and government soldiers, on the other, forced 500 villagers to flee. On May 30, the Karen BGF battalion 1012 gained full control over the BGF headquarters in Myaing Gyi Ngu.

Amid rising tensions between Karen and government troops, more than 200 people fled to Thailand in mid-June. On July 7, government soldiers retook control over the BGF headquarters, previously seized by Karen BGF battalion 1012. By the end of July, six government soldiers were killed in clashes with KNLA. In September, 71 clashes occurred between the KNLA and government troops, leaving 137 people dead. In early No-



vember, the government reinforced its troops in Karen State.

Despite ongoing fighting, the government offered peace talks to DKBA Brigade 5 on August 18. However, the offer was rejected. By the end of August, government had offered peace talks to KNU as well. On September 28, leaders of the KNU met with a government delegation in Mae Sot, Thailand, and agreed on direct talks with the government, followed by several meetings. On October 26, a government delegation met with DKBA Brigade 5 representatives in Mottama, Mon State, to discuss the end of fighting. On November 3, both parties reached a ceasefire agreement. KNU also formed a delegation for peace talks with the government on November 11. Eight days later, five groups held peace talks with the government and three of them, including KNU, informally agreed on a ceasefire and further talks.

*prü*

## MYANMAR (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and power struggle between various opposition groups and the government de-escalated. The first half of the year saw the formal transition from military rule under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which had been in power since 1997, towards democracy. In November 2010, general elections had taken place. On February 4, then-Prime Minister Thein Sein was elected president by the newly formed houses of parliament. On March 30, Thein Sein appointed a cabinet. On the same day, former SPDC chairman General Than Shwe dissolved the council, thereby formally handing over power to the civil government. Than Shwe, however, became head of the newly formed State Supreme Council in February. The creation of his council, designed to preserve national sovereignty, raised concerns over the real locus of national power. In the second half of the year, further steps towards de-escalation had been undertaken by the government. Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD), held talks with Minister Aung Mye Thaw. This was the first meeting of this kind since Suu Kyi's release from house arrest in 2010. On August 19, Thein Sein met with Suu Kyi. NLD was allowed to re-register as a political party by the Union Election Commission on December 13. On May 16, in reaction to international pressure, Thein Sein reduced the sentences of a number of prisoners by one year and commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment. 15,000 prisoners were released. In October, another 6,000 prisoners were released. Of these prisoners at least 120 were political prisoners. The political developments were welcomed by the UN, the USA, and the EU. On November 30, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar and held talks with Thein Sein as well as with Suu Kyi. It had been the first visit of a high-ranking US government official in 56 years.

*lr*

## MYANMAR (SSA-S, SSA-N / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: **SSA-S, SSA-N vs. government**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The conflict concerning autonomy between the northern and southern wings of the Shan State Army (SSA-N and SSA-S), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. Brigade 1 of SSA-N continued to ignore official calls to join the government-led Border Guard Force. A round of talks between ethnic rebel groups culminated in the founding of the United Nationalities Federal Council, an umbrella organization of armed anti-government groups, in February 2011. SSA-N was among the founding parties and SSA-S considered joining [→ Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State), Myanmar (KNU, KNLA / Karen State, Kayah State), Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. On May 21, SSA-S and SSA-N announced their merger. Violent incidents involving SSA-S, SSA-N, and government forces occurred throughout the year. In December 2010, the government increased troop deployment in Shan State in an attempt to disrupt communication between SSA-N brigades 1 and 7. SSA-S and government forces clashed repeatedly in the four months following the general elections of November 2010. In an SSA-S raid on three pro-government militia bases on February 28, six fighters were killed. On March 13, the government broke its ceasefire agreement with the SSA-N, leading to dozens of skirmishes between government and SSA-N forces between March and July. On July 13, an SSA-S spokesman accused the government of dropping bombs onto SSA-S and SSA-N forces. At the end of July, government troops initiated an attack on the SSA-N headquarters in Wan Hai, Shan State. Shan State Army soldiers allegedly killed two civilians on August 20. The United Wa State Army [→ Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)] and SSA-S both confirmed to support SSA-N. After negotiations initiated by the government in August, SSA-S signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in Taunggyi, Shan State, on December 2. According to an SSA-N spokesman, it was not approached by the government.

*jre*

## NEPAL (MADHESHIS / TERAI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: **JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMMM, ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM, MJF, TMDP vs. government**  
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between various Madhesi political parties - among them the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) and the Terai Madhesh Democratic Party (TMDP) - and various militant groups such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), the Janatantrik Terai Madhesh Mukti Morcha (JTMMM), the Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM), the Terai Janatantrik Party-Madhes (TJP-M), the Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT), and the Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (SJTMM), on the



one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Bomb blasts and killings by armed outfits continued throughout the year. On January 13, JTMM blasted an improvised explosive device (IED) in Rautahat district, causing only minor damages to a building. Two JTMM members were shot dead by police in Rupandehi district on March 6. A further JTMM IED blast occurred in Bardiya district on June 20. Three months later, JTMM detonated a pressure cooker bomb in a factory in Sunsari district. On September 19, four JTMM cadres gunned down a police officer in Bara district. A bomb planted inside a passenger bus by JTMM injured thirteen people in Rautahat district on March 25. The JTMM Rajan Mukti faction led by Rajiv Jha (JTMM-R) renounced its armed fight on April 24. Still, in an IED explosion in a passenger bus in Mahottari district five days later, planted by JTMM-R, two people were seriously injured. Several cadres of the JTMM faction led by Jwala Singh (JTMM-J) were arrested throughout the year. ATMM, also known as Aakhil Tarai Liberation Front, owned up to the murder of a government officer in Bara district on February 22. ATMM exploded a bomb in a microbus in Rupandehi district on March 28, injuring 23 people of whom two died later. Six cadres of TJP-M were arrested by police in Saptari district on July 6. *ls*

## NORTH KOREA - SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: **North Korea vs. South Korea**  
Conflict items: **territory, system/ideology, international power**

Tensions in the conflict over system, international power, and territory between North Korea (NK) and South Korea (SK) remained, but abated slightly throughout the year. In 2010, the conflict was on the brink of war after NK had allegedly torpedoed the SK warship Cheonan in March and had conducted a deadly shelling on SK's island Yeonpyeong in November. In December 2010, the US and SK held joint naval maneuvers in the Yellow Sea. In addition, SK conducted week-long naval live-fire exercises from 29 sites across the country. Beginning on January 5, the government of NK repeatedly proposed a meeting with SK. After an initial refusal by SK, a colonel meeting took place on February 8. The next day, it was broken up without any significant breakthrough. On February 5, a boat carrying 31 North Koreans drifted into South Korean waters. After diplomatic negotiations, SK sent 27 back to NK. On March 3 to 5 and April 12, several cyberattacks stroke SK enterprises and government websites. SK accused NK of causing the attacks. In addition, SK accused NK of jamming GPS signals during a joint SK-US naval exercise on March 4. On March 22, both countries agreed on establishing a joint research project on the volcanic activity of NK's active volcano Mount Paektu. Despite a secret meeting between the two Koreas on May 9, NK continued to deny its role in the sinking of the Cheonan. On July 26, SK allowed humanitarian organizations to deliver flour to NK for the first time since the November 2010 attack. On August 10, shots were fired across the border near the disputed island Yeonpyeong without triggering a major deterioration of bilateral relations. On August 23, SK citizens were

forced to leave Kumgang resort in NK, a recreational destination for international tourists opened in 1998. On October 4, SK sent aid to NK to help in the aftermaths of severe floods on the peninsula. On December 19, NK announced the death of Kim Jong-il. SK sent two small delegations to attend the funeral ceremony and allowed its citizens to send condolences to NK. The heads of the two delegations met with NK's new leader Kim Jong-un. On December 28, a two-day funeral procession took place in Pyongyang. During that event, Kim Jong-un was installed as NK's supreme leader of the party, state and army. Responding to Kim's death, SK put its military on alert while calling on the population to maintain calm. *mr*

## NORTH KOREA - USA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: **North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, international power, other**

The system and international power conflict between North Korea (NK), on the one hand, USA, South Korea (SK) and Japan, on the other, persisted. Shortly after joint naval maneuvers of SK and the US in the Yellow Sea in December 2010, both held their largest joint military exercises to mark the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan alliance. The same month, the US again rejected to resume talks with NK unless it met US demands regarding NK's nuclear activities. US envoy Bill Richardson stated during his visit to NK at the end of December that the country agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to return to NK. They had been expelled from NK's facilities in April 2009. After talks with the President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hu Jintao, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated on January 11 that NK had the capabilities to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years, thus posing a direct threat to the US. During his stay in Japan, two days later, Gates further called upon NK to enter peace negotiations with SK and re-emphasized the potential threat of NK for the region and the world. Leaking of a UN report in February revealed that experts believed NK to operate secret nuclear sites. On February 28, SK and the US began their annual land, sea, and air drills. Just one day earlier, NK had denounced the eleven-day exercises and threatened SK with an all out war. Amid growing tensions, officials from five humanitarian agencies warned of looming food shortages due to poor harvests and an unusually harsh winter in NK. Another UN report, leaking on May 14, claimed that NK and Iran shared ballistic missile technology ([→ Iran - USA et al.](#)). On May 26, a US warship halted a NK vessel bound for Myanmar suspected to carry missile technology. On June 8, NK reportedly test-fired a short-range missile off its western coast. On July 24, the US invited NK's deputy foreign minister to explore the resumption of international nuclear negotiations. On September 25, delegates from the US and NK met in Geneva, Switzerland, and discussed guidelines to reinstall six-nation talks. Another meeting, scheduled for late December, was canceled due to the death of NK leader Kim Jong-il. The US, Japan, and SK boycotted a minute of silence at the UN General Assem-

bly on December 22. North Korea condemned SK's behavior as intolerable. The US and PRC respectively reaffirmed their support to their allies and emphasized their goals to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

mr

## PAKISTAN (BLA ET AL. / BALOCHISTAN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: **Baloch and Brahui tribes, BSO, BPLF, JWP, BLA, BRA, BLUF, BNP, LeB, BMDT vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession, resources**

The conflict between various militant separatist groups based in Balochistan province, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, over resources and the status of the province continued on a violent level.

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed two and injured six security personnel in a landmine blast in Kohlu District on 12/08/10. On February 22, a BLA roadside bomb killed at least two security personnel in the city of Gwadar. BLA reportedly ambushed a convoy of the federal paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in Kohlu District on July 15, leaving at least 15 BLA fighters and eight FC members dead. On August 12, four army personnel were killed when BLA fired five rockets on a military cantonment in the provincial capital, Quetta. On August 28, BLA opened fire on a passenger train in the Kachi area and reportedly killed three people and injured nineteen. A clash between BLA and FC on November 20 in Loralai District, left at least fourteen FC troops dead and ten injured. Six days later, a BLA landmine killed two and injured three security personnel near Sui, in Dera Bugti District.

The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) shot dead eleven FC personnel and injured two near Gwadar on March 21. On April 26, BLF launched two separate bomb attacks on navy buses in Karachi, Sindh province, reportedly killing four navy personnel and leaving 56 people injured. Four days later, BLF launched a similar blast in the city, killing four navy troops and injuring eighteen others. On July 5, five FC personnel were killed and five others were seriously injured in a bomb blast, for which BLF claimed responsibility, in Balochistan's Kech District.

On March 11, the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), took responsibility for two separate remote-controlled bomb blasts that killed four people, among them FC personnel, and injured 24 others in Nasirabad District and Sui. After the blast, authorities arrested over 60 people. Six days later, BRA killed three people and injured seven others in a similar attack in Nasirabad District. On July 29, a remote-controlled bomb planted by BRA derailed a passenger train in Jafarabad District. The attack disabled service between Quetta and the rest of the country for about two days. In the first four months of the year, BLA, BLF, and BRA undermined energy supply security by damaging gas pipelines and the electricity infrastructure. On April 27, for instance, BRA claimed responsibility for having blown up two gas pipelines in Dera Bugti District.

isy

## PAKISTAN (MOHAJIRS - BALOCHIS, PAKHTUNS, SINDHIS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1947**



Conflict parties: **Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP, Balochis, PPP, Sindhis**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict in the province of Sindh over subnational predominance between the Urdu-speaking Mohajir people and its political organization, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), on the one hand, and Pakhtuns, backed by the Awami National Party (ANP), Balochis, supported by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and Sindhis, on the other, escalated to a war. Mohajirs represented the majority in Sindh's capital, Karachi, which was Pakistan's largest city and economic hub. PPP was the ruling party at both provincial and federal levels. Most of the violence observed occurred in Karachi. In the first eight months of the year, approx. 1,400 people were killed in Karachi according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. In the first six months alone, there had been 490 targeted killings, leaving 77 MQM, 29 ANP, and 26 PPP supporters dead.

On January 12, three ANP and three MQM activists were shot dead in targeted killings in Karachi. During the first nine days of March, 41 people were killed in Karachi, among them three police officials and members of MQM and the Pakhtoon Student Federation (PSF). All in all, 160 people lost their lives due to sniper shootings in Karachi in March. In July and August, the conflict between MQM, ANP, and PPP peaked with a total of at least 481 casualties. Between July 5 and 9, 113 people were shot dead in various neighborhoods of Karachi, with public life being paralyzed. The killings followed a clash between MQM activists, on the one hand, and ANP and PSF supporters, on the other, at the Federal Urdu University. Small-to-medium weapons including AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers were used. An additional 1,000 troops of the federal paramilitary Frontier Corps supported police forces in the streets of Karachi. On August 17, a former PPP member of the federal parliament was killed by unidentified gunmen. This was amid a renewed wave of targeted killings in Lyari, Karachi, which claimed the lives of 12 people. Violence erupted thereupon in different parts of the city. Reportedly, 42 people were shot dead and at least 43 injured. Attackers again used guns, hand grenades, and rocket-propelled launchers.

Violence continued between September and December, when at least 68 people fell victim to targeted killings, among them activists from different political parties. In this period, approx. 2,000 paramilitary Pakistan Rangers together with police detained several hundred suspects and recovered AK-47 assault rifles, TT pistols, and hand grenades in joint search operations.

isy

## PAKISTAN (TALIBAN - VARIOUS TRIBES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: **TTP, LI vs. various tribes**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

The conflict over sub-national predominance and ideology between militants of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant Islamist groups, among them the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), on one side, and various pro-government tribal militias, on the other, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province continued on a highly violent level. More than 634 people died throughout the year, including approx. fourteen tribal elders.

The government continued to encourage the creation of tribal forces as a means to counter extremism, with mixed results. On March 3, March 10, and August 18, different tribal militia leaders from FATA threatened to stop their fight due to insufficient support from the government. Furthermore, on June 6, people of various tribal regions refused to form anti-Taliban militias. Still, in April and September, various tribes in FATA assured full cooperation to the government's paramilitary forces in their fight against militants.

Throughout the year, TTP and tribal militias were engaged in mutual ambushes, with the latter being partially backed by government troops. On 12/06/10, two TTP suicide bombers attacked a tribal council meeting of the Alizai and Safi tribes, which was also attended by security officials, in Mohmand Agency, FATA. At least 40 persons were killed and another 70 injured. On 12/25/10, a TTP suicide bomber blew herself up at a World Food Programme distribution center in Khar in FATA's Bajaur Agency, killing 45 persons and injuring another 80, most of them members of the Salarzai tribe, who are part of the anti-Taliban militias. Following a truce announced between Turi and Bangash tribes and the TTP, militants attacked a village in Kurram Agency, FATA, on January 30, leaving twenty TTP militants and six tribesmen dead.

On April 28, at least 33 militants, two pro-government tribesmen and one security personnel were killed, when gunships pounded three militant hideouts in Kurram Agency. In another incident, on May 25, TTP militants set ablaze 15 houses of tribal militia members in Kohat, KP. On July 25, at least 27 TTP militants and four tribesmen were killed in a gunfight in the Masozai area of Kurram Agency. At least 56 Kukikhel tribesmen were killed and 123 injured in a TTP suicide attack during the Friday prayers in the Jamrud area of Khyber Agency, FATA, on August 19. In another incident, on September 15, a TTP suicide bomber blew himself up during the funeral prayers for a local militia member in Jandol town, KP, killing 31 persons and injuring 63 others.

Clashes between the Zakhakhel tribe and LI in Khyber Agency began on April 3, after LI had killed a tribe member. Backed by government troops, the fighting continued throughout the year, claiming the lives of approx. 100 people. Starting on April 10, at least one hundred families fled from Bazaar Zakhakhel area of Khyber Agency to safer places due to the clashes. In another incident, on June 23, at least five persons died when members of tribal militias regained control of the

Ghareeb Khel Mountain in FATA. Losing two more of its strategic hilltops, three LI militants were killed during an attack launched by Zakhakhel tribal forces on July 9. On October 20, paramilitary security forces launched a targeted operation in the Malikdeenkhel area in Khyber Agency and killed 34 militants. Furthermore, on November 13, nine volunteers of Zakhakhel tribal forces were killed and six others injured when a bomb, concealed in a donkey cart by LI militants, exploded in Mastak bazaar in Khyber Agency. *mfu*

## PAKISTAN (TTP, LEJ, SSP - VARIOUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: **TTP, LeJ, SSP vs. various religious groups**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

The system and predominance conflict between militant Sunni groups, among them Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sipah-e-Saheba (SSP), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), on the one hand, and various religious minorities, on the other, de-escalated but remained violent. Assaults and suicide bombings were committed all over the country. The attacks mainly targeted Shiites, Sufis, Christians, and Hindus. In total, about 200 people were killed and more than 300 injured.

During the month of Muharram, especially sacred to the Shia community, particularly Shiites were attacked all over the country. On 12/08/10, a suicide bomber killed eighteen people and injured at least 30 at a market in a Shiite area of Tirah Bazar in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Two days later, up to 17 people were killed and about 20 injured in Hangu, KP, when a suicide bomber rammed his tractor and trailer with at least 100kg of explosives into a Shiite hospital. The explosion damaged sixteen houses nearby. LEJ claimed responsibility for the attack. Three caretakers of a Sufi shrine were fatally shot and four people injured in Peshawar, KP, on 12/14/10. LEJ was held responsible for the attack. On January 4, Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab, was killed by one of his bodyguards, justifying the killing with Taseer's criticism of Pakistan's blasphemy laws. On October 1, Taseer's murderer was sentenced to death. On January 25, a suicide bomber killed thirteen people and injured dozens at a Shiite mourning procession in Lahore, Punjab province. On February 8, Shiite and Sunni tribesmen agreed on a ceasefire in Kurram, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in order to stop the sectarian violence in the area. TTP supported the deal. On March 2, the Federal Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian, was killed in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. TTP later claimed responsibility. On March 4, a bomb blast killed ten people and injured 37 at a Sufi shrine in Akbarpura, KP. Suspected sectarian militants attacked a coach in Hangu district, KP, on March 13, killing eleven passengers. On March 25, militants killed thirteen, injured eight, and kidnapped 35 coach passengers, mostly Shiites, in FATA. Three months later, 22 were released.

On April 3, two suicide bombings within twenty minutes killed 49 people and injured more than 90 in front of a Sufi shrine in Sakhi Sarwar in Punjab. TTP claimed responsibility

for the attack. The prayer leader of a mosque in Quetta, Balochistan province, was shot dead on July 28. On August 31, a suicide bomber killed at least ten and injured 22 Shiites celebrating the end of Ramadan at a mosque in Quetta. The bomb also destroyed ten cars and damaged two houses nearby. In a LEJ attack near Quetta on a Shiite pilgrim bus on September 20, at least 26 people were executed. Later that day, three relatives of the victims were assassinated nearby. In an attack on a Muharram procession in Jhang District, Punjab, on December 6, six participants and five policemen were injured. Four days later, unknown radicals destroyed two ancient Sufi shrines in FATA.

hru

## PAKISTAN (VARIOUS ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: *various Islamist militant groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between various Islamist militant groups, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, Haqqani network, and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued for the fifth year running. Attacks were carried out throughout the whole country, claiming the lives of more than 4,200 people. The government carried out two major military offensives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): "Operation Thunder", in Mohmand Agency, and "Operation White Mountain", in Kurram Agency.

A new offensive of "Operation Thunder" began on April 6 and lasted for almost four months. The military, backed by warplanes, gunships, and artillery, attacked militant hideouts in Bezai and Safi tehsils. In the operation, at least 67 militants and 72 soldiers died, more than 1,500 militants surrendered and over 1,600 families fled to the Kashmir Kor Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camp, Mohmand Agency. On September 2, the military stated that it had recaptured 80 to 85 percent of Mohmand Agency and that the IDPs had returned. Between the beginning of July and August 18, the military conducted "Operation White Mountain" in central and lower Kurram. The operation targeted militants and aimed at securing and reopening the Thall-Parachinar road, a major thoroughfare. Some 4,000 troops, supported by heavy artillery, gunships, and transport helicopters, participated in the operation. By the end of the operation, more than 200 militants had been killed and at least 100,000 persons had fled their homes.

Heavy fighting between security forces and militants erupted in different areas of Bajaur, Khyber, and Orakzai Agencies, FATA. On March 29, the government claimed that about 90 percent of Orakzai Agency had been cleared of militants and that the IDPs were able to return. However, fighting continued and led to the deaths of at least 180 militants, including the head

of the Darra Adamkhel chapter of TTP, who died in an attack in Orakzai Agency on May 31. Between July 13 and 26, the army conducted the small scale operation "Tri Star" in South Waziristan Agency, FATA, to flush out militants. As the operation ended, the military stated that it had gained full control of the area, inflicted heavy casualties on militants, and captured large caches of arms and ammunition.

The USA continued to support the government. US drones flew at least 69 attacks, killing between 435 and 672 persons. On March 17, a US drone missile strike on a tribal council killed at least 41 civilians. On June 3, al-Qaeda leader and head of HuJI, Ilyas Kashmiri, allegedly was killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan Agency along with another eight militants. While the US and HuJI confirmed the death, Pakistani media questioned the allegations. Other high-ranking militants were killed by US forces, as well: Al-Qaeda's new second-in-command, Atiyah abd al-Rahman, on August 27, al-Qaeda's chief of operations in Pakistan, Abu Hafs al-Shahr, on September 15, and Omar Wazir, leading figure of the Mullah Nazir group, on October 27. On May 2, US special forces killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in "Operation Neptune Spear" in Abbottabad, KP. Four other persons were killed in the covert attack, among them one of his sons.

Various Islamist militants, primarily TTP, carried out various suicide attacks and ambushes, targeting both security personnel and civilians. On February 10, an unidentified suicide bomber killed 31 persons and injured 42 others at an army recruitment center in Mardan District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP). TTP militants triggered a car bomb explosion, killing at least 32 persons and injuring 125 others in Faisalabad District, Punjab province, on March 8. On June 2, between 250 to 300 Pakistani and Afghan Taliban [→Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)] attacked Shaltalo security post in the Upper Dir District of KP, killing at least 27 security personnel and 45 militants. On August 27, at least 25 soldiers and 20 militants were killed when approx. 200 to 300 TTP and other Taliban attacked seven paramilitary Frontier Corps checkpoints in Chitral District, KP. Two TTP suicide attacks in Quetta on September 7, targeting the Deputy Inspector General of Balochistan, killed at least 26 people and injured over 60. After the killing of Bin Laden, TTP carried out several attacks on security forces, claiming to revenge Bin Laden's death. The most destructive of these attacks took place when TTP suicide bombers targeted paramilitary personnel in the Shabqadar tehsil in Charsadda District, KP, on May 13, killing 73 paramilitary forces and 17 civilians.

mfu

## PHILIPPINES (ABU SAYYAF / MINDANAO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *Abu Sayyaf vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the government remained violent. The army claimed to have killed nineteen ASG members in the first five months of 2011. On 12/21/10, security forces arrested ASG member Abu Isaac. Two days later, an ASG founding



member, Asagal Haipe, was sentenced to 23 years in prison for abduction. Throughout the year, government troops clashed repeatedly with ASG. On January 9, the army killed two ASG gunmen and captured one in Zamboanga City, Mindanao. One day later, ASG killed five businessmen in Basilan province. On February 13, the army overran an ASG base. Five militants and two soldiers were killed. One month later, security forces launched a combined ground and air assault on Sacol Island, Mindanao, after detecting the presence of leading ASG figure Khair Mundos, his deputy Puruji Indima, and at least fifteen fighters. However, according to the army, all targeted escaped. In June, government elite troops captured two ASG militants. In July, ASG clashed with government troops, killing seven soldiers. Security forces killed an ASG militant in a clash in Mindanao on August 7. One month later, troops killed three ASG-allied gunmen. On October 23, eight people were killed in an attack by militants in Mindanao. Eight days later, an airstrike killed five ASG fighters, among them three of their leaders.

Throughout the year, ASG carried out several bombings. On 12/25/10, an ASG bomb, installed in the chapel of a police camp in Jolo, Sulu province, wounded at least six. On January 25, a bomb destroyed a bus in the Philippine capital district, killing four people and leaving at least fourteen wounded. Officials accused ASG. On March 10, alleged ASG militants detonated a bomb near a school in Jolo, killing five people and wounding nine others. In late May and mid-September, several bomb blasts wounded at least thirteen people in Mindanao, including five soldiers. On November 27, three people were killed in an ASG hotel bombing in Zamboanga City.

sip

## PHILIPPINES (MILF - BIFM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: **MILF vs. BIFM**  
Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

A new violent subnational predominance conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), on one side, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), on the other, erupted. On February 6, MILF announced it expected the emergence of a more radical faction, led by former MILF commander Ameril Umbra Kato. By February 18, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters led by Kato consisted of 300 to 1,000 fighters. Throughout the year, MILF repeatedly tried to convince Kato to return. In August, Kato renamed his group BIFM. After Kato had rejected an ultimatum of MILF to return to the group until September 26 and continued to oppose the peace process with the government, he was formally expelled from MILF on September 29 (→Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)). On February 6, BIFM attacked the village of Dungguan, Mindanao, killing two civilians. From August 9 to 14, MILF and BIFM clashed repeatedly. A total of fourteen were killed in the clashes and about 3,000 people displaced in Mindanao. In response, the government deployed troops in the area and expressed concerns that the rift within MILF might reduce the chances of a peace deal. On September 15, MILF and BIFM clashed in Maguindanao, Mindanao, leaving four fighters dead. On October 3, another

clash killed three people and wounded four in Barangay Kam-po Dos, Mindanao. BIFM Commander Mutin was killed in fights with MILF in Maguindanao on November 18. At the end of November, MILF reported that Kato had died of a stroke on November 26. However, this was rejected by BIFM.

prü

## TAJIKISTAN (VARIOUS ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **UTO, HuT, al-Qaeda, IMU vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and national power conflict between various Islamist militant groups, among them the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. President Emomalii Rakhmon repeatedly called religious extremism a serious threat to internal security and stability. On 10/19/10, in an alleged UTO attack on a military convoy in Rasht Valley, 28 soldiers had died. The military retaliation campaign continued, involving the deployment of special forces. On January 4, former UTO commander Alovuddin Davlatov, allegedly associated with al-Qaeda, and seven other UTO members were killed in eastern Tajikistan. Three weeks later, Mazori Fathiddinov, an alleged al-Qaeda member, was killed. On April 14, Abdullo Rakhimov, the person allegedly behind the attack in October 2010, was killed in Rasht Valley in addition to sixteen other Islamist militants. In July, military officials announced to have successfully eliminated militant groups in Rasht Valley. Meanwhile, several militants and former UTO members surrendered their weapons and fought alongside government forces. Several new laws restricting Islamic education were passed. One law explicitly barred minors from participating in religious education.

aga, mr

## THAILAND (UDD, PTP - PAD)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **UDD, PTP vs. PAD**  
Conflict items: **national power**

The national power conflict between the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the so-called "red shirts", politically affiliated with the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and openly supporting former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, on the one hand, and the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the so-called "yellow shirts", on the other, remained violent.

On May 10, King Bhumibol Adulyadej dissolved the House of Representatives and set new general elections for July 3. PTP won a clear majority. One day later, Yingluck Shinawatra, PTP candidate and Thaksin's younger sister, announced to form a five-party coalition. Whereas her cabinet excluded PAD leaders, several appointed ministers held close ties to Thaksin. On September 16, a government commission gave recommendations to review political cases related to the coup of



2006. On October 7, PAD announced to resume rallying if the government tried to obtain a royal pardon for Thaksin. On November 15, the government allegedly decided to give Thaksin a possibility for return, sparking protests from PAD. Five days later, the government stated that Thaksin would not be included in the list of convicts to be granted a royal pardon.

Despite the state of emergency, in force since 04/07/10, both sides rallied repeatedly. For instance, from 11/23/10 until 12/2/10, at least 1,000 PAD members rallied outside the parliament in protest against the government proposals to amend the constitution. On January 4, the state of emergency in Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakan was lifted. Four days later, the government approved the enforcement of the Internal Security Act in seven Bangkok districts in order to deter protests. It remained in force until May 24. On January 24, police arrested five men with home-made explosive devices near Government House, where PAD was holding a rally. On April 21, two PAD members were shot and wounded in Chonburi province while preparing for demonstrations. On May 30, at least two people were wounded in a blast at a PAD rally next to the Government House. *hal*

## THAILAND (VARIOUS ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: ***various Islamist separatists vs. government***  
Conflict items: ***secession, system/ideology***

The secession and ideology conflict between Islamist militants and the government in the southern border provinces Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla continued on a highly violent level. At least 535 people were killed throughout the year. Islamist separatists repeatedly staged bomb attacks. More than 100 bomb attacks were reported in the first ten months. In addition to bomb attacks, Islamist separatists attacked representatives of the central government, including state officials, public school teachers, and defense volunteers as well as Buddhist monks and civilians of every religion on an almost daily basis. For instance, on February 3, six alleged insurgents shot dead four civilians and two defense volunteers and wounded at least two in Panare district of Pattani province. On May 8, three police officers were killed and fourteen people wounded in a bomb attack in Pattani's Kapor district. On July 19, a motorcycle bomb wounded seven civilians and nine soldiers of Yala's special forces in Bannang Sata district, leaving at least one soldier dead. On July 27, alleged insurgents bombed railway tracks in Narathiwat's Rangae district, thereby temporarily suspending train services in the three southern border provinces. On August 26, five defense volunteers were killed in a bomb trap in Narathiwat's Rueso district. On September 23, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra stated that the government currently had no intention of forming a special administrative zone in the south, despite having promised this in her election campaign. Three days later, three coordinated bomb attacks killed at least four civilians and wounded more than 110 in Narathiwat's Sungai Kolok district. Police blamed the Islamist militant Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) as well as local

drug traffickers. On October 25, the anniversary of the 2004 Tak Bai incident, at least fifteen coordinated bombs detonated in the town of Yala. Apart from two militants, at least one civilian was killed and 45 wounded, fourteen of them severely. Five bombs could be defused.

In addition to bomb attacks, Islamist separatists and security forces clashed repeatedly. On January 19, presumed separatists attacked a military outpost in Rangae district. At least four soldiers were shot dead and six wounded. On February 9, soldiers raided an RKK operational base in Cho Ai Rong district of Narathiwat. Two days later, two suspected insurgents of the RKK were shot dead in two separate gunfights with security forces in Bacho and Yingo districts of Narathiwat. On March 23, army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha publicly apologized for the military's role in the 2004 Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents. One week later, a convoy of ten military buses, carrying over 400 soldiers, was attacked by alleged militants in Narathiwat's Bajoh district, injuring 26 soldiers. On September 15, presumed insurgents killed one soldier and four paramilitary rangers in an attack in Pattani's Kapho district. On December 13, militants attacked two military outposts in Rueso district. Two bombs exploded at the office of the Suvaree Tambon Administration Organization, Narathiwat, followed by a grenade attack. Soldiers stationed at the office opened gunfire and caused the militants to retreat. Another military outpost was attacked by a 40mm grenade that, however, missed the target. Police forces held the RKK responsible for the attack.

In mid-April, informal talks between the separatist group Patani United Liberation Organization, in alliance with Barisan Revolusi Nasional, and government officials were allegedly resumed in an undisclosed location outside Thailand. On December 13, the government extended the state of emergency for the three southern border provinces until 03/19/12. *hal*

## THAILAND - CAMBODIA (BORDER)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: ***Thailand vs. Cambodia***  
Conflict items: ***territory, international power***

The border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia remained violent. The arrest of seven Thai nationals in Cambodia on 12/29/2010 and the subsequent sentence on charges of illegal border trespassing province before Phnom Penh Municipal Court caused repeated protests by the nationalist groups People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and Thailand Patriotic Network, a PAD splinter group, in Bangkok and border areas.

Three days after the verdict, fighting erupted in the area of the disputed Preah Vihear temple on February 4. Four days of heavy fighting resulted in the deaths of at least 10, injuring several dozens, displacing around 30,000 civilians on both sides and causing damage to settlements and the ancient temple. Both sides blame the other for the aggression. Cambodia called on the UN and ASEAN to intervene. ASEAN chair and Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa offered mediation and the deployment of border observers, a step which was embraced by Cambodia. However, Thailand rejected third party intervention reiterating the need to resolve the dispute

bilaterally. Renewed minor clashes in mid-February left one soldier dead.

Two meetings of the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Joint Boundary Commission in March and April, respectively, ended without any significant results. In late April, the two countries resumed fighting in Cambodia's Oddar Meanchey province in the vicinity of two other contentious temples, Ta Krabey and Ta Moan. Further violent clashes in Preah Vihear were reported on April 26 leaving at least one soldier dead. After 12 days of fighting, tensions eased on May 2. At least 17 soldiers and one civilian lost their lives during the clashes, dozens were injured and up to 100,000 are reported to have fled the area with housing and infrastructure destroyed. On April 28, Cambodia requested the ICJ to clarify its 1962 ruling on the Preah Vihear case and to order the withdrawal of Thai troops from the area. Talks on the sidelines of an ASEAN summit in early May again did not result in a lasting settlement even if the parties agreed to jointly survey the area and continue talks. On June 25, the Thai delegation withdrew from the UNESCO World Heritage Convention claiming that the body ignores its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On July 18, the ICJ pronounced its judgement and ordered both sides to withdraw military personnel establishing a provisional demilitarized zone in the area around Preah Vihear. On August 16, a Thai surveillance drone crashed into Cambodian territory near the temple. However, the Cambodian side blamed an unknown terrorist group for the incident instead of seeing it as a renewed attack by Thailand. Tensions eased and rhetoric has become more conciliatory since the Thai elections on July 3. The new Prime Minister Yingluck Thaksin paid a state visit to Cambodia on September 15. A meeting of the GBC scheduled for November to further discuss the ICJ ruling and troop withdrawal was delayed by the floods that hit large parts of Thailand in the last quarter of 2011. The meeting is now scheduled for late December.

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## USA - PAKISTAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: **USA vs. Pakistan**

Conflict items: **other**

The conflict between Pakistan and the USA about the breach of Pakistan's sovereignty by US forces remained violent. In various incidents throughout the year, NATO and US troops crossed the Pakistani border. On May 17, two NATO helicopters intruded into Pakistani airspace at Admi Kot post in North Waziristan Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A brief exchange of fire between Pakistani troops and the helicopters left two Pakistani soldiers injured. One month later, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a complaint with the US Embassy about a NATO aircraft incursion around 2.5 km inside Pakistani territory. In another incident, on October 26, Pakistani officials accused NATO of violating Pakistan's airspace above North Waziristan Agency with helicopters. The agency was the stronghold of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani network [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militant groups), Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. In a cross-border

attack by NATO on a check post in Salala village of Mohmand Agency, FATA, on November 26, at least 25 Pakistani soldiers lost their lives. While Pakistan accused NATO of intentionally attacking the check post, the US assured that this had been an accident. Three days later, Pakistan decided to boycott the Bonn conference on Afghanistan. In addition, on December 1 Pakistan's Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stated that he had given his troops full liberty to respond to any further cross-border attacks by NATO.

Triggered by the unilateral action that led to the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 2, Pakistan implemented several steps to limit US presence and influence on its soil. Due to the diplomatic pressure from Pakistan following the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, on June 8 the US decided to withdraw two-thirds of its military personnel from Pakistan. One week later, Pakistan intelligence rounded up several people who were believed to be working for CIA. On December 8, Pakistan announced it would employ air defense along its border to Afghanistan to pre-empt new attacks. Three days later, a senior Pakistani official stated that Pakistan would bring down any intruding US drone. On November 4, CIA agreed to refrain from carrying out drone strikes without the consent of Pakistan.

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## VIETNAM (MONTAGNARDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1958**

Conflict parties: **Montagnards vs. government**


Conflict items: **autonomy, system/ideology**

The autonomy and ideology conflict between the Montagnard minority in Vietnam's central highlands and the government continued. Throughout the year, security forces disrupted religious gatherings in Gia Lai province and demanded Montagnard Christians to sign pledges to join registered churches. Force was used in various cases and several Montagnards were arrested. In December 2010, the Cambodian government ordered the UNHCR to shut down the Montagnard refugee center in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, by January 1. Later, the deadline was extended to February 15. About half of the approx. 20 remaining refugees were sent to a third country, the others were sent back to Vietnam. On February 18, Kok Ksor, president of the Montagnard Foundation, highlighted the continuing persecution of Montagnard Christians in Vietnam. A Human Rights Watch report stated that more than 250 Montagnard Christians currently remained imprisoned.

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## THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

## THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB



The total number of conflicts in the region of the Middle East and Maghreb increased from 49 to 62 in 2011. With 41 cases, about two-thirds of the region's conflicts concerned ideology or the orientation of the political system, including fourteen opposition conflicts in which democratic reforms were demanded. As in 2010, system/ideology was a conflict item in eleven highly violent conflicts and thus the item most violently pursued. The overall number of highly violent conflicts significantly increased in 2011 from eight to thirteen. In contrast to the two wars in 2010, eight conflicts reached the highest intensity level, accounting for almost half the number of wars in 2011.

Five new high-intensity conflicts erupted in the course of the Arab Spring protests as millions took to the streets calling for political reforms and security forces cracked down on demonstrations. Protests started in Tunisia and Egypt, where ensuing clashes resulted in up to 1,000 deaths in total. In both countries, the long-serving presidents, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, were ousted [→Tunisia (various opposition groups), Egypt (various opposition groups)]. After 42 years of rule and eight months of civil war that caused between 10,000 and 30,000 deaths and over 700,000 refugees, Libya's ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed in October. Based on a UN SC mandate, the uprising was militarily supported by NATO [→Libya (opposition)]. Another war broke out in Yemen after the violent crackdown on protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh had led to mass defections of troops and tribal forces aligning with the political opposition. Before Saleh resigned in November, some 1,600 people were killed and thousands injured [→Yemen (various opposition groups)]. Syria's President Bashar al-Assad responded to calls for democratic reforms with a massive military crackdown, killing up to 6,000 civilians and defected soldiers and causing tens of thousands to flee [→Syria (various opposition groups)]. The Arab Spring protests also spread to further countries in the region. Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, and Morocco also faced violent opposition conflicts, all on the intensity level of violent crises. Altogether, the struggle for social and political change claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians and security forces in the Middle East and Maghreb. Even in those countries that experienced regime change in 2011, economic


challenges, societal and sectarian tensions, and slow transfer of political power might spark new violence in the region.

Furthermore, the conflict between Islamist militants and the government in Afghanistan continued on the highest intensity level [→Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. A resolution of the conflict seems unlikely, as the number of civilian and combatant fatalities has further increased in comparison to last year and international forces have begun the process of withdrawing. Additionally, the conflict between Sunni militant groups and the government in Iraq remained on the intensity level of war. Large-scale attacks on civilians and officials, suicide bombings, as well as targeted killings left some 4,000 people dead. These militant activities were often carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its affiliates amidst political, ethnic, and sectarian tensions. Furthermore, both in Algeria and Mauritania, the conflicts between the respective government and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were carried out on a highly violent level. Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia were also confronted with al-Qaeda activities. Last year's limited war between the Yemeni government and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) escalated to a war. Throughout the year, AQAP members and affiliated Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia seized partial control of southern parts of the country. The military deployed hundreds of troops, tanks, as well as tactical aircraft, and was supported by tribal forces.


Also, the conflicts in Turkey and Iran concerning autonomy for Kurdish areas escalated to war level. In October, Turkey launched large-scale military attacks involving some 10,000 soldiers and aircraft against the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. In Iran, the government deployed thousands of troops to the north-western provinces and launched a major offensive on the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), considered an offshoot of PKK.

The limited war between Israel and various militant Palestinian groups operating in the Gaza Strip continued [→Israel ( Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)]. In the conflict between Hamas and al-Fatah, the rival Palestinian factions approached each other. The al-Fatah-led Palestinian National Authority (PNA) unilaterally applied for UN membership in September [→Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)].

#### CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2011 COMPARED TO 2010



#### FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2011 IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB BY INTENSITY GROUPS





## CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                   | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>  | Conflict items                            | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|--|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads - Hazara)*            | Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara  | subnational predominance, resources       | 2007  | •                   | 3                      |
| Afghanistan (LeJ)                               | Lashkar-e-Jhangvi vs. government   | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)                    | Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG, various militant groups vs. government                                      | system/ideology, national power           | 1994  | •                   | 5                      |
| Algeria (AQIM)                                  | AQIM vs. government  | system/ideology, national power           | 1989  | •                   | 4                      |
| Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*                    | Berbers vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology                 | 1963  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Algeria (various opposition groups)*            | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Bahrain (various opposition groups)             | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1975  | •                   | 3                      |
| Egypt (Muslims - Christians)                    | Muslims vs. Christians   | subnational predominance                  | 1952  | •                   | 3                      |
| Egypt (Bedouin activists)*                      | Bedouin activists vs. government   | other                                     | 2004  | •                   | 3                      |
| Egypt (Islamist groups)*                        | Islamist groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1992  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Egypt (various opposition groups)               | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1954  | ↑                   | 5                      |
| Egypt - Sudan*                                  | Egypt vs. Sudan  | territory                                 | 1958  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Iran (Jundallah / Sistan-Balochistan)*          | Jundallah vs. government   | autonomy, system/ideology                 | 1979  | •                   | 3                      |
| Iran (People's Mujahideen)*                     | People's Mujahideen vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1965  | •                   | 1                      |
| Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas)                     | PJAK vs. government  | autonomy                                  | 1979  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| Iran (various opposition groups)*               | various opposition groups vs. government   | system/ideology, national power           | 1993  | •                   | 3                      |
| Iran - Israel*                                  | Iran vs. Israel  | system/ideology, international power      | 1979  | •                   | 2                      |
| Iran - UAE*                                     | Iran vs. UAE   | territory                                 | 1970  | •                   | 1                      |
| Iran - USA, EU (nuclear program)                | Iran vs. USA, EU   | international power                       | 1979  | •                   | 2                      |
| Iraq (al-Sadr group, Shiite militant groups)*   | al-Sadr group, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Promised Day Brigades vs. government                  | system/ideology, national power           | 2004  | •                   | 3                      |
| Iraq (Sunni militant groups)                    | AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920 Revolution Brigades, Sunni militant groups vs. government, Al-Sahwa militia | system/ideology, national power           | 2003  | •                   | 5                      |
| Iraq (KRG - Kurdish opposition movement)*       | KRG vs. Kurdish opposition movement  | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)*             | KRG vs. government   | subnational predominance, resources       | 2005  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Iraq (opposition movement)*                     | opposition movement vs. government   | system/ideology                           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Iraq - Iran*                                    | Iran vs. Iraq  | territory, international power            | 1969  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Iraq - Kuwait*                                  | Iraq vs. Kuwait  | territory, resources                      | 1961  | •                   | 1                      |
| Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)                       | al-Fatah vs. Hamas   | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 1994  | ↘                   | 1                      |
| Israel (Hamas - various Salafist groups)*       | various Salafist groups vs. Hamas  | system/ideology                           | 2007  | ↘                   | 2                      |
| Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories) | Hamas, PRC, PIJ, Army of Islam vs. government  | secession, system/ideology                | 1988  | •                   | 4                      |

## CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2011

| Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>                   | Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>                       | Conflict items                            | Start | Change <sup>3</sup> | Intensity <sup>4</sup> |
|---|---|---|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Israel (Hezbollah)*                             | Hezbollah vs. Israel                                | system/ideology                           | 1982  | •                   | 2                      |
| Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)          | Palestinian National Authority vs. government       | secession, system/ideology, resources     | 1948  | •                   | 3                      |
| Israel - Lebanon*                               | Israel vs. Lebanon                                  | territory, international power, resources | 1948  | •                   | 3                      |
| Jordan (Hamas)*                                 | Hamas vs. government                                | system/ideology                           | 1994  | •                   | 1                      |
| Jordan (various opposition groups)              | IAF, Salafists, opposition groups vs. government    | system/ideology                           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Kuwait (Bedouns)*                               | Bedouns vs. government                              | other                                     | 1960  | ↑                   | 3                      |
| Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)*                       | Fatah al-Islam vs. government                       | system/ideology                           | 2006  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)* | March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance              | system/ideology, national power           | 1975  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Libya (opposition)                              | opposition vs. government                           | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 5                      |
| Mauritania (AQIM)*                              | AQIM vs. government                                 | system/ideology, national power           | 2007  | ↗                   | 4                      |
| Morocco (AQIM)*                                 | AQIM vs. government                                 | system/ideology, national power           | 2003  | •                   | 2                      |
| Morocco (February 20 Movement)*                 | February 20 Movement vs. government                 | system/ideology                           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)            | POLISARIO, indigenous Sahrawis vs. government       | secession                                 | 1975  | •                   | 3                      |
| Morocco - Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*            | Morocco vs. Spain                                   | territory                                 | 1956  | •                   | 1                      |
| Morocco - Spain (Parsley Island)*               | Morocco vs. Spain                                   | territory                                 | 2002  | •                   | 1                      |
| Oman (opposition movement)                      | opposition movement vs. government                  | system/ideology                           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)*                | al-Houthi rebels vs. government                     | subnational predominance                  | 2009  | ↓                   | 1                      |
| Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*                            | AQAP vs. government                                 | system/ideology, national power           | 1990  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Saudi Arabia (opposition movement)*             | opposition movement vs. government                  | system/ideology                           | 1990  | •                   | 1                      |
| Saudi Arabia (Shiites)*                         | Shiites vs. government                              | system/ideology, national power           | 1979  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Syria (various opposition groups)               | various opposition groups vs. government            | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 5                      |
| Syria - Israel                                  | Syria vs. Israel                                    | territory, international power            | 1948  | ↗                   | 3                      |
| Syria - USA*                                    | Syria vs. USA                                       | system/ideology, international power      | 2003  | •                   | 2                      |
| Tunisia (AQIM)*                                 | AQIM vs. government                                 | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Tunisia (various opposition groups)             | various opposition groups vs. government            | system/ideology, national power           | 2010  | <b>NEW</b>          | 4                      |
| Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas)                    | PKK vs. government                                  | autonomy                                  | 1974  | ↗                   | 5                      |
| Turkey - Iraq*                                  | Turkey vs. Iraq                                     | international power                       | 1979  | •                   | 1                      |
| Yemen (al-Houthi rebels - Sunni tribal forces)  | al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces            | subnational predominance                  | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 3                      |
| Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)*                       | al-Houthi rebels vs. government                     | system/ideology, subnational predominance | 2004  | ↘                   | 3                      |
| Yemen (AQAP - al-Houthi rebels)*                | AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebels                           | system/ideology                           | 2010  | •                   | 3                      |
| Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)                   | AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government, tribal forces | system/ideology, national power           | 1992  | ↗                   | 5                      |
| Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)*                      | SMM vs. government                                  | secession                                 | 2009  | •                   | 3                      |
| Yemen (various opposition groups)               | various opposition groups vs. government            | system/ideology, national power           | 2011  | <b>NEW</b>          | 5                      |

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## AFGHANISTAN (TALIBAN ET AL.)



Conflict parties: **Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG, various militant groups vs. government**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The war concerning national power and the orientation of the political system between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and various militant groups, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, on the other, continued. At least 607 international troops were killed between 12/01/10 and December 31.

According to a UN report, the first half of 2011 was the deadliest period for civilians since 2001. The death toll rose by 28 percent in comparison to the first six months of 2010. While militant groups were responsible for 1,167 civilian fatalities, 207 civilians were killed by security forces during this period. Militants mostly used improvised explosive devices, carried out suicide attacks, and conducted large-scale, coordinated assaults on public places. For example, on February 18, a Taliban-affiliated suicide bombing in a shopping area in the city of Khost killed eleven people and wounded another 39. On March 28, the Taliban carried out a bomb attack on construction workers in Barmal district, Paktika province, killing approx. twenty civilians. On May 18, some 100 Taliban fighters ambushed road construction workers in Paktika, killing 35. In an ensuing gun battle between the company's security guards and Taliban gunmen, eight attackers were killed. Unknown militants destroyed a hospital in Azra district, Logar province, using a car bomb on June 25, killing some 27 people and injuring 53. Three days later, at least nine gunmen and three suicide bombers assaulted the Intercontinental Hotel in the capital Kabul with bombs, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and anti-aircraft weapons, killing eleven civilians. A five hour long battle between militants and police supported by ISAF troops, using a drone and helicopters, followed, leaving several militants and two policemen dead. The Taliban claimed responsibility, though NATO officials further accused the Haqqani network. Two days later, a roadside bomb attack caused the death of twenty civilians in Nimroz province. Further, military and government-related targets were in the focus of militant attacks. On February 21, a suicide bomber assaulted a government office in Kunduz province, leaving some 30 people dead. On March 14, a Taliban suicide bomber attacked an army center in the city of Kunduz, killing 36 people. On May 7, a two-day battle between dozens of Taliban fighters, security personnel, and ISAF troops erupted in Kandahar after 60 to 100 Taliban militants had launched attacks on public buildings, using heavy machine guns, bombs, and RPGs. Some twenty militants, fifteen civilians, and two security personnel were killed. In early July, up to 200 Taliban fighters from Pakistan crossed the border and attacked police posts, resulting in two-day long heavy clashes with security forces supported by NATO aircraft in Nuristan province [→Pakistan (various Islamist

militant groups)]. According to officials, 40 Taliban, five civilians, and 33 policemen were killed. On September 13, militants launched a major attack in Kabul, targeting police offices, government buildings, and the US embassy with bombs and RPGs. In a subsequent 20-hour battle involving US and Afghan helicopters, numerous militants, civilians and security personnel were left dead. On August 6, militants shot down a US helicopter in Wardak province, killing all 38 troops on board.

Besides, militants assassinated politicians, persons of public life, and leading security personnel. On January 29 and March 10, respectively, both the deputy governor of Kandahar province and the police chief of Kunduz province were killed in suicide bomb attacks. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the assassination of Ahmad Wali Karzai, President Hamid Karzai's half-brother, on July 12. Two days later, a suicide bomber attacked his funeral in Kandahar city, killing four. On July 17, Jan Muhammad Khan, senior adviser of the president, was killed by two armed men. The Taliban claimed responsibility. On September 20, the head of the High Peace Council (HPC), Burhanuddin Rabbani, was killed in a suicide attack in Kabul.

In comparison to large-scale operations conducted in recent years, such as 2010 "Operation Moshtarak," ISAF concentrated on smaller operations and precise airstrikes to counter the insurgency. For example, Afghan and ISAF troops supported by aircraft killed some 80 militants in an operation in Paktika province, in mid July. Between October 17 and 20, joint security forces killed at least 45 militants and detained at least 79 in operations in different provinces.

Especially ISAF airstrikes, increasing considerably in frequency, claimed the lives of a large number of insurgents. For example, on February 9, fighting erupted between ISAF forces and militants in Kajaki district, Helmand province. ISAF used mortars and deployed air forces, killing approx. ten. Several days later, 30 militants were killed in an ISAF airstrike and a subsequent battle in Ghaziabad district, Kunar province. ISAF operations also led to civilian deaths and increasing tensions between the government and international security forces. According to Afghan officials, NATO aircraft killed eighteen civilians, twenty police and some 30 Taliban in Du Ab district on May 25. In July, an ISAF rocket attack in Helmand killed at least 39 civilians, mostly women and children. Karzai condemned the attacks and accused ISAF of not paying enough attention to civilian casualties. HIG representatives met an HPC delegation in Islamabad, Pakistan, in early January, yet did not attend subsequent meetings until June. On June 4, Rabbani said HPC held peace talks with the Taliban's Quetta Council, HIG, and the Haqqani network. On December 6, the day after the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Germany, both Taliban and HIG stated that the conference was pointless and no important issues had been discussed.

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## ALGERIA (AQIM)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: **AQIM vs. government**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The conflict between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

and the government over national power and the orientation of the political system continued on a highly violent level. On 12/09/10, the army launched its largest counterterrorist offensive in years with up to 7,000 soldiers and helicopter gunships in the province of Boumerdes and the region of Kabylia, leaving at least 50 AQIM fighters dead. In order to stop AQIM's communication and remote bomb triggering, the government jammed the mobile phone network for several days. In late December 2010, security forces killed at least 27 AQIM fighters during several operations in Jijel and Boumerdes provinces. AQIM killed one soldier in the same area on 12/25/10. In April, security forces killed ten AQIM fighters in different counter-terrorist operations in Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou province. On April 15, about 50 AQIM fighters attacked an army post in Kabylia, leaving thirteen soldiers and two militants dead. On May 23, following a bomb explosion in Niger, troops killed three AQIM fighters in Tamanrasset province [→Niger (AQIM)]. In early June, two bombings in Jijel and Kabylia left at least six security personnel dead and two others wounded. On July 16, a suicide bomber attacked a police headquarters near the capital Algiers and killed at least two people. On August 13, a suicide bomber attacked the police headquarters of the city of Tizi Ouzou and injured 29 people. Several days later, AQIM killed three civilians and two policemen while security forces killed two fighters nearby. In the year's deadliest attack on August 26, two suicide bombers attacked a military school in ChercHELL, Tipaza, killing sixteen soldiers and two civilians. In an operation deploying helicopters on September 27, troops killed five AQIM members in Boumerdes. Over the course of the year, several roadside bombings had left dead eleven security personnel and six civilians. Concerns about AQIM acquiring weapons from Libya grew since March. In reaction, the government launched security operations along its border [→Libya (opposition)]. Several high level meetings and security summits including delegations of EU member states were held in Algiers. The EU pledged funds. Moreover, the USA sent delegations to Algiers to intensify bilateral cooperation concerning the issue. In a further multilateral approach, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria decided on May 20 to set up a joint force including about 75,000 soldiers to secure the Sahara-Sahel desert zone within 18 months [→Mali (AQIM) i.a.]. On June 21, security forces backed by helicopters arrested two AQIM fighters and killed two others at the Libyan border. In early October, troops killed eight gunmen and wounded three near the border to Niger, and seized heavy weapons as anti-tank missiles. Throughout the year, the government conducted targeted killings, leaving several AQIM leaders dead. *flor*

## BAHRAIN (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: *various opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and national power conflict between the mainly Shiite opposition and the Sunnite government continued. In total, security forces killed up to 50 people and detained

about 3,000 protesters of which hundreds were tried in military courts. Encouraged by the Arab Spring protests, demonstrations calling for a more democratic constitution and an end to discrimination of the Shiite majority started in February and quickly spread to several cities surrounding the capital Manama [→Tunisia (various opposition groups) i.a.]. Police repeatedly used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse an increasing number of mostly Shiite demonstrators. On February 17, troops drove apart a demonstration at Pearl Square in Manama, killing four protesters, injuring more than 200 and detaining dozens. The next day, all members of parliament of the Shiite al-Wefaq bloc resigned. After government troops had shot and injured another 60 protesters in and around Manama, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa ordered the withdrawal of troops from Pearl Square on February 19. The same day, demonstrators reassembled on the square. Tens of thousands citizens protested in Manama the following days. Daily clashes between Shiite opponents and Sunnite supporters of the government ensued. Hamad responded to the protests by releasing more than 300 prisoners including 23 accused of trying to overthrow the monarchy in 2010. Furthermore, he requested support of 1,000 Saudi troops and 500 Emirati policemen who arrived on March 14. The following day, Hamad declared martial law. On March 16, government troops used tear gas, tanks, and helicopters to clear Pearl Square, killing six protesters and injuring about 50. Additionally, five policemen were killed, four of them when overrun by cars. The following weeks, security forces killed at least eight civilians and detained hundreds of protesters including opposition leaders. The Pearl Square statue, which had become a symbol for the protesters, was also torn down by government forces. After martial law was lifted on June 1, protests again increased with thousands of participants, sparking further violent clashes with security forces. On June 29, Hamad established an independent international commission which investigated the protests and the related deaths. Three days later, a national dialogue initiated by the king started. On July 17, al-Wefaq withdrew in protest to what they called a biased distribution of seats. Furthermore, the party and most Shiite voters boycotted the parliamentary by-elections on September 24, leading to a turnout of less than 20 percent. Meanwhile, daily clashes between Shiite protesters and security forces continued. On December 20, the government promised to reinstate all of the 2,000 suspended public employees previously dismissed due to their participation in protests. *ba*

## EGYPT (MUSLIMS - CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1952**


Conflict parties: *Muslims vs. Christians*  
Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict over subnational predominance between Muslims and Coptic Christians continued on a violent level. As in previous years, Coptic Christians, the largest non-Muslim minority, faced discriminatory government policies, political and economic marginalization, as well as sporadic violence, including through security forces. In response to a car bombing on

a Coptic church in Alexandria on January 1, leaving at least 21 people dead and approx. 100 injured, hundreds of Coptic protesters demanded more state protection. The protesters clashed with Muslim residents and security forces in the capital Cairo and Alexandria on January 1 and 2, respectively. The Muslim and Coptic opponents threw stones and bottles at each other as well as at security forces. Police fired tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters. On January 2, President Hosni Mubarak stated that the attack was directed at all Egyptians and pledged to track down the culprits. On March 5, approx. 4,000 Muslims attacked Christian homes and burnt a church in Soul, in Helwan governorate. Violent clashes between Muslims and Christians erupted again three days later in the outskirts of Cairo, after hundreds of Christian protesters had blocked a vital road. During the fighting, thirteen demonstrators died, 140 were wounded. According to Christian residents, Muslims attacked the rally with knives, sticks, and Molotov cocktails. The army allegedly fired on demonstrators and suppressed the clashes. In April, thousands of Muslims took part in demonstrations organized by Salafists, ultra-conservative Muslims, demonstrating in front of the Ministry of Defense, demanding the release of a woman who supposedly converted to Islam, allegedly held by the Coptic Church. In response, thousands of Christians staged a sit-in in front of the Saint Mark's Cathedral in Abbasseya, Cairo, on May 7, claiming to protect the church from Salafists. Later, a group of Muslims clashed with Copts, leaving two churches in Abbasseya burnt, at least thirteen persons dead, and more than 200 people injured. On May 14, Muslims shot at another sit-in in Cairo, killing two Christians and injuring 78. In June, a crowd of Muslims burnt down eight Christian homes in Awlad Khalaf, Asyut. In subsequent clashes, three Muslims were shot dead by Christians. In the capital, on October 9, several hundred Copts protested against a recent church attack in Aswan. At least 25 people were killed and more than 200 people injured when security forces tried to break up the demonstration. Protesters set army vehicles on fire.

skb

## EGYPT (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)



The system and national power conflict between several opposition groups and the government escalated to a highly violent level. The opposition consisted of several secular and religious groups, among those the Muslim Brotherhood. After the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), led by then-Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, took over power and thus became the new government.

Encouraged by protests in Tunisia, ten thousands of anti-Mubarak demonstrators clashed with police forces in the center of Cairo on January 25 [→ Tunisia (various opposition groups)].

In reaction, the government shut down Internet service nationwide and suspended mobile services in selected regions of the country. Throughout the country, protests continued on the following days and escalated into violent riots. On January 26, protesters threw petrol bombs at governmental buildings in Suez and the local office of Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP). Mubarak announced a curfew on January 28 after thousands of protestors had joined further demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, Mansoura, Suez and Aswan, calling for the President's dismissal from office.

On January 29, Chief of Intelligence Omar Suleiman was appointed the first vice-president under the rule of Mubarak. The Egyptian Museum had been plundered the previous night. On January 30, the Ministry of Information ordered the shut-down of the Arab satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera.

Since late January, Cairo's Tahrir Square became main site of increasing daily anti-government protests, including up to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, who repeatedly clashed with government supporters. The opponents used automatic rifles and petrol bombs. Military forces tried to separate opposing groups by deploying tanks and soldiers.

In response to ongoing violence throughout the country, the government made political concessions. On February 6, for instance, Suleiman held talks with secular opposition groups and independent legal experts, concerning a possible way out of the crisis. One day later, the government released Wael Ghanim, the previously arrested representative of the oppositional 6th of April movement. On February 10, Mubarak transferred power to Suleiman, yet ignoring calls for his own resignation. The next day, due to additional international pressure, Mubarak stepped down and handed over power to SCAF. On February 13, SCAF dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution. According to a government report, the nationwide death toll linked to protests between January 25 and February 11 reached 846, leaving more than 6,400 people injured.

Between April and July, protesters in Cairo and Suez repeatedly demanded an immediate trial of Mubarak, his family, and those government officials responsible for previous violent against the opposition movement. In the course of these occasionally violent demonstrations and their dispersion by police forces, at least two protesters were killed and thousands were injured. On April 16, the former ruling party NDP was dissolved by court order. The trial of Mubarak and his two sons Alaa and Gamal began in Cairo in August 3.

On March 7, the new government led by Tantawi was sworn into office. In response, pro-democracy activists criticized that the personnel continuity stagnated political transformation. In a constitutional referendum on March 19, Egyptians paved the way for new parliamentary and presidential elections within six months. On April 30, the formerly banned Muslim Brotherhood set up a new party, the Freedom and Justice Party. Under the pressure of continuous protests in Cairo and Alexandria throughout September and November, the Egyptian Cabinet tendered its resignation on November 23. In clashes between security forces and demonstrators throughout November, up to 40 people died and more than 100 people were injured.

Parliamentary elections started on November 28 with the last stage scheduled for January 2012. Further clashes between the military police and the civilian protesters left at least



seventeen people dead and more than 440 people injured between December 16 and 23. sep

## IRAN (PJAK / KURDISH AREAS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: **PJAK vs. government**

Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran between the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government escalated. PJAK was considered an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party [→Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas)]. In March, six members of the security forces were killed in several attacks in Kurdistan province. Deputy Interior Minister Ali Abdollahi blamed PJAK. On April 1, PJAK fighters attacked a police station, killing four border guards and injuring another three near Marivan, Kurdistan. Security forces killed four PJAK members. At the end of June, thousands of government troops launched an offensive against PJAK camps, including some on Iraqi territory. They deployed tanks, artillery, and helicopters in the border region. On June 26 and 27, twelve people were killed in clashes with PJAK fighters near the Iraqi village of Wiza, Erbil. The government claimed that its troops had killed more than 50 PJAK fighters and lost eight members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) by July 19. PJAK stated to have killed 108 IRGC members and injured another 200, while losing sixteen fighters. The following week, six members of IRGC were killed in clashes with PJAK members in Sardasht, West Azerbaijan province, including IRGC General Abbas Asemi. In August, PJAK leader Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi declared his organization's willingness to negotiate and lay down its weapons. The government halted its offensive during Ramadan and started it anew on September 2. The following day, the government stated that it had killed another 30 PJAK members, including senior commander Majid Kavian, and had injured 40 more, while two IRGC members had been killed. In contrast, PJAK declared that it had killed 76 government troops. On September 5, PJAK offered a ceasefire which was rejected by the government. The government demanded the complete withdrawal of PJAK forces from Iranian ground. According to international organizations, up to 900 families were displaced by Iranian shelling and found accommodation in camps in Erbil. mni, ba

## IRAN - USA, EU (NUCLEAR PROGRAM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: **Iran vs. USA, EU**


Conflict items: **international power**

The conflict between Iran, on the one hand, and the USA and the European Union (EU), on the other, centering on Iran's nuclear program, continued. Throughout the period of observation, the US and EU expanded their sanctions on Iran, while Iran constantly reaffirmed its willingness for talks. On 12/02/10,

Iran accused the UK, the US and Israeli intelligence services of the killing of nuclear scientist Majid Shahriyari [→Iran - Israel]. On 12/06/10 and 12/07/10, the first negotiations after one year between the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran yielded no results. On January 3, Iran invited several countries to inspect its nuclear facilities. The EU, the People's Republic of China, and Russia declined the offer. On January 8, Iran announced to produce its own fuel plates and rods for a nuclear research reactor. On January 21 and 22, talks between P5+1 and Iran continued without any results. On May 23, EU imposed further sanctions on Iranian companies and citizens. On June 7, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeated that his country would not stop uranium enrichment. On September 4, Iran announced that the first nuclear power plant in the city of Bushehr had started to produce electricity. On September 22, authorities early released two US hikers, previously sentenced to eight years in jail for spying. On October 10, the US accused Iran of having plotted the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to the US, a charge Iran denied. On November 8, the International Atomic Energy Agency published a report stating that Iran had worked and might still be working on the creation of nuclear weapons. The P5+1 expressed their concern and urged Iran to clarify the allegations. Iran declared that the intelligence was forged. On November 29, protesters stormed the UK embassy in Tehran and briefly detained six staff members. Iran expressed regret over the attack. The UN Security Council condemned the attack in the strongest terms. One day later, the UK pulled its diplomats out of Iran and ordered the immediate closure of the Iranian embassy in London. On December 8, Iran presented an unmanned US drone and stated that it had been downed while flying over Iranian territory. On December 27, Iran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, including the deployment of oil, if further sanctions would be imposed. Four days later, US President Barack Obama implemented sanctions against Iran targeting its financial sector. fk

## IRAQ (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**



Conflict parties: **AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920 Revolution Brigades, Sunni militant groups vs. government, Al-Sahwa militia**

Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and other various Sunni militant groups, on one side, and the government supported by the USA and the Sunni Sahwa militia, on the other, continued. Militant Sunnis perceived themselves as politically and economically marginalized and their religious views to be underrepresented in the political system and the predominantly Shiite government coalition. The US military support for the government ended in mid-December when the remaining 47,000 US troops withdrew from Iraq.

Last year's political impasse was resolved on 12/21/10 when the parliament approved Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's new government, which included representatives of all major factions. However, political tensions between Sunnis and Shiites intensified again in December, when Shiite al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, accusing him of supporting Sunni militant groups.

Almost 4,000 fatalities caused by militants were reported, constituting no improvement of the overall security situation as compared to 2010. On an almost daily basis, militants carried out assaults by means of bombs, suicide attacks or gunfire, targeting both civilians and security forces. Most attacks took place in the mainly Sunni provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, and Salah ad Din, as well as in Baghdad, where the highest number of attacks and casualties was reported. Official sources were occasionally ignorant as to the perpetrators, but most frequently blamed AQI, ISI, and affiliated Sunni militant groups.

Throughout the year, different Sunni militant groups carried out large-scale attacks against security forces and governmental institutions. On January 18, a suicide bomber killed some 60 people and wounded more than 100 in front of a police recruiting center in Tikrit, Salah ad Din. Officials blamed AQI-linked militants of having targeted men applying for jobs as police trainees. On March 29, assailants, equipped with explosive belts, hand grenades and guns, stormed the provincial council headquarters in Tikrit, took hostages and set off several car bombs, killing 58 and wounding 98. On May 5, alleged AQI members detonated a car bomb at a police building in Hilla, in Babil province, leaving more than twenty officers dead and 80 wounded. On June 21, two suicide car bombs killed at least 27 people, mostly police officers, in the governor's compound in Diwaniya, in al-Qadisiyyah province. On September 25, militants successively set off four bombs outside a government building in the city of Karbala, killing seventeen. Officials blamed AQI affiliates. Besides, targeted killings were widely conducted by Sunni militants. Assassinations of public figures as politicians, police commanders, and military leaders accounted for some twenty percent of the killings.


In addition to government-related targets, Sunni militant groups also attacked civilians. US and Iraqi officials repeatedly accused them of trying to delegitimize the political system and to ignite sectarian tensions by mainly targeting Shiites. On January 20, two major car bombs on Shiite pilgrim routes near Karbala killed at least 50 and injured more than 150. One week later, another car bomb killed 64 mourners at a funeral in a mainly Shiite area of Baghdad. The deadliest day of the year was August 15. Following an online voice recording in which AQI had stated that they were preparing a large-scale assault, 42 attacks were carried out all over the country. Car bombs, gunfire, and suicide bombings left some 100 people dead and more than 300 wounded. In the same month, ISI killed seven leaders of the moderate Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and distributed leaflets saying that executing members of this party was allowed everywhere. For instance, a bomb attack on a mosque targeted one of IIP's most prominent leaders and killed him and some 30 others on August 29. On September 12, alleged AQI members killed 22 Shiite pilgrims in an ambush near Rutba, al-Anbar. On October 28, militants set off two roadside bombs on a busy street in Baghdad's mainly

Shiite neighborhood of Ur, leaving some 30 dead and more than 100 wounded. During Shiite Ashura festivities in Hilla on December 5, militants killed 28 pilgrims with car and roadside bombs. On December 22, a series of coordinated bomb attacks in mainly Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad caused the death of more than 60 people and injured almost 200.

Furthermore, AQI and its affiliates continued its fight against the government-backed Sahwa militia, also known as Sons of Iraq or Awakening Councils. On August 15, AQI fighters stormed into a mosque in Yusufiya, near Baghdad, read aloud the names of seven Sahwa members, took them outside, and killed them in front of the mosque. On November 3, a suicide bomber attacked Sahwa members waiting to get their salary in front of the military headquarters in Baquba, Diyala, leaving six militants dead.

val

## ISRAEL (AL-FATAH - HAMAS)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: ***al-Fatah vs. Hamas***

Conflict items: ***system/ideology, subnational predominance***

The system and subnational predominance conflict between the secular Palestinian National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian territories further de-escalated. The conflicting parties intensified political and diplomatic cooperation, leaving aside questions concerning the strategy towards Israel. Throughout the year, different views regarding the power distribution in common state and security institutions hindered forming a unity government.

On February 2, Hamas ruled out its participation in municipal elections in the West Bank unless a unity deal with al-Fatah came into being. Thousands of demonstrators across the Palestinian territories demanded the restoration of national unity in February and March. On February 20, the Fatah-led Palestinian National Authority (PNA) declared its interest to form a national unity government. The rival factions held talks in Gaza on April 3 and signed a reconciliation document in Cairo on May 3, agreeing to form an interim government to supervise its implementation. On June 12, Hamas rejected al-Fatah's nomination of Salam Fayyad as prime minister. On October 20, Hamas rejected general elections prior to the full implementation of the Cairo agreement. Nevertheless, after meeting in Cairo on November 24, al-Fatah leader and PNA President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal agreed upon holding elections in May 2012. On December 2, Fayyad refrained from taking a high office in a future government. Two days later, representatives met for another round of talks, even though the conflict parties accused the respective other side of arresting their supporters in Gaza and the West Bank. At a summit in Cairo starting on December 20, the factions agreed inter alia that a unity government should be sworn in and political prisoners should be released by the end of January 2012. On December 22, a committee was formed to prepare for the inclusion of Hamas in the Fatah-led Palestinian Liberation Organization. However, by the end of the month, Hamas detained a Fatah member.

iv

## ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL. / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: *Hamas, PRC, PIJ, Army of Islam vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other Islamist militant groups operating in Gaza, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained highly violent. Throughout the year, Hamas and other militants repeatedly launched rocket attacks on the Southern District and the government carried out air strikes. On 12/18/10, Israel Air Force (IAF) killed five militants trying to launch rockets. On January 11, security forces killed Mohammed Najjar, a high-ranking Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative in Gaza. Nine days later, militants launched a mortar attack, killing one Israeli civilian. On March 15, the Navy seized a cargo vessel in the Mediterranean Sea allegedly carrying Iranian advanced weaponry, destined for Hamas and other groups in Gaza. As rocket fire continued throughout March, military forces launched their heaviest attacks since 2009, using tanks and aircraft, leaving 23 Palestinians dead. The first major terrorist attack in the city of Jerusalem since 2004 killed a British civilian and injured 50 others on March 23. While Hamas tried to restore a truce the next day, PIJ announced it would not abide by it if the government continued to attack Gaza. Heavy fighting resumed in April as militants fired over 130 mortar shells and subsequent clashes killed eighteen Palestinians in Gaza. Thus, the government and Hamas announced on April 10 their willingness for a ceasefire. On May 15, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired tank shells and several rounds from machine guns at border crossings in Gaza, when thousands of Palestinians marched towards Israeli troops, commemorating the 1948 Arab-Israeli War [→ Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories); Syria - Israel]. One Palestinian was killed and at least 80 injured. Affiliates of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) carried out a terrorist attack on August 18, killing eight Israelis and injuring dozens. In an attempt to pursue the perpetrators, IDF killed several leaders of PRC, at least fifteen civilians in Gaza, and three Egyptian security personnel. After several days of fighting, the conflict parties agreed on a ceasefire, but rocket fire and air strikes continued. Hamas and other factions rejected a plan issued by the Middle East Quartet for restarting negotiations on September 24. The militants stated that the plan neither called for a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem and the West Bank nor for an Israeli pullout from these areas to pre-1967 lines. On October 18 and November 18, the Israeli government released 1,100 Palestinians in a prisoner swap for soldier Gilad Shalit. On October 29, PIJ fired Grad rockets into the Southern District, killing one civilian and injuring four others. In a subsequent series of IAF strikes on key targets in Gaza, ten people were killed. Air strikes continued throughout November. On December 27, IAF bombed several targets to prevent cross-border attacks by Jihadists and killed a Palestinian linked to ultra-conservative Salafists, injuring twenty others [→ Israel (Hamas - various Salafist groups)]. Rocket fire,

as well as air strikes, continued and killed the leader of Islamist Army of Islam on December 30. *hl*

## ISRAEL (PNA / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: *Palestinian National Authority vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology, resources*

The conflict over the creation of a Palestinian state between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the government continued. On 12/01/10, Israel's Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman refused to freeze settlement building in the Palestinian territories. The USA vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the settlements as illegal on February 18, arguing that it would harm chances for peace talks. Since April, the government had approved the construction of at least 6,930 settler homes. On May 25, PNA President Mahmoud Abbas announced to unilaterally seek for UN membership, which was repeatedly rejected by government officials. On September 23, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called direct talks a necessary condition for Palestinian independence. Earlier that day, Abbas had applied for UN membership. In reaction to Palestine's admission to UNESCO, Israel froze transfers of tax and customs revenue to the PNA on November 1. On November 14, representatives of the Middle East Quartet met with both parties separately. Progress was not achieved, as PNA renewed its refusal to hold peace talks without a settlement freeze.

Throughout the year, Palestinian protests against the Israeli separation wall and the policy of land confiscation persisted in the West Bank and were repeatedly dispersed by Israel Defense Forces (IDF). On January 1, IDF fired tear gas at 1,000 protesters in Bil'in, fatally wounding one Palestinian. On May 15, another 1,000 demanded the right to return for refugees at the Qalandiya checkpoint. IDF injured 250 protesters with tear gas and rubber bullets, whereas Palestinians hurled stones and flares. On August 1, IDF conducted an arrest raid in the Qalandiya refugee camp. According to government sources, they shot dead two Palestinians after residents had injured five soldiers by throwing stones. Two days later, PNA denounced the operation, while the EU urged Israel to investigate the deaths. On December 9, IDF dispersed a protest in Nabi Saleh, killing one demonstrator. PNA spokesman Ghassan Khatib demanded to hold Israel responsible. *eol*

## JORDAN (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *IAF, Salafists, opposition groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology*


A new conflict erupted between opposition groups, including

the Islamic Action Front (IAF), Salafists, unemployed youths, and trade unionists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other.

The opposition demanded economic and political reforms, and an end to corruption. Encouraged by the Arab Spring protests, demonstrations started on January 14 and continued on a weekly basis throughout the year [→ Tunisia (various opposition groups) i.a.]. On January 28, for instance, 3,500 protesters gathered in the capital Amman and 2,500 in other cities. In the following weeks, King Abdullah II dissolved the government, replaced Prime Minister Samir Rifai with Marouf Bakhit, and announced his resolve to political and economic reform. Subsequently, the government revoked restrictions on public gatherings. Nevertheless, 5,000 people protested in Amman on February 25. Demonstrations turned violent for the first time on March 25. In clashes between 200 government supporters and 2,000 opponents in Amman, intervening riot police killed at least one protester. 120 were injured, including policemen. On April 15, government loyalists clashed with about 350 anti-government Salafists, some of whom were armed with swords, demonstrating for the release of 90 Islamist prisoners in the city of Zarqa. Security forces dispersed the crowd by using tear gas, leaving 91 people injured, 40 of them officers. On June 12, Abdullah II expressed his willingness to yield his power and to appoint prime ministers and cabinets to parliament. On July 15, policemen beat up about twenty people, mostly journalists covering a protest march, in Amman. Authorities announced an independent investigation and suspended four police officers. Abdullah II replaced Bakhit by Awn al-Khasawneh on October 17. On December 23, thousands of government supporters attacked about 300 Islamist protesters with rocks in the city of Mafraq, while police fired teargas at the opponents. In the course of the clashes, dozens were injured, IAF offices were set ablaze, and several shops destroyed.

asu

## LIBYA (OPPOSITION)



A war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government erupted. In the course of the Arab Spring protest, mass protests against the high level of state repression of Muammar Qaddafi's government started in February and subsequently turned into a highly violent conflict [→ Tunisia (various opposition groups) i.a.]. In response to the government's violent suppression of protests, anti-government groups established the National Transitional Council (NTC) as their leading board on February 27. Reports on the total number of casualties varied between 10,000 and 50,000 people, while the number of civilian deaths remained unknown.

In the first violent incident on February 16 at least four peo-

ple died in clashes between demonstrators and police in the cities of Benghazi and al-Bayda. The following week, an estimated 300 people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and government forces all over the country, most of them in the eastern province of Cyrenaica.

On February 23, armed opposition groups took control of several cities, among them Misrata and Zawiyah, resulting in a counterattack by government forces the other day, in which at least twenty were killed. In further battles on March 6, Qaddafi's troops recaptured Brega, Ras Lanuf and Zawiyah, pushing the rebels towards Benghazi. In Misrata more than 200 people were killed in heavy fights throughout March.

On March 17, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians, excluding foreign occupation troops on Libyan territory. Subsequently, US and European aircraft bombarded strategic sites of the government in Ajdabiyah, Misrata, and Tripoli between March 19 and 31. On March 31, NATO took control of the operation. After weeks of fighting, NTC forces, supported by NATO warplanes, gained control of Ajdabiyah on April 11. The same month, more than 300 people died in severe clashes in Misrata. On April 21, NTC fighters advanced to Yafran in the border region to Tunisia, sparking two weeks of highly violent clashes, which spilled over to Tunisian territory.

The following months, thousands of NTC fighters backed by NATO warplanes further advanced towards Tripoli, sparking heavy fights especially in the coastal towns of Brega, Misrata and Zlitan, as well as in Zintan. Throughout May and June, NTC fighters and government forces repeatedly clashed in the towns of Misrata and Zintan, leaving more than 80 people dead. Meanwhile, NATO continuously bombed Tripoli, killing at least 50 people and destroying several government depots, tanks, vehicles and helicopters. Between July 16 and August 22, almost 150 NTC fighters died in clashes in Brega. After heavy fights between August 1 and 19, NTC forces backed by NATO gained control of Zlitan, leaving more than 90 dead. In August, NTC forces seized control over the cities of Zawiyah, Bir al-Ghanam, Tawargha and Gharayan. On August 20, NTC fighters started the offensive on Tripoli and took over the city center three days later, leaving about 2,000 people dead. Nevertheless, sporadic clashes with the remaining government supporters persisted until the end of the year.

On August 24, NTC forces started to advance towards the last of Qaddafi's bastions in Bani Walid and Sirte. Five days later, Qaddafi's youngest son, Khamis, died in a heavy confrontation in nearby Bani Walid. On September 13, clashes in Sirte and Bani Walid left 20 casualties.

On September 16, UN recognized the NTC as the official government, constituting a change in the constellation of conflict actors. The same day, eleven government fighters died in clashes with Qaddafi supporters while advancing towards Sirte and Bani Walid. On October 3, NTC leaders announced their intention to resign as soon as the security situation was stabilized, in order to push forward the democratization process. On October 10, most of Sirte fell under the control of government forces after one week of intense fighting, leaving at least seventeen dead. On October 12, Qaddafi's son Muatassim was caught while trying to escape Sirte. On October 20, government forces gained control of the whole city of Bani Walid af-



ter launching a massive attack against the remaining Qaddafi supporters, among them Bakr Yunus Jabr, head of the former armed forces, who was killed in the fight. The same day, Qaddafi succumbed to his wounds after he was captured near Sirte.

Subsequently, NATO announced the end of its intervention in Libya on October 31. Later that day, Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril resigned and NTC appointed Abdurrahim el Keib as his successor. Tribal tensions became more present since Qaddafi's death. Consequently, the government sent delegates to specific areas to reconcile the tribes on November 11. On November 19, Qaddafi's son, Seif al-Islam, was arrested in Obari. On December 6, the government announced to disarm the population of Tripoli and dissolve brigades in several parts of the country by the end of the year. Nevertheless, clashes between Qaddafi loyalists and government forces, as well as between different tribes, were reported in November and December. Furthermore, protests against the NTC government arose in December.

yal, rl

## MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: **POLISARIO, indigenous Sahrawis vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict over the secession of Western Sahara between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) and parts of the indigenous Sahrawi population, on one side, and the government, on the other, continued. A new round of UN-brokered negotiations between POLISARIO and the government on January 21 did not reach agreement. On April 27, the UN Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate for another year. However, POLISARIO criticized UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's report to the Council, with regard to the MINURSO mandate not including a human rights agenda. Another round of unofficial negotiations ended in an impasse on July 21 as both sides continued to reject their respective proposals concerning future negotiations. In contrast to the government, which aimed to grant Western Sahara autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, POLISARIO insisted on a referendum in the Western Sahara including the option of independence. Nevertheless, the parties started discussions on education, environment, health, and natural resources and agreed on further talks later in the year. Violent clashes between Moroccans and local Sahrawis occurred, as well as looting on February 26 in Dakhla, Oued ed Dahab-Lagouira province. According to officials, the unrest left two Moroccans dead and fourteen others injured. An army official claimed that secessionists had taken advantage of the quarrel. Subsequently, Western Saharan activists took to the streets in order to call for an investigation. On September 27, groups of Moroccans and Sahrawis attacked each other with sticks and knives after a football match in Dakhla. Anti-riot police fired teargas to disperse the opponents and troops were deployed to restore order. At least 27 people were injured and seven people killed, including two security officials.

sel

## OMAN (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: **opposition movement vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology**


A violent conflict erupted between an opposition movement, demanding political and social reforms as well as an end to corruption, and the government. Encouraged by the Arab Spring protests, demonstrations started on January 17, as 200 citizens protested in the capital Muscat (→Tunisia (various opposition groups) i.a.). The number of protesters increased to 300 the following day. In response, the government raised the minimum wage on February 16. Two days later, about 800 protesters demanded democratic reforms, especially regarding legislative powers of the parliament. On February 26, Sultan Qaboos bin Said replaced six cabinet members. The same day, approx. 2,000 people protested in Sohar, al-Batina. The conflict turned violent for the first time on February 27 when another 2,000 demonstrators gathered in the same city. Protesters threw stones and set ablaze a government building and cars. Some demonstrators tried to storm a police station. Security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and batons, killing at least two protesters. On March 1, up to 300 protesters blocked a main route in the city and the access to a bridge. Army forces intervened with tanks and fired warning shots, driving demonstrators apart. In the course of another demonstration one month later, some 400 protesters attacked security forces with stones and knives, while police used tear gas, water cannon, batons and rubber bullets. At least one protester was killed, eight were injured, and approx. 50 were arrested. Several thousand demonstrated in Salalah, Zufar, on April 22. Throughout the following months, the number of demonstrations decreased significantly.

Between March and May, security forces arrested hundreds of protesters, most of whom were later pardoned. However, at least 55 protesters were sentenced to prison terms. The government met demands for social reform by stabilizing prices for commodities and services on August 16. Moreover, it created thousands of jobs in the public sector. In October, Qaboos granted the elected chamber of the parliament the right to propose bills and more competences to control ministers.

sul

## SYRIA (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**



Conflict parties: **various opposition groups vs. government**  
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

A war over national power and the orientation of the political system broke out between extra-parliamentary oppositional groups, led by the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) consisting of defected soldiers, on the



one hand, and the government of President Bashar al-Assad, on the other. According to the UN and human rights groups, government forces killed more than 5,000 civilians and army defectors, injured several thousand and temporarily detained up to 69,000. The government blamed foreign agents and extremists for causing the unrest and killing over 2,000 security forces. Throughout the year, approx. 20,000 Syrians fled to Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan while tens of thousands were internally displaced. Foreign media was ejected from Syria in late April, making the independent verification of most reports difficult.

Encouraged by the Arab Spring protests, smaller demonstrations started in Damascus in February [→Tunisia (various opposition groups), i.a.]. First massive protests occurred in Deraa, sparked by the arrest of fifteen school children for anti-regime graffiti on March 6. Throughout the year, hundreds of thousands took part in weekly demonstrations in Syria's main cities. Security forces dispersed most protests using tear gas and live ammunition. In March, up to 42 demonstrators were killed in Latakia and Homs alone. Subsequently, authorities conducted mass arrests, overnight raids, assaults, and sieges on towns, causing a shift from initial calls for democratic reform to demands for regime change. On April 25 for instance, security forces stormed Deraa with at least 140 tanks, heavy artillery, and machine guns, leaving over 85 civilians and eight soldiers dead by May 6. Additionally, authorities cut electricity and communication lines. In May, over 20,000 soldiers, backed by helicopters and tanks, attacked and besieged numerous localities, including Banyas, Homs, Talkalakh, and Rastan, killing almost 100 civilians. Over 22,000 residents fled. On June 3, security forces fired on a crowd in Hama, killing at least 70 people. After anti-government protests involving about 400,000 people, government forces besieged the town on July 3. Troops backed by tanks stormed Hama on July 31, killing approx. 300 people in the following days. In the first week of August, tank assaults killed at least 70 civilians in Deir al-Zor, while thousands were internally displaced. As of August 13, security forces, supported by tanks and gunboats, attacked Latakia, killing about 30 civilians and forcing up to 10,000 to flee. After weeks of violence against demonstrators, defections from security forces and clashes between loyalist forces and defectors had increased in Idlib and other regions since June. On June 4, 120 security agents were killed in Jisr al-Shughour, reportedly in the course of a mutiny. Ensuing clashes between government forces and alleged deserters left at least 42 civilians and several security agents dead and resulted in thousands of refugees. On June 12, at least 15,000 troops took control of the town with 40 tanks. Thereafter, thousands of troops supported by several hundred tanks and anti-aircraft guns launched repeated attacks on suspected deserter strongholds across the country. On July 11, security forces stormed and besieged large parts of Homs. Clashes between troops and about 100 defectors left at least 50 people dead. Between September and December, over 60 civilians, sixteen defectors and over 38 soldiers were killed in clashes in Rastan, Zabadani, and several southern cities. In a massive campaign including heavy bombardment in Idlib starting on December 17, security forces killed approx. 320 people, among them soldiers who attempted to flee their positions. Since November, deserters repeatedly attacked checkpoints

and convoys with heavy weaponry, killing dozens of security agents in the governorates Idlib, Hama, and Homs. In a first attack in Damascus, FSA members fired shoulder-mounted rockets and machine-guns at an Air Force Intelligence complex on November 16.

On October 9, violence spilled over the Syrian border, as dozens of protesters attacked several Syrian embassies in Europe. In pursuit of dissidents, Syrian military forces entered Lebanese territory on multiple occasions and killed three Syrians on October 18. Under heavy domestic and international pressure, Assad made political concessions. He replaced the cabinet on March 29 and lifted the emergency law on April 21. On July 24, the new cabinet adopted a draft law allowing a multiparty system. Despite ongoing violence and calls for boycott by opposition groups, local elections were held on December 12, observed for the first time by judicial officers. Many countries took a supportive stance towards the opposition, calling for an end to violence, deeper political reform, and finally for regime change in August. Since April, US and EU had imposed mainly economic sanctions and a weapons embargo. On October 4, Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the crackdown, but international pressure continued. Since July, Syria's relations with several Arab States and Turkey had deteriorated. The Arab League (AL) suspended Syria's membership on November 12, and imposed economic sanctions on November 27.

On December 19, the government signed an AL initiative, demanding an end of violence, the withdrawal of troops, the release of political prisoners, and dialog with the opposition. Three days later, first AL observers arrived in Syria to monitor the deal's implementation, which most opposition groups dismissed. Despite the agreement, security forces again besieged Homs the same day, killing scores of civilians. *mki, mass*

## SYRIA - ISRAEL

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: **Syria vs. Israel**  
Conflict items: **territory, international power**

The conflict between Syria and Israel over international power and the Golan Heights occupied by Israel escalated because of violent border incidents. In February, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposed a plan to restart negotiations with Syria, initiated by the chairman of the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. On May 15, about 4,000 mostly Palestinian refugees protested at the border, being tolerated and supervised by Syrian authorities, to commemorate the displacement of Palestinians after the founding of Israel in 1948. As 300 protesters crossed the ceasefire line and managed to break through the Technical Fence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) used tear gas and opened fire to disperse the crowd and shot four protesters dead. Both countries agreed in principle that UNDOF should investigate the incident. On June 5, the anniversary of the 1967 Six-Day-War, a crowd of 500 mostly Palestinian demonstrators gathered again in the border area and attempted to cross the ceasefire line at several points. According to UNDOF, IDF used tear gas and live ammunition to deter

protesters and prevent them from crossing. Several anti-tank mines exploded due to a firebomb-induced brush fire. Syria stated that eighteen protesters had been killed by Israeli gunfire. According to Israel, however, ten people had been killed solely due to the brush fire. On June 6, Syrian Health Minister Wael Al Halki accused IDF of being responsible for further injuring 350 protesters, whereas Israel stated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad allowed demonstrations to divert attention from the domestic conflict [→ Syria (opposition)]. In order to prevent further infiltrations, IDF planted additional anti-personnel mines along the Golan Heights border in August. *cg*

## TUNISIA (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2010**


Conflict parties: *various opposition groups vs. government*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

A new conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system arose between various opposition groups and the government. Protests against poor living standards, police violence and for political reform started in mid-December 2010. Quickly increasing in size to thousands of participants all over the country, the demonstrations encouraged similar protests in other countries of the region, known as Arab Spring. Security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the demonstrations. In December 2010 and January 2011, at least 147 citizens were killed and more than 500 injured during clashes between demonstrators and security forces. After the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 12/17/10 in the city of Sidi Bouzid, local demonstrations against arbitrary treatment by authorities started. The protests spread to neighboring villages and police forces killed two demonstrators on 12/24/10 in Menzel Bouzaïene, Sidi Bouzid province. Rallies further disseminated all over the country and reached the capital Tunis on 12/27/10. Up to 50 protesters had been killed in Kasserine province in clashes with security forces by January 11, when military forces were deployed in major cities. Several policemen were also injured, as demonstrators threw stones and petrol bombs at them. On January 12 and 13, at least 16 protesters were killed by security forces all over the country. The same day, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali announced the reduction of food prices, ordered the security forces to stop using firearms against demonstrators and promised political reforms. Amid further protests and violent clashes, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14. Shops were looted, buildings set on fire and random drive-by shootings took place in Tunis the night of Ben Ali's flight. Subsequently, soldiers and tanks were deployed to restore security. On January 15, at least 60 prisoners were killed during riots in two prisons in Monastir province. Parliamentary Speaker Fouad Mebazaa became acting president, and Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi announced a new government on January 17. It included members of Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party, as well as members of opposition parties and the Tunisian General Labor Union. Demonstrations with thousands of participants ensued, who de-

manded elections and the resignation of all RCD government members. Ghannouchi dismissed the RCD members on January 27. Following further violent protests of tens of thousands of demonstrators, which left at least three dead and more than 100 injured in Tunis, Ghannouchi resigned on February 27 and was succeeded by Beji Caid Essebsi. On March 9, the RCD was dissolved. Demonstrations significantly decreased in frequency and size. However, they sporadically turned violent in the following months. Between May 8 and 10, authorities arrested about 200 demonstrators after clashes with security forces in Tunis. In June, former president Ben Ali was sentenced in absentia to 51 years in prison for theft and corruption. On July 15, demonstrators all over the country demanded the prosecution of those responsible for the killings during the turmoils. Two days later, a civilian was killed by a stray bullet during a protest in Sidi Bouzid, after demonstrators threw petrol bombs at the police. Another civilian died in Sbeitla, Kasserine, and four protesters were injured on September 2. On October 23, Islamist Ennahda party won 89 out of 217 seats in the constituent assembly and declared a coalition with center-left seculars of Ettakatol party and the Congress for the Republic (CPR). After the constituent assembly adopted a provisional constitution, Moncef Marzouki, CPR member and previously exiled opposition leader, was elected president on December 12. *sag*

## TURKEY (PKK / KURDISH AREAS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1974**



Conflict parties: *PKK vs. government*  
Conflict items: *autonomy*

The conflict over autonomy between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the government escalated to a war when the military started large-scale operations in the border region to Iraq in August. Throughout the year, the government accused various Kurdish political organizations, as the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the banned Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), of supporting PKK.

In the general elections on June 12, BDP won 6.6 percent of the votes. Six of the elected BDP representatives were suspected to be members of the PKK-linked KCK. Subsequently, the Supreme Election Committee banned one BDP representative, Hatip Dicle, from parliament on June 22. In protest of this, BDP representatives refused to take their oath in parliament until October 1. Up to 50,000 pro-Kurdish protesters demanded Dicle's admission to the parliament and clashed with police in major cities on June 23. Between June and December, police arrested 4,500 alleged KCK and BDP members on charges of supporting PKK.

On February 28, PKK ended its ceasefire, which it had declared on 08/13/10, and killed at least 24 soldiers and policemen in several attacks by July. In the largest attack since October 2008, PKK fighters killed thirteen soldiers in the southeastern province of Diyarbakir on July 14. According to government sources, the clash left seven others injured and

seven PKK members dead. In contrast, PKK claimed the death of twenty soldiers and two of its own fighters. The same day, the Democratic Society Congress, a platform of Kurdish non-government organizations, declared autonomy for predominantly Kurdish areas, in Diyarbakir. Coinciding with partly violent anti-Kurdish protests in several cities, security forces conducted a major offensive, deploying hundreds of elite soldiers, warplanes, and helicopter gunships to Diyarbakir on July 15.

On August 17, the military launched large-scale operations against PKK in northern Iraq, involving some 10,000 soldiers, heavy artillery, and more than a dozen F-16 warplanes [→ Turkey - Iraq]. The government claimed to have killed up to 100 PKK fighters during the first week of the attacks, hitting 349 targets with artillery fire and 132 targets by the Air Force in the Kandil Mountains, as well as in the regions of Khakurk, Avasin-Basyan, and Zap. According to the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government, seven civilians were killed on August 21. The government rejected those claims. On August 29, BDP politician Yildirim Ayhan was killed in a demonstration against air strikes, violently dispersed by security forces in Hakkari province. On October 10, parliament extended authorization for security forces to carry out air strikes and cross-border attacks against PKK.

Security forces had killed more than 250 PKK militants, wounded some 200, and destroyed numerous PKK bases and arsenals since August 17. Between August and November, PKK killed at least 61 people, including thirteen civilians in numerous attacks in the southeast provinces of Van, Bitlis, Hakkari, Osmaniye, Tunceli, Bingöl, Siirt, Diyarbakir, Batman, and Sirnak. For instance, some 100 PKK fighters attacked seven outposts of the military in Hakkari, killing 24 soldiers and wounding eighteen, on October 19. A week later, combat aircraft hit PKK targets in northern Iraq and some 500 soldiers crossed the border with armored vehicles. In the border region to Iraq, the Air Force killed 35 smugglers, who they took for PKK militants on December 28. Two days later, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan admitted mistakes in the operation and expressed his regret.

vs

## YEMEN (AL-HOUSHI REBELS - SUNNI TRIBAL FORCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces*  
Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

A new conflict over subnational predominance erupted between the Shiite al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces, including members of the Islamist Islah party and Salafist militants. Al-Houthi rebels clashed with tribal forces and Salafist militants as both tried to expand their control over Northern provinces. Furthermore, al-Houthi members repeatedly accused the Salafists of receiving support from neighboring Saudi Arabia and criticized them for building military camps in the border region [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)]. The Salafist militants claimed that al-Houthi rebels aimed at increasing Shiite influence in Yemen [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)].


After tribal forces had seized Al Jawf province in March

from government troops, they clashed with al-Houthi fighters on June 1, leaving at least five tribesmen dead. As al-Houthi fighters refused to give up a military base in the province on July 8, clashes ensued with Islah-allied tribal forces in the following weeks. At least 110 people had been killed and 139 injured by July 30, when the opponents agreed on a cease-fire and Islah member Sheikh Hussein Al-Thaneen became governor of Al Jawf.

Salafists assaulted an al-Houthi supporter in October, sparking further clashes. On November 14 and 15, seven people were killed in clashes between al-Houthi rebels and fighters affiliated with the Joint Meeting Parties, an umbrella organization of various opposition groups including Islah, in Al Jawf. On November 26, al-Houthi fighters attacked Damaj, Saada province, controlled by Salafist militants. Up to 32 people were killed and 48 injured the next two days. In an al-Houthi attack on a religious school in the city, on November 30, another 26 people were wounded. A total of 85 people died in clashes in November. Fighting for the city continued throughout the following month. For instance, fourteen Salafist militants and al-Houthi fighters were killed on December 8 and 9. Another fourteen people were killed in clashes between al-Houthi rebels and tribesmen on December 19 and 20. One week later, Islah supporters clashed with al-Houthi members in the capital Sanaa, injuring 20 people. Throughout December, at least 60 Salafist militants were killed in clashes with al-Houthi rebels in Saada.

fhö, ba

## YEMEN (AQAP, ANSAR AL-SHARIA)



Conflict parties: *AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government, tribal forces*  
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government supported by the USA, on the other, escalated to a war. The government stated that Ansar al-Sharia was the Yemeni wing of al-Qaeda. The militants mainly operated in Abyan province. After government troops had left southern provinces at the beginning of the year for the capital Sanaa, Ansar al-Sharia militants gradually seized control of large parts of Abyan, including its capital Zinjibar. Government troops launched an offensive to regain the city in July, sparking heavy clashes lasting until the end of the year. At least 500 people were killed in the fight for Zinjibar. Approx. 100,000 people fled Abyan since May, most of them to Aden province. AQAP suicide bombings and US drone attacks on the group's leaders continued. Opposition leaders accused President Ali Abdullah Saleh of deliberately surrendering areas to prove his inalienability [→ Yemen (various opposition groups)].

After government forces had withdrawn from Jaar, Abyan province, Ansar al-Sharia militants took control of the city on

March 28. Starting there, they launched an offensive on Zinjibar. Some 300 fighters of Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP seized control of the city on May 27. Heavy clashes with government forces ensued, causing 30,000 inhabitants to flee the city. Three days later, fighter jets bombed the city, killing thirteen people. On June 11, government forces killed eighteen fighters in Zinjibar and three in Lawdar, Abyan, while reporting ten own casualties. On June 22, government troops supported by air force killed up to fifteen militants near Zinjibar. In fights over a stadium used as a military base outside the city, at least 31 soldiers and nineteen militants were killed on June 29 and 30. On July 5, two soldiers, 40 militants, and ten civilians were slain in Zinjibar, while an airstrike killed four in Jaar. On July 16, the government deployed 500 additional troops to Zinjibar. The same day, security forces attacked the city with tanks, supported by some 450 allied tribesmen and US logistics. At least 20 militants and two soldiers were killed. The 25th brigade complained of lacking support by the government. On July 24, in the course of an AQAP attack on a military camp outside Zinjibar, soldiers killed ten militants. Ansar al-Sharia took control of Shaqra, Abyan, on August 17, facing little resistance. At least six soldiers and twenty militants were killed as troops seized areas near Zinjibar on August 28. The same day, two war planes bombed Zinjibar and Shaqra, killing several people. On September 15 and 16, air strikes took out further thirteen militants and one soldier in Zinjibar. On October 2, clashes in the city left 15 militants and 13 soldiers dead. On October 15, the government stated Egyptian national Ibrahim al-Banna, a senior AQAP member, was killed in an air strike along with 23 other people near Azzan, Shabwa province. The same day, a crucial gas pipeline was blown up, temporarily halting gas exports. Ansar al-Sharia claimed responsibility for the attack, denounced US drone attacks and denied al-Banna's death. On November 12, eleven militants, including senior Ansar al-Sharia member Naif al-Wahtani, were killed in clashes with government forces and allied tribesmen. Between November 21 and 24, security forces killed 28 militants in artillery attacks near Zinjibar, and nine alleged AQAP members in Mudiya, Abyan. In December, at least 57 people were killed in air strikes and clashes between government forces and militants in Abyan. On December 31, in Aden, 20,000 protesters demanded an end to violence.

AQAP continued to carry out bomb attacks, targeting particularly officials in the city of Aden. For instance, an alleged AQAP suicide bomber killed nine soldiers and wounded 21 in the city on July 24, in an attack on a military convoy destined to Zinjibar. On October 28, the head of anti-terror police in Aden province was killed by a car bomb. Two further suicide attacks killed at least nine tribesmen in Mudiya on August 21.

Throughout the year, the US used drones and air strikes against senior AQAP members. For example, high-ranking Anwar al-Awlaki was killed by a drone strike on September 30, after a failed attempt on May 5. Another drone attack killed Abdulrahman al-Wuhayshi in Zinjibar, a relative of AQAP leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi, on December 23.

*ba, cf*

## YEMEN (VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS)



Conflict parties: *various opposition groups vs. government*  
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

A war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government erupted. The opposition consisted of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), including the Islamist Islah party, the Yemeni Youth Movement, tribal forces, and defected troops. Hundreds of thousands demonstrated against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as widespread poverty, crime, and corruption, encouraged by the Arab Spring protests [→Tunisia (various opposition groups) i. a.]. More than 1,600 people were killed and thousands injured on all sides. Although Saleh repeatedly signaled his willingness to resign, he remained in office.

After authorities had temporarily detained Tawakul Karman, member of the main opposition party Islah on January 23, thousands of people protested in the capital Sanaa, calling for political and social reforms and the resignation of Saleh. Police used water cannon, teargas, and batons to disperse the protests. Saleh announced on February 2 to leave office after the next presidential elections in 2013. Subsequently, daily protests spread throughout the country and increased in size to tens of thousands, demanding his immediate resignation. Security forces shot and killed at least 25 protesters by mid-March. On March 18, at least 52 demonstrators were killed by security personnel and government supporters in a sniper attack in Sanaa. In reaction, several government officials resigned and troops defected, including major General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar and large parts of his forces. In the following week, dozens were killed and hundreds were injured as security forces repeatedly fired on demonstrators. On April 13, a violent encounter between government troops and forces loyal to Ali Mohsin left six dead. On May 22, Saleh refused to sign a deal for the transition of power brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The next day, at least 38 people were killed in fights between security forces and troops of Islah leader and head of the Hashid tribal federation, Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar. The following week, at least 200 people were killed in clashes between government troops and al-Ahmar's tribal forces in Sanaa. The military used heavy artillery to regain buildings occupied by the tribesmen. Another twenty people were killed as hundreds of soldiers stormed a protest camp in the city of Taiz with tanks. On June 3, a mortar shell hit the presidential estate and injured Saleh, who left for Saudi Arabia to seek medical treatment. Vice-President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi took over as acting president the following day. From June to August, demonstrations with up to hundreds of thousands of participants continued in the provinces of Sanaa city, Taiz, Aden, and Ibb, as well as fights between Saleh's supporters and opponents, including tribal forces. On September 18, government troops used anti-aircraft guns to disperse a



demonstration of tens of thousands in Sanaa, leaving 30 protesters dead and dozens injured. The next day, at least 22 people were killed and more than 350 wounded during fights between government troops and tribal forces as well as defected troops of Ali Mohsin in the capital. After Saleh had returned on September 23, demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants ensued. In further clashes, 40 people, mainly protesters, were killed. On September 25, a government official stated that approx. 1,500 civilians and security forces had been killed since February. In October, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets every week. Between October 15 and 18, security forces repeatedly opened fire at demonstrators and clashed with defected troops flanking the protests in Sanaa. Simultaneously, they confronted tribal forces who used mortars and anti-aircraft missiles in other parts of the city. At least 43 people were killed. On October 21 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014, which demanded an end of violence and the signing of the GCC initiative. Four days later, up to 25 civilians, government soldiers and tribal fighters were killed in Sanaa and Taiz. On November 23, Saleh signed a GCC-brokered deal to transfer power to al-Hadi, granting himself immunity from prosecution. JMP signed the deal. In the following weeks, thousands of demonstrators demanded Saleh to be put on trial. Between December 1 and 4, at least nineteen people were killed in battles between opposition fighters and troops loyal to Saleh deploying artillery and tanks in Taiz. On December 7, a unity government, headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Baswinda and including both members of Saleh's General People's Congress and the JMP, assumed office. On December 18, Ali Mohsin declared to back the November 23 agreement and withdrew his forces from the capital. Nevertheless, protests with thousands of participants against the new government continued as well as fights between government troops and tribal forces.

*dad, ba*



## METHODOLOGY

Since 1991, quantitative conflict research at the HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties of war. Thus, the HIIK is particularly concerned with the concrete actions and communications between conflict parties. Such a process-oriented approach gives the analysis of political conflicts, especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Beginning in 2011, the HIIK in cooperation with the Conflict Information System (CONIS) research group – established in 2005 and likewise located at Heidelberg University – has taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. In particular, the institute has revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now not only takes into account the intensity for a given conflict area in a given year, but determines the intensity of the conflict processes for subnational political units and months as well. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the conflict actions and communications, on which the intensity assessment is based, are now evaluated by combining qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the means and consequences of a conflict. This is intended to further enhance exactitude, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.


According to the revised definition, a political conflict is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society (the conflict items), between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so. A conflict actor is either an individual, a state, an international

to the conflict item.

Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict actors. Examples may include elections and court proceedings. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure. Core state functions encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A state function or the international order is threatened if its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikely in a conflict actor's point of view.

Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. Due to the character of conflict measures, conflict items attain relevance for the society as a whole – either for coexistence within a given state or between states. This aspect constitutes the genuinely political dimension of political conflicts. The catalog of conflict items in use up to the present Conflict Barometer covers ten different items. Ideology/system is encoded if a conflict actor aspires a change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime type itself. National power means the power to govern a state. Whereas autonomy refers to attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence, secession refers to the aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, decolonization aims at the independence of a dependent territory. Subnational predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population. The item resources is encoded if the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued. Territory means a change of the course of an international border, while international power as an item describes the change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state. The item other is used as residual category.

In addition to the three constituting elements – conflict actors, measures, and items – conflict intensity is an essential feature of political conflicts. A conflict intensity is an attribute of the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflict in a geographical area and a given space of time. Since 2003, the HIIK has been using a five-level model of conflict intensity.



*The concept of political conflict and its attributes*

organization or a non-state actor. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining

| Intensity Level | Previous Terminology | Terminology since 2011 | Level of Violence     | Intensity Class  |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1               | latent conflict      | dispute                | non-violent conflicts | low intensity    |
| 2               | manifest conflict    | non-violent crisis     |                       |                  |
| 3               | crisis               | violent crisis         | violent conflicts     | medium intensity |
| 4               | serious crisis       | limited war            |                       | high intensity   |
| 5               | war                  | war                    |                       |                  |

*The terminology of intensity levels*

Under its revised methodology, the intensity levels are now known as dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war. The last three constitute the category of violent conflicts, in contrast to the non-violent conflicts (dispute and non-violent crisis). Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violent crisis one of the actors is threatened with violence.

In measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used indicating the conflict means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and personnel, the dimension of consequences the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees. For every region-month observed – i.e. for every calendar month in every first-level subnational political unit – each of these indicators is assessed and given a score. In order to determine the respective region-month intensity, the five values are aggregated.

Combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies, the following concrete steps are taken when assessing the conflict intensities: First, the institute's conflict observer evaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it was used. A catalog of keywords helps to distinguish light from heavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon's employment. Second, the observer identifies the conflict measure of an analyzed region-month in which the highest number of personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishes between low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 20 and 60 persons killed. Fourth, the amount of destruction resulting from the conflict is determined in four dimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure, accommodation, economy, and culture. Last, the conflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-border

refugees and internally displaced persons in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees. The region-month intensities can be aggregated to inform about the conflict intensity in a given calendar year in a specific conflict area. A conflict area is the sum of all subnational units affected by the violent conflict in question. The area-year intensity is basically equal to the maximum region-month intensity in a given area-year. In addition, the exact area-year intensity is fine-tuned by looking at the annual and area-wide numbers of casualties and refugees as the two core indicators of conflict assessment. A violent crisis can thereby be upgraded to limited war level if there were more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war can be upgraded to war level if there were more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000 refugees. In contrast, a limited war can be downgraded to a violent crisis if there were less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees. Likewise, a war can be downgraded to limited war level if there were less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees.

The revised methodology of the HIIK and CONIS enables a detailed analysis of conflict dynamics. In contrast to other conflict methodologies, the Heidelberg approach rests on a broad empirical basis. The number of conflict-related deaths is not excluded from the analysis, but is just one indicator among several. This aims at increasing the validity of the data obtained. The specified set of indicators guides the institute's conflict observers through the research process, improving reliability and reproducibility of the data. The theoretical disaggregation of the concepts of political conflict and conflict intensity, the multitude of indicators included, as well as the differentiated evaluation at the subnational and monthly levels, allow for a detailed observation, collection, and analysis of non-violent and violent political conflicts worldwide.

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## DATABASE CONIS

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The data on which the Conflict Barometer is based has been collected and processed in cooperation between the HIIK and the CONIS Group, using news archives and other open sources.

The CONIS database comprises information on all forms of inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today. With more than 12,000 conflict-year data, it aims at under-

standing the dynamics of violent and non-violent conflicts worldwide. CONIS was developed on the basis of the Conflict Simulation Model (COSIMO) database in the course of two research projects at Heidelberg University, co-financed by the European Union and in collaboration with the HIIK.

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
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## VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2011 ON SUBNATIONAL LEVEL



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT  
CRISIS  
LIMITED WAR  
WAR





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